CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DENUCLEARIZATION OF NORTH KOREA

Ultimately, the successful denuclearization of North Korea will likely require the following conditions as a minimum:

 

·      Kim Jong Un’s commitment to denuclearization and his ability to actualize such a policy within the DPRK without opposition.  This is not as simple as it appears.  The DPRK has invested heavily in its nuclear weapons programs, and presumably, there are interest groups within national security and military-industrial organs who could oppose giving up weapons.  While it appears that Kim Jong Un has control over party and military structure (any opposition appears to have not fared too well so far) the possibility nevertheless exists of the emergence of serious opposition to actual denuclearization

·      South Korean commitment not to alter or destabilize political structure of DPRK,

-       No direct or indirect challenges to regime legitimacy and political structure

-       North Korea will likely evolve into Chinese-style communism, i.e., closed political structure with open economy

-       Human rights to be overlooked for a time.  China can help North Korea in this regard.  Not likely to be a problem for South Korea itself

·      DPRK’s need for South Korean and American investment and technology to develop its mineral resources and economy, which will not be forthcoming unless the country agrees to denuclearize.  The value of these golden carrots must be seen in context of Kim Jong Un’s speech before the 7^th Korean Worker’s Party Congress from May 6 to May 9, 2016, after a 36-year hiatus.  Frank Ruediger of the University of Vienna most appropriately titled the Congress “A Return to a New Normal.”[1]  In his speech:

Kim Jong Un refrained from following the typical socialist fallacy of promoting producer goods over consumer goods. Rather, he emphasized the need for a balanced development of the sectors of the national economy. In fact, he even sounded slightly critical of past economic policies when he stressed that past investments, which were mainly in the economy’s foundations, need to translate into actual improvements of the people’s lives. Developmental economists will feel reminded of the debate between supporters of balanced and unbalanced growth in the 1960s. Once again, we see that many of North Korea’s problems are far from unique.[2]

·      China’s determination to ensure a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula, and willingness to cooperate with the United States, North Korea and South Korea in pursuit of that goal,

·      Security guarantee to DPRK provided by the United States, China, and perhaps Russia.  In Kazakhstan’s case, security assurances were provided by Permanent Five (P-5) states of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC)[3],

-       Will likely require an iron-clad guarantee and some security mechanism as remedy for a breach thereof

-       May require US to remove forces from South Korea as a security guarantee to North.  On the other hand, Soviets agreed to German unification without requiring unified Germany withdrawal from NATO

·      The personal involvement of senior-level policy officials on all sides, and

·      U.S. technical and financial assistance through the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to support the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure and expand the scope of U.S.-DPRK relations.  While originally “created for the purpose of securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in the former states of the Soviet Union … CTR assistance has expanded to non-Soviet countries such as the South Asia region, Iraq, Afghanistan, China, and African nations such as Djibouti, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda.” [4]  The CTR provides a credible and time-tested mechanism for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

·      As was the case in Kazakhstan, it will be Kim Jong Un’s “support for, and ability to lead the political process without domestic opposition”[5], as well as his ability to implement the process that will be keys to successful denuclearization. 

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[1] Frank Ruediger, The 7th Party Congress in North Korea: A Return to a New Normal,  38 North (May 20, 2016) http://www.38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016/ accessed on September 10, 2016.

[2] Reudiger, Id.

[3] Dena Sholk, The Denuclearization of Kazakhstan (1991-1995), Georgetown University INAD 912, April 30, 2013; https://isd.georgetown.edu/sites/isd/files/JFD_Sholk_Denuclearization.pdf (accessed on January 8, 2017), p. 3

[4] Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,  June 1, 2014;

 https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-program/  accessed April 10, 2018.

[5] Sholk, p. 3.

Dirge for America's Long Wars and Future Wars

A plain without a feature, bare and brown,
   No blade of grass, no sign of neighborhood,
Nothing to eat and nowhere to sit down,
   Yet, congregated on its blankness, stood
   An unintelligible multitude,
A million eyes, a million boots in line,
Without expression, waiting for a sign.

Out of the air a voice without a face
   Proved by statistics that some cause was just
In tones as dry and level as the place:
   No one was cheered and nothing was discussed;
   Column by column in a cloud of dust
They marched away enduring a belief
Whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to grief.

From 'The Shield of Achilles' by W. H. Auden

Some Comments to 'We Fail Better' Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military

Re October 20, 2015 Foreign Policy podcast 

The E.R.: ‘We Fail Better’ Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military  David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake, and Tom Ricks wrestle with America's recent legacy in the Middle East and what's broken with the last superpower's armed forces.   

In the podcast, among other things, Tom Ricks said that he disagreed with exit strategy requirement of the [General Colin] Powell Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine provides that:

Military force used as last resort

Clear-cut military objective

We can measure that the military objective has been reached (end state)

Military force should be use in overwhelming fashion

The Powell Doctrine was subsequently renounced by the Clinton. For example, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin concluded that such constraint would limit the military usefulness in “achieving policy objectives”. It “could lead to the military becoming like nuclear weapons in the Cold War - important, but not useful”.   Successive administrations concurred.

ISSUE

Isn’t an exit strategy exactly what is necessary to determine whether a military objective has been reached, the end state?    

Discussion

Von Clausewitz observed that:

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration.  Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.  Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92.

Sun Tzu illustrates the consequences of failure:

Victory is the main object in war.  If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 3.

When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.  (The Art of War, Book II, Par. 4)

Hence, what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.  And therefore the general who understands war is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 21.

Gulf Conflict.  The Powell Doctrine was given full effect during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; and it was a great success militarily and its clearly stated and limited political objectives:  Iraq must get out of Kuwait—nothing more was required of Saddam Hussein.  Politically, some argue that it was a failure because we did not pursue the Iraqi Army into Iraq proper; thus allowed Saddam Hussein to survive and requiring our greater effort at a later date.   In responding to the issue, I defer to Clausewitz: 

Modifying Condition 3:  In War the Result is Never Final

 Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final.  The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.  It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80.

The fact remains that this was a very successful American military operation the likes of which have not been repeated since—as the podcast discussion clearly addressed.

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The Iraq and Afghan wars share that common trait that they’re largely “expeditionary military operations in hostile territories.”  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision:  America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p. 67

Moreover, we could not formulate an end state (much less an exit strategy) because we did not, and still do not, understand the complexity of the environment.  As a result, the Bush as well as the Obama administrations have been unable formulate realistic military and political objectives.

“In both cases, the Bush [and the Obama] administration showed little regard for the complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts within conflicts, dangerously unsettled regional neighborhoods (especially involving Pakistan and Iran), and the unresolved territorial disputes, al of which severely complicated US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and ignited wider regional anti-American passions.”  (Id.)

CONCLUSION

The Powell Doctrine needs to be reexamined in light of our largely unsuccessful expeditionary military operations into areas where our vital interests are clearly not involved. 

Role and Place of Ideological Struggle in Modern Warfare

1)     The stability of troop morale depends on the conviction of the rank-and-file masses as to the just nature of the war in which they sacrifice their lives.  If they recognize the cause for which they struggle to be just, they fight with enthusiasm.  (‘The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow, 1972), p. 207; translated under the auspices of the US Air Force).  Lenin:  “[C]onviction as to the justness of war and recognitions of the need to sacrifice one’s life for the good of one’s brothers elevates the spirit of soldiers and forces them to endure unheard of burdens.” (Phil. Her., p. 207). 

In contrast.  The bourgeoisie attempts to pass off its own mercenary interests as the interest of all the people.  The problem is to reveal to the soldiers and the entire populace of a given country the criminal goals of the bourgeois government and incite the masses to refuse to be accomplices of the crime.  (Phil. Her., p. 207). 

[COMMENT] In the fight against ISIS and derivatives thereof, US armed forces probably suffer from a lack of ideological conviction as to the justness or importance of the fight.  ISIS on the other hand is a poster child for the above statement.  Politically, it recruits from disaffected Muslims and foreign fighters who do not share the West’s value systems or its aspirations.

2)     Lenin—Revolutionary deeds are performed by millions of individuals at a moment of special upsurge and exertion of all human capabilities, when all their consciousness, will, enthusiasm and fantasy are mobilized… their extensive _____ possesses proletarian instinct, proletarian comprehension and awareness of duty.” (Phil. Her., p. 188). [COMMENT:  ISIS – religion]  “The spiritual capability of revolutionary masses to stand and win in a savage clash with the class enemy is based on the profoundly just character of the struggle being wages by the proletariat and its army.  We can wage war because the masses know what they are fighting for …”  Imperialist armies lack this source.  (Phil. Her., p. 188).   

[COMMENT]  The above observation is the bottom line of why ISIS / derivatives are winning —they are in their  own neighborhoods and the US armed forces are far from home and without real focus, e.g., ‘Why we fight’ series in Word War Two.  Slogans like ‘fighting for democracy’ are just as bland and useless as were Soviet calls for proletarian sentiment.  But the theory and observations stated above correctly assess the issue.  In 2015, ISIS bases its appeal on religion and Muslim victimization. 

3)     It’s not so much that ISIS achieves military objectives – it achieves political objectives. Under a chapter titled ‘Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat’ Col. Harry Summers recalls a conversation in Hanoi 1975, ““You know you never defeated us on the battlefield” said the American Colonel.  The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark for a moment. “That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.”  (On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Presidio Press, 1982), p. 1.). US does not have a resonant message to which local population can relate or rally to.  Add to this the view of US as supporter and patron of Israel – anything or anyone we support is suspect.

4)     Even a strong will which is not enlightened by elevated communist ideals [or religious, ideological fervor, etc.] may become a counterfeit jewel, for will without principles or ideals is blind.  (Phil. Her., p. 189).  [US armed forces in 2015 with respect to fight against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, etc.?]

 

 

Why is the United States involved in conflicts in which it does not understand and / or fully appreciate the internal dynamics and motivators of the different players?  The fact is that not everyone in the world thinks like Americans, nor share the same views as to what is in their best interests nor share the same aspirations in a specific sense.  Even if they do to an extent, the means to achieve these objectives may be completely at odds with the American views. 

            Moral forces in war provide legitimacy to the struggle.