Showing posts with label syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label syria. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 21, 2015

Some Comments to 'We Fail Better' Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military


Re October 20, 2015 Foreign Policy podcast 
The E.R.: ‘We Fail Better’ Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military  David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake, and Tom Ricks wrestle with America's recent legacy in the Middle East and what's broken with the last superpower's armed forces.   
In the podcast, among other things, Tom Ricks said that he disagreed with exit strategy requirement of the [General Colin] Powell Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine provides that:
Military force used as last resort
Clear-cut military objective
We can measure that the military objective has been reached (end state)
Military force should be use in overwhelming fashion
The Powell Doctrine was subsequently renounced by the Clinton. For example, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin concluded that such constraint would limit the military usefulness in “achieving policy objectives”. It “could lead to the military becoming like nuclear weapons in the Cold War - important, but not useful”.   Successive administrations concurred.
ISSUE
Isn’t an exit strategy exactly what is necessary to determine whether a military objective has been reached, the end state?    
Discussion
Von Clausewitz observed that:
Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration.  Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.  Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92.
Sun Tzu illustrates the consequences of failure:
Victory is the main object in war.  If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 3.
When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.  (The Art of War, Book II, Par. 4)
Hence, what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.  And therefore the general who understands war is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 21.
Gulf Conflict.  The Powell Doctrine was given full effect during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; and it was a great success militarily and its clearly stated and limited political objectives:  Iraq must get out of Kuwait—nothing more was required of Saddam Hussein.  Politically, some argue that it was a failure because we did not pursue the Iraqi Army into Iraq proper; thus allowed Saddam Hussein to survive and requiring our greater effort at a later date.   In responding to the issue, I defer to Clausewitz: 
Modifying Condition 3:  In War the Result is Never Final
 Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final.  The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.  It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80.
The fact remains that this was a very successful American military operation the likes of which have not been repeated since—as the podcast discussion clearly addressed.
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The Iraq and Afghan wars share that common trait that they’re largely “expeditionary military operations in hostile territories.”  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision:  America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p. 67
Moreover, we could not formulate an end state (much less an exit strategy) because we did not, and still do not, understand the complexity of the environment.  As a result, the Bush as well as the Obama administrations have been unable formulate realistic military and political objectives.
“In both cases, the Bush [and the Obama] administration showed little regard for the complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts within conflicts, dangerously unsettled regional neighborhoods (especially involving Pakistan and Iran), and the unresolved territorial disputes, al of which severely complicated US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and ignited wider regional anti-American passions.”  (Id.)
CONCLUSION
The Powell Doctrine needs to be reexamined in light of our largely unsuccessful expeditionary military operations into areas where our vital interests are clearly not involved. 

Sunday, September 6, 2015

Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism


Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism  -- Sources    


This list is but a small sampling of sources that suggest Saudi Arabia's support for terrorist organizations.  I will update the list periodically.

Please feel free to add sources in the comments section:


  1. Ahmed Rashid, Descent to Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York:  Viking, 2008)
  2. Lori Plotkin Boghardt, ‘Saudi Funding of ISIS’, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 2275, June 23, 2014
  3. Josh Rogin, ‘America’s Allies are Funding ISIS’, The Daily Beast, June 14, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/america-s-allies-are-funding-isis.html
  4. Steve Clemons, 'Thank God for the Saudis': ISIS, Iraq, and the Lessons of Blowback’, The Atlantic, June 23, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-saudi-arabia-iraq-syria-bandar/373181/
  5. Salim Mansur, ‘ISIS, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the West’, Gatestone Institute, June 14, 2015, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5956/isis-saudi-arabia-iran
  6. Vicky Nanjappa, ‘Why Does Saudi Arabia Support the ISIS?’, oneindia, June 29, 2015  http://www.oneindia.com/feature/why-does-saudi-arabia-fund-the-isis-1791158.html
  7. Michael Stephens, ‘Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support?, BBC News, September 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253
  8. Patrick Cockburn, ‘Iraq crisis: How Saudi Arabia helped Isis take over the north of the country’, The Independent, July 13, 2014. [Cockburn was former MI-6 boss] http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/iraq-crisis-how-saudi-arabia-helped-isis-take-over-the-north-of-the-country-9602312.html
  9. Joshua Keating, ‘Why the Iraq Mess Is So Awkward for Saudi Arabia’, Slate, June 13, 2014, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/06/16/the_saudis_helped_create_a_monster_they_can_t_control_in_iraq.html
  10. Kim Sengupta, ‘Turkey and Saudi Arabia alarm the West by backing Islamist extremists the Americans had bombed in Syria’, The Independent, May 12, 2015 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-antiassad-jihadists-10242747.html
  11. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Our Radical Islamic BFF, Saudi Arabia’ New York Times, September 2, 2015
  12. Ben Norton,  Saudi Arabia funds and exports Islamic extremism: The truth behind the toxic U.S. relationship with the theocratic monarchy,  Salon, January 6, 2016 http://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/saudi_arabia_funds_and_exports_islamic_extremism_the_truth_behind_the_toxic_u_s_relationship_with_the_theocratic_nation/
  13. Ishaan Tharoor, 'The Saudi Origins of Belgium's Islamist Threat', The Washington Post, March 23, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/23/the-roots-of-belgiums-islamist-threat-reach-back-to-saudi-arabia/

Sunday, August 2, 2015

War as Continuation of Politics: For Whose Benefit?


The Soviets were great writers on military affairs.  The United States Air Force translated a number of Soviet military works under the series Soviet Military Thought. 

One interesting volume is ‘The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow, 1972). 
The authors expand Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’:  Precisely because all wars are, and each given war is, a continuation of politics, they are essentially not only identical but are also profoundly disparate from one another, and frequently complete opposites.  This occurs because the political content of war is determined by the social character of the classes waging it, their political goals and a number of other concretely historical conditions. (p. 25).

[COMMENT]  This is important because particularly in the US, the classes who direct the wars do not fight them directly – volunteer soldiers – no direct impact upon classes who direct and benefit from the country being at war.  Could a disconnect emerge between policy makers and those who fight our wars?  As most Americans do not / have not served in the armed forces, is the civil-military disconnect deeper within American society?  Soldiers are “Heroes” – paid in kudos and acclaim to keep military happy.  Now with decreasing benefits, will military remain subservient? 

[COMMENT]  For example, the problem with the Syrian civil war is the socio-economic and political conditions of the initial stages of the war, that is, the opponents of President Assad versus government forces was changed essentially by the advent of ISIS Daesh, transforming it from a just war against an oppressive government to Assad’s just war against a worse and more unjust threat.  The justice of the cause is from the point of view of the eye of the beholder.  The Syrian civil was whose character was that of a just war, became an unjust war because ISIS is worse threat.  The US and its ‘allies’ [joke] have fought or opposed Assad and Iran.  This is a fact.  But where, when, and who denied utilization of Assad and Iran by US in order to demoralize / destroy the common enemy, ISIS (Daesh)?
Militarism.  As a weapon serving the ruling classes to crush all (political and economic) movements.  (p. 65).  [COMMENT]  Why do we fight these wars?  Follow the money, i.e., whose interests are being advanced?  Who benefits from these wars?  Certainly not the US or the US taxpayers?  So far (2015) the ‘war on terror’ has cost 5K deaths / $2T and we’re still there.  How can our political leaders continue to advocate and pursue ill-defined, ambiguous goals and unwinnable wars?  Are we just mercenaries or cannon fodder for sinister interests that are manipulating us?  Our national security and interests are not threatened so why are we involved in conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia?  What are we doing there? 
Are we really military adventurists the Soviets accused us of being?  These are basic questions but seem apropos to our actions post-Soviet Union—or even before.  We invaded Grenada in 1983, Lebanon 1983, Panama 1988; Gulf War 1990-91; Haiti, 1994; Somalia 1992; Bosnia 1994-95; Afghanistan 2001; Iraq 2003; Lybia 2011; Syria 2014.  What are we doing?  Is our economic system, capitalism, the cause of war?  Is war a method of resolving antagonistic conflicts based on “private ownership relations?”  (E.g., p. 72).  Are wars for the profit of the 1% at the expense of the rest of us?  Is war class based in the United States—for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many?  Are our interventions another form of exploitation? (E.g., p. 72). 

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Role and Place of Ideological Struggle in Modern Warfare


1)     The stability of troop morale depends on the conviction of the rank-and-file masses as to the just nature of the war in which they sacrifice their lives.  If they recognize the cause for which they struggle to be just, they fight with enthusiasm.  (‘The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow, 1972), p. 207; translated under the auspices of the US Air Force).  Lenin:  “[C]onviction as to the justness of war and recognitions of the need to sacrifice one’s life for the good of one’s brothers elevates the spirit of soldiers and forces them to endure unheard of burdens.” (Phil. Her., p. 207). 

In contrast.  The bourgeoisie attempts to pass off its own mercenary interests as the interest of all the people.  The problem is to reveal to the soldiers and the entire populace of a given country the criminal goals of the bourgeois government and incite the masses to refuse to be accomplices of the crime.  (Phil. Her., p. 207). 
[COMMENT] In the fight against ISIS and derivatives thereof, US armed forces probably suffer from a lack of ideological conviction as to the justness or importance of the fight.  ISIS on the other hand is a poster child for the above statement.  Politically, it recruits from disaffected Muslims and foreign fighters who do not share the West’s value systems or its aspirations.
2)     Lenin—Revolutionary deeds are performed by millions of individuals at a moment of special upsurge and exertion of all human capabilities, when all their consciousness, will, enthusiasm and fantasy are mobilized… their extensive _____ possesses proletarian instinct, proletarian comprehension and awareness of duty.” (Phil. Her., p. 188). [COMMENT:  ISIS – religion]  “The spiritual capability of revolutionary masses to stand and win in a savage clash with the class enemy is based on the profoundly just character of the struggle being wages by the proletariat and its army.  We can wage war because the masses know what they are fighting for …”  Imperialist armies lack this source.  (Phil. Her., p. 188).   
[COMMENT]  The above observation is the bottom line of why ISIS / derivatives are winning —they are in their  own neighborhoods and the US armed forces are far from home and without real focus, e.g., ‘Why we fight’ series in Word War Two.  Slogans like ‘fighting for democracy’ are just as bland and useless as were Soviet calls for proletarian sentiment.  But the theory and observations stated above correctly assess the issue.  In 2015, ISIS bases its appeal on religion and Muslim victimization. 
3)     It’s not so much that ISIS achieves military objectives – it achieves political objectives. Under a chapter titled ‘Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat’ Col. Harry Summers recalls a conversation in Hanoi 1975, ““You know you never defeated us on the battlefield” said the American Colonel.  The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark for a moment. “That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.”  (On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Presidio Press, 1982), p. 1.). US does not have a resonant message to which local population can relate or rally to.  Add to this the view of US as supporter and patron of Israel – anything or anyone we support is suspect.

4)     Even a strong will which is not enlightened by elevated communist ideals [or religious, ideological fervor, etc.] may become a counterfeit jewel, for will without principles or ideals is blind.  (Phil. Her., p. 189).  [US armed forces in 2015 with respect to fight against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, etc.?]
 
 
Why is the United States involved in conflicts in which it does not understand and / or fully appreciate the internal dynamics and motivators of the different players?  The fact is that not everyone in the world thinks like Americans, nor share the same views as to what is in their best interests nor share the same aspirations in a specific sense.  Even if they do to an extent, the means to achieve these objectives may be completely at odds with the American views. 
            Moral forces in war provide legitimacy to the struggle.
 

Saturday, August 24, 2013

Do Not Get Involved in Syria

Regardless of the nobility of our motives, or of ghastly pictures shown each night on television, we must be extremely wary of becoming involved militarily in conflicts where the hatreds run deep, in societies where, traditionally, political accommodation is non-existent.  This is not to say that we should ignore conflict, but we must be prepared to use the other instruments of national power, i.e., the political, economic, and diplomatic to help to terminate it.  However we should keep in mind what the eminent political philosopher, Hans Morgenthau, has observed:
      
       Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies;
      they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success
      of the policies they inspire. What is important to know, is not
      the motives of the statesman, but his intellectual ability to
      comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his po-
      litical ability to translate what he has comprehended into suc-
      cessful political action.[i] 

In 1994-1995, I was a student at the US Army's Command and General Staff College.  There, a former senior United Nations representative in Sarajevo told the class during a presentation on the Balkan Wars that Bosnian Government officials, as well as Bosnian Serb officials, both wanted US forces on the ground immediately.  They wanted this so they could immediately start killing American troops, thereby getting the US involved in the conflict on "their side".  Clearly a protracted war such as the one being waged in Syria is the last type of conflict we want to become engaged in.   

In fact, a SOF helicopter pilot who ferried Syrian troops during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm said  a Syrian soldier told him he would rather be killing Americans than Iraqis.  We do not need to get involved there.

STAY OUT OF SYRIA!
Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret).





[i].  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p.6.

Friday, August 23, 2013

A Small Contribution to US Diplomacy


While in the U. S. Air Force I flew B-52 bombers; I was an electronic warfare officer. But given my Russian language skills [not very good but passable in aviation terminology], among other interesting things that I did, I had an additional duty of flying on Soviet diplomatic flights as an additional navigator.  Whenever official Soviet aircraft entered the US, we required that an American Air Force representative accompany the crew to ensure their compliance with American aviation rules.  That was the official version.  The real reason was that the Soviets used to impose the same requirements on us, so it was a tit-for-tat.  I have over 75 hours of ‘additional navigator’ time in IL-76s and TU-154s.

On July 1989 I flew my first mission as a “Штурман [shturman or navigator].” I was accompanied by another more experienced senior officer, who was showing me “the ropes”.  Our mission was to escort an IL-76 that was on an international expedition to the Antarctica safely through American airspace.  Our duties began in Minneapolis, Minnesota and would end in Havana, Cuba.  Soviet flights would typically recover in Cuba as they had a large maintenance and repair facility there.  As I am a native Spanish speaker, I was doubly valuable because although we had more capable Russian speakers than yours truly, I was the only one that spoke Spanish—a useful skill when in Cuba.

We had official U. S. Passports with Cuban entry visas obtained through the Cuban Embassy to the UN.  After we cleared the Ministry of Interior inspection at Jose Marti Airport, we boarded a taxi.  We were both in civilian suits and I sat in the front of the taxi next to the driver. 

It was a Monday morning and the people of Havana were going to work.  At some point in the drive to the hotel, we got behind a bus.  It was crammed with people and they all seemed to have grim looks.  Some of the people in the back of the bus began glaring at us; one young man with a mustache seemed particularly unfriendly. 

For some reason, I instinctively stuck my arm out of the taxi and waved at them.  To my surprise, everyone broke out into a smile including the young man that had seemed so grim before.  People are people.

Little things matter, even in diplomacy...