Open Letter to President Trump Calling for Indian Troops to Afghanistan

Dear President Trump:

I've been reading Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" in conjunction with Robert S. McNamara's 1995 memoir, In Retrospect. As a retired military officer, I can say with  certainty that the military hasn't learned the lessons of Vietnam..."More troops" and "More troops" is not the answer to every problem; and our diplomatic initiatives are tepid and ineffective at best.

I believe that the end state in Afghanistan requires a bit of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy to wake the Pakistanis up. We cannot solve the problems there if Pakistan is both our ally and enemy. Consequently, it is time to give the Pakistanis electro-shock therapy and scare the hell out of them by invoking their worst nightmare.

Since Pakistan appears unable and/or unwilling to curtail Al Qaeda/Taliban military activities within its territory which are directed at American/NATO troops in Aghanistan, I urge you to request for the introduction of Indian troops into Afghanistan to ensure that no more attacks are carried from Pakistan into Afghanistan. An Indian Western Theater of Operations ought to be created composed of at least 240,000 Indian troops (the number of troops that US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told the US Senate in 2002 that would be required to stabilize Iraq and the number of troops Admiral Mullen would love to have there) whose mission is to stabilize Afghanistan through a two-front strategy against Pakistan. I believe that India would be open to provide this kind of military assistance to the United States and NATO forces if India was asked.

India is the only regional power with the military forces capable of doing this. The anvil of India & Kashmir to the east of Pakistan against the hammer of an Indian Western Theater Army presents Pakistan with a two-front strategic problem--which Pakistan is wholly incapable of dealing with with. In a nutshell, Pakistan's worst nightmare.

The United States clearly has the capacity to provide the Indians with the logistics support necessary to move and sustain such a force. Consequently, it must do so. India is poised politically and militarily to bring stability into this region which Pakistan has been unable and/or unwilling to do so.

If Pakistan is unable to curtail outside activities within its borders, then India can ensure that there will be no interference from these forces in Afghanistan. As the world’s largest democracy and an economy that is of increasing importance to the United States, India’s power is central to the calculus of stability in the region.

India has supported Afghani administrations in the past, and will bear the brunt of a resurgent Islam if the Taliban triumphs in Afghanistan. Such result will lead to serious instability in the region particularly given Pakistan’s own instability in the face of Islamic fundamentalism.

Moreover, unlike the United States, the Pakistanis know that India will not leave the region. Consequently, for Pakistan, the die is cast: Either get your house in order or India with the support of the United States will do it for you.

In 1971, Nixon and Kissinger used China against the Soviet Union and China used the United States against the Soviet Union. Likewise, in 2017 the United States should use India against Pakistan and India will use the US against Pakistan.

It is time to ante up the stakes in the region and a robust diplomatic effort combined with ongoing military operations inside Afghanistan will make the Pakistanis realize that a stable Afghanistan even under American tutalege is better that an Afghanistan that is home of 300,000 Indian troops--who do not like the Pakistanis and their extremist allies.


Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.)
Lincoln Hills, California

Dirge for America's Long Wars and Future Wars

A plain without a feature, bare and brown,
   No blade of grass, no sign of neighborhood,
Nothing to eat and nowhere to sit down,
   Yet, congregated on its blankness, stood
   An unintelligible multitude,
A million eyes, a million boots in line,
Without expression, waiting for a sign.

Out of the air a voice without a face
   Proved by statistics that some cause was just
In tones as dry and level as the place:
   No one was cheered and nothing was discussed;
   Column by column in a cloud of dust
They marched away enduring a belief
Whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to grief.

From 'The Shield of Achilles' by W. H. Auden

Some Comments to 'We Fail Better' Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military

Re October 20, 2015 Foreign Policy podcast 

The E.R.: ‘We Fail Better’ Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military  David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake, and Tom Ricks wrestle with America's recent legacy in the Middle East and what's broken with the last superpower's armed forces.   

In the podcast, among other things, Tom Ricks said that he disagreed with exit strategy requirement of the [General Colin] Powell Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine provides that:

Military force used as last resort

Clear-cut military objective

We can measure that the military objective has been reached (end state)

Military force should be use in overwhelming fashion

The Powell Doctrine was subsequently renounced by the Clinton. For example, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin concluded that such constraint would limit the military usefulness in “achieving policy objectives”. It “could lead to the military becoming like nuclear weapons in the Cold War - important, but not useful”.   Successive administrations concurred.

ISSUE

Isn’t an exit strategy exactly what is necessary to determine whether a military objective has been reached, the end state?    

Discussion

Von Clausewitz observed that:

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration.  Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.  Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92.

Sun Tzu illustrates the consequences of failure:

Victory is the main object in war.  If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 3.

When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.  (The Art of War, Book II, Par. 4)

Hence, what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.  And therefore the general who understands war is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 21.

Gulf Conflict.  The Powell Doctrine was given full effect during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; and it was a great success militarily and its clearly stated and limited political objectives:  Iraq must get out of Kuwait—nothing more was required of Saddam Hussein.  Politically, some argue that it was a failure because we did not pursue the Iraqi Army into Iraq proper; thus allowed Saddam Hussein to survive and requiring our greater effort at a later date.   In responding to the issue, I defer to Clausewitz: 

Modifying Condition 3:  In War the Result is Never Final

 Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final.  The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.  It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80.

The fact remains that this was a very successful American military operation the likes of which have not been repeated since—as the podcast discussion clearly addressed.

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The Iraq and Afghan wars share that common trait that they’re largely “expeditionary military operations in hostile territories.”  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision:  America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p. 67

Moreover, we could not formulate an end state (much less an exit strategy) because we did not, and still do not, understand the complexity of the environment.  As a result, the Bush as well as the Obama administrations have been unable formulate realistic military and political objectives.

“In both cases, the Bush [and the Obama] administration showed little regard for the complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts within conflicts, dangerously unsettled regional neighborhoods (especially involving Pakistan and Iran), and the unresolved territorial disputes, al of which severely complicated US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and ignited wider regional anti-American passions.”  (Id.)

CONCLUSION

The Powell Doctrine needs to be reexamined in light of our largely unsuccessful expeditionary military operations into areas where our vital interests are clearly not involved. 

Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism

Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism  -- Sources    

This list is but a small sampling of sources that suggest Saudi Arabia's support for terrorist organizations.  I will update the list periodically.

Please feel free to add sources in the comments section:

1. Ahmed Rashid, Descent to Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York:  Viking, 2008)
2. Lori Plotkin Boghardt, ‘Saudi Funding of ISIS’, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 2275, June 23, 2014
3. Josh Rogin, ‘America’s Allies are Funding ISIS’, The Daily Beast, June 14, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/america-s-allies-are-funding-isis.html
4. Steve Clemons, 'Thank God for the Saudis': ISIS, Iraq, and the Lessons of Blowback’, The Atlantic, June 23, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-saudi-arabia-iraq-syria-bandar/373181/
5. Salim Mansur, ‘ISIS, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the West’, Gatestone Institute, June 14, 2015, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5956/isis-saudi-arabia-iran
6. Vicky Nanjappa, ‘Why Does Saudi Arabia Support the ISIS?’, oneindia, June 29, 2015  http://www.oneindia.com/feature/why-does-saudi-arabia-fund-the-isis-1791158.html
7. Michael Stephens, ‘Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support?, BBC News, September 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253
8. Patrick Cockburn, ‘Iraq crisis: How Saudi Arabia helped Isis take over the north of the country’, The Independent, July 13, 2014. [Cockburn was former MI-6 boss] http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/iraq-crisis-how-saudi-arabia-helped-isis-take-over-the-north-of-the-country-9602312.html
9. Joshua Keating, ‘Why the Iraq Mess Is So Awkward for Saudi Arabia’, Slate, June 13, 2014, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/06/16/the_saudis_helped_create_a_monster_they_can_t_control_in_iraq.html
10. Kim Sengupta, ‘Turkey and Saudi Arabia alarm the West by backing Islamist extremists the Americans had bombed in Syria’, The Independent, May 12, 2015 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-antiassad-jihadists-10242747.html
11. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Our Radical Islamic BFF, Saudi Arabia’ New York Times, September 2, 2015
12. Ben Norton,  Saudi Arabia funds and exports Islamic extremism: The truth behind the toxic U.S. relationship with the theocratic monarchy,  Salon, January 6, 2016 http://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/saudi_arabia_funds_and_exports_islamic_extremism_the_truth_behind_the_toxic_u_s_relationship_with_the_theocratic_nation/
13. Ishaan Tharoor, 'The Saudi Origins of Belgium's Islamist Threat', The Washington Post, March 23, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/23/the-roots-of-belgiums-islamist-threat-reach-back-to-saudi-arabia/

Hammer and Anvil -- Indian Force Projections in AFPAK

As the world’s largest democracy and an economy that is of increasing importance to the United States, India’s power is central to the calculus of stability in the region.

An Indian deployment in Afghanistan projects a two-front threat to Pakistan... the eastern anvil of Kashmir and India itself and a western hammer of Indian forces in Afghanistan that can project Indian power against Pakistan in an easterly direction.

India has supported President Karzai in the past, and will bear the brunt of a resurgent Islam if the Taliban triumphs in Afghanistan. Such result will lead to serious instability in the region particularly given Pakistan’s own instability in the face of Islamic fundamentalism.

Moreover, unlike the United States, the Pakistanis know that India will not leave the region. Consequently, for Pakistan, the die is cast: Either get your house in order or India with the support of the United States will do it for you.