Dear President Trump:
I've been reading Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" in conjunction with Robert S. McNamara's 1995 memoir, In Retrospect. As a retired military officer, I can say with certainty that the military hasn't learned the lessons of Vietnam..."More troops" and "More troops" is not the answer to every problem; and our diplomatic initiatives are tepid and ineffective at best.
I believe that the end state in Afghanistan requires a bit of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy to wake the Pakistanis up. We cannot solve the problems there if Pakistan is both our ally and enemy. Consequently, it is time to give the Pakistanis electro-shock therapy and scare the hell out of them by invoking their worst nightmare.
Since Pakistan appears unable and/or unwilling to curtail Al Qaeda/Taliban military activities within its territory which are directed at American/NATO troops in Aghanistan, I urge you to request for the introduction of Indian troops into Afghanistan to ensure that no more attacks are carried from Pakistan into Afghanistan. An Indian Western Theater of Operations ought to be created composed of at least 240,000 Indian troops (the number of troops that US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told the US Senate in 2002 that would be required to stabilize Iraq and the number of troops Admiral Mullen would love to have there) whose mission is to stabilize Afghanistan through a two-front strategy against Pakistan. I believe that India would be open to provide this kind of military assistance to the United States and NATO forces if India was asked.
India is the only regional power with the military forces capable of doing this. The anvil of India & Kashmir to the east of Pakistan against the hammer of an Indian Western Theater Army presents Pakistan with a two-front strategic problem--which Pakistan is wholly incapable of dealing with with. In a nutshell, Pakistan's worst nightmare.
The United States clearly has the capacity to provide the Indians with the logistics support necessary to move and sustain such a force. Consequently, it must do so. India is poised politically and militarily to bring stability into this region which Pakistan has been unable and/or unwilling to do so.
If Pakistan is unable to curtail outside activities within its borders, then India can ensure that there will be no interference from these forces in Afghanistan. As the world’s largest democracy and an economy that is of increasing importance to the United States, India’s power is central to the calculus of stability in the region.
India has supported Afghani administrations in the past, and will bear the brunt of a resurgent Islam if the Taliban triumphs in Afghanistan. Such result will lead to serious instability in the region particularly given Pakistan’s own instability in the face of Islamic fundamentalism.
Moreover, unlike the United States, the Pakistanis know that India will not leave the region. Consequently, for Pakistan, the die is cast: Either get your house in order or India with the support of the United States will do it for you.
In 1971, Nixon and Kissinger used China against the Soviet Union and China used the United States against the Soviet Union. Likewise, in 2017 the United States should use India against Pakistan and India will use the US against Pakistan.
It is time to ante up the stakes in the region and a robust diplomatic effort combined with ongoing military operations inside Afghanistan will make the Pakistanis realize that a stable Afghanistan even under American tutalege is better that an Afghanistan that is home of 300,000 Indian troops--who do not like the Pakistanis and their extremist allies.
Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.)
Lincoln Hills, California
Showing posts with label War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War. Show all posts
Monday, August 21, 2017
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
Some Comments to 'We Fail Better' Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military
Re
October 20, 2015 Foreign Policy podcast
The
E.R.: ‘We Fail Better’ Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake, and
Tom Ricks wrestle with America's recent legacy in the Middle East and what's
broken with the last superpower's armed forces.
In
the podcast, among other things, Tom Ricks said that he disagreed with exit strategy
requirement of the [General Colin] Powell Doctrine. The Powell Doctrine provides that:
Military force used as last
resort
Clear-cut military objective
We can measure that the
military objective has been reached (end state)
Military force should be use
in overwhelming fashion
The Powell Doctrine was subsequently
renounced by the Clinton
ISSUE
Isn’t
an exit strategy exactly what is necessary to determine whether a military
objective has been reached, the end state?
Discussion
Von Clausewitz observed
that:
Since war
is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object,
the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the
value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must
follow. Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92.
Sun Tzu illustrates the consequences of
failure:
Victory is
the main object in war. If this is long
delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength
will be exhausted. The Art of War, Book
II, Par. 3.
When the
army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not
suffice. (The Art of War, Book II, Par.
4)
Hence,
what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations. And therefore the general who understands war
is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny. The Art of War, Book II, Par. 21.
Gulf Conflict. The Powell Doctrine was given full effect
during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; and it was a great success militarily and its
clearly stated and limited political objectives: Iraq
must get out of Kuwait Iraq
Modifying
Condition 3: In War the Result is Never
Final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is
not always to be regarded as final. The
defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for
which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later
date. It is obvious how this, too, can
slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. Book One, Chapter One, § 9,
p. 80.
The fact
remains that this was a very successful American military operation the likes
of which have not been repeated since—as the podcast discussion clearly
addressed.
Moreover,
we could not formulate an end state (much less an exit strategy) because we did
not, and still do not, understand the complexity of the environment. As a result, the Bush as well as the Obama
administrations have been unable formulate realistic military and political
objectives.
“In both
cases, the Bush [and the Obama] administration showed little regard for the
complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts
within conflicts, dangerously unsettled regional neighborhoods (especially
involving Pakistan and Iran), and the unresolved territorial disputes, al of
which severely complicated US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and ignited wider
regional anti-American passions.” (Id.
CONCLUSION
The Powell
Doctrine needs to be reexamined in light of our largely unsuccessful
expeditionary military operations into areas where our vital interests are
clearly not involved.
Sunday, September 6, 2015
Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism
Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism -- Sources
- Ahmed
Rashid, Descent to Chaos: The
- Lori
Plotkin Boghardt, ‘Saudi Funding of
- Josh Rogin, ‘
- Steve Clemons, 'Thank God for
the Saudis': ISIS,
- Salim Mansur, ‘ISIS,
- Vicky Nanjappa, ‘Why Does
- Michael Stephens, ‘Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support?, BBC News, September 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253
- Patrick
Cockburn, ‘
- Joshua Keating, ‘Why the Iraq Mess Is So Awkward for
- Kim Sengupta, ‘
- Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Our Radical Islamic BFF,
- Ben Norton, Saudi Arabia funds and exports Islamic extremism: The truth behind the toxic U.S. relationship with the theocratic monarchy, Salon, January 6, 2016 http://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/saudi_arabia_funds_and_exports_islamic_extremism_the_truth_behind_the_toxic_u_s_relationship_with_the_theocratic_nation/
- Ishaan Tharoor, 'The Saudi Origins of Belgium's Islamist Threat', The Washington Post, March 23, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/23/the-roots-of-belgiums-islamist-threat-reach-back-to-saudi-arabia/
Sunday, August 2, 2015
War as Continuation of Politics: For Whose Benefit?
The Soviets were great writers on
military affairs. The United States Air
Force translated a number of Soviet military works under the series Soviet
Military Thought.
One interesting
volume is ‘The Philosophical Heritage of
V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow
The authors expand Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’: Precisely because all wars are, and each given war is, a continuation of politics, they are essentially not only identical but are also profoundly disparate from one another, and frequently complete opposites. This occurs because the political content of war is determined by the social character of the classes waging it, their political goals and a number of other concretely historical conditions. (p. 25).
The authors expand Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’: Precisely because all wars are, and each given war is, a continuation of politics, they are essentially not only identical but are also profoundly disparate from one another, and frequently complete opposites. This occurs because the political content of war is determined by the social character of the classes waging it, their political goals and a number of other concretely historical conditions. (p. 25).
[COMMENT] This is important because particularly in the
US
US or the US Central Asia ? What
are we doing there?
Are we really military adventurists the Soviets accused us of being? These are basic questions but seem apropos to our actions post-SovietUnion —or
even before. We invaded Grenada in 1983, Lebanon
1983, Panama 1988; Gulf War
1990-91; Haiti , 1994; Somalia 1992; Bosnia United States
[COMMENT] For example, the problem with the Syrian civil war is the
socio-economic and political conditions of the initial stages of the war, that
is, the opponents of President Assad versus government forces was changed
essentially by the advent of ISIS Daesh,
transforming it from a just war against an oppressive government to Assad’s
just war against a worse and more unjust threat. The justice of the cause is from the point of
view of the eye of the beholder. The Syrian civil was whose
character was that of a just war, became an unjust war because ISIS is worse threat. The US
and its ‘allies’ [joke] have fought or opposed Assad and Iran Iran
Militarism. As a weapon serving the ruling classes to
crush all (political and economic) movements.
(p. 65). [COMMENT] Why do we fight these wars? Follow the money, i.e., whose interests are
being advanced? Who benefits from these
wars? Certainly not the Are we really military adventurists the Soviets accused us of being? These are basic questions but seem apropos to our actions post-Soviet
Sunday, July 26, 2015
Role and Place of Ideological Struggle in Modern Warfare
1) The
stability of troop morale depends on the conviction of the rank-and-file masses
as to the just nature of the war in which they sacrifice their lives. If they recognize the cause for which they
struggle to be just, they fight with enthusiasm. (‘The
Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow
In contrast. The bourgeoisie attempts to pass off its own
mercenary interests as the interest of all the people. The problem is to reveal to the soldiers and
the entire populace of a given country the criminal goals of the bourgeois
government and incite the masses to refuse to be accomplices of the crime. (Phil. Her., p. 207).
[COMMENT] In the fight against ISIS and derivatives thereof , US ISIS on the other hand is a poster child for the above
statement. Politically, it recruits from
disaffected Muslims and foreign fighters who do not share the West’s value systems or its aspirations.
2)
Lenin—Revolutionary deeds are performed by millions of individuals at a
moment of special upsurge and exertion of all human capabilities, when all
their consciousness, will, enthusiasm and fantasy are mobilized… their
extensive _____ possesses proletarian instinct, proletarian comprehension and
awareness of duty.” (Phil. Her., p. 188). [COMMENT: ISIS –
religion] “The spiritual capability of
revolutionary masses to stand and win in a savage clash with the class enemy is
based on the profoundly just character of the struggle being wages by the
proletariat and its army. We can wage
war because the masses know what they are fighting for …” Imperialist armies lack this source. (Phil. Her., p. 188).
[COMMENT] The above observation is the bottom line of why ISIS / derivatives are winning —they are in their own neighborhoods and the US armed forces are
far from home and without real focus, e.g., ‘Why we fight’ series in Word War
Two. Slogans like ‘fighting for
democracy’ are just as bland and useless as were Soviet calls for proletarian
sentiment. But the theory and
observations stated above correctly assess the issue. In 2015, ISIS
bases its appeal on religion and Muslim victimization.
3) It’s
not so much that ISIS achieves military
objectives – it achieves political objectives. Under a chapter titled ‘Tactical
Victory, Strategic Defeat’ Col. Harry Summers recalls a conversation in Hanoi Israel
4)
Even a strong will which is not enlightened by elevated communist
ideals [or religious, ideological fervor, etc.] may become a counterfeit jewel,
for will without principles or ideals is blind.
(Phil. Her., p. 189). [US armed
forces in 2015 with respect to fight against ISIS ,
Al-Qaeda, etc.?]
Why is the United States
Moral
forces in war provide legitimacy to the struggle.
Friday, September 26, 2014
Law of Victory in War?
LAW OF
VICTORY?[1]
What we ought to be
looking at is whether there is a recipe for success in both war and peace that
can be brought to light.
Q:
What is the secret of success in
combat, in an operation?
How is victory achieved?
Is there still that “magic key” which
opens the “magic box of victory”?
Maybe everything is decided by the talent
of the military leader?
Is the answer contained in the formula
“the fittest wins”?
Is there a law of victory and if there is,
what is it?[2]
Basic
formulation of a Law of Victory: The
course and outcome of war is determined by the political goals and correlation
of the aggregate forces of the warring sides, as well as by the ability of the
latter to take into account the effects of the laws of war and warfare.[1]
Analysis: law of victory incorporates a triad: formulation of a goal; creation of a
corresponding troop grouping; and expert use of the available forces.
Law of victory incorporates an objective
and subjective side
Objective: the goal and the correlation of forces is a
permanent constituent of victory, reflecting the need to prepare in advance
Subjective: the essence of the law of victory (in a
narrow sense). As a variable constituent
of victory, it reflects that cognized freedom of action which is retained by
military leaders ( commanders) of the opposing sides in the context of an
abjective limitation of forces already in the course of war (operation or
combat). Freedom is realized through
the ability and skill to make an
efficient use of their forces and fires, as well as other objective factors
(time, space, terrain features, climactic and weather conditions, and so forth)
which assume the form of “degrees of freedom” so that their effects favorable
for the troops are strengthened and the unfavorable minimized. This is in fact military art - the art of
using the laws of warfare in the interest of victory.[2]
A
characteristic of the law of victory is its certain logical transcendence as it
incorporates all the laws of war and warfare.
“ This means that the law of victory is impossible to represent in a
manifest and unequivocal form: It is a
“thing in itself”, as it were. This
means that its cognition is inconceivable without studying the laws of warfare.[3]
The
problem is not to prove the dependence of the course and outcome of warfare on
the knwoledge and creative use of its objective laws - this is obvious, but to
elicit, in a concrete situation, those laws whose effect objectively contribute
to victory, and, by making and executing corresponding decisions, use them
actively - by engaging in “creative work” in the battlefield.
Monday, May 19, 2014
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu Reconsidered
Throughout history some battles have had tremendous strategic effects beyond those of immediate tactical success. For example, the German defeat at the battle of Stalingrad placed the Germans on the strategic defensive for the remainder of the war. Germany never conducted large-scale offensives after Stalingrad.
Was Dien Bien Phu an example of a battle achieving large strategic ends? On the one hand the victory succeeded in
removing the French from Vietnam. On the
other hand its success ultimately led to the American intervention, furthering
the conflict for another twenty years.
If the Viet Minh had not achieved such a decisive military victory over
them, the French, whose goals were vastly overambitious given both available
resources and national will, would have eventually withdrawn their forces and
acceded to the Viet Minh's quest for independence as they subsequently did in
Algeria. It is worthy to note that in
Algeria there was no Dien Bien Phu equivalent, the French withdrew, and there was
no American intervention.
I contend that
Dien Bien Phu, while being a great tactical victory, was a strategic failure
because it created more problems for the Viet Minh than it solved as battlefield success led to strategic failure, i.e., American involvement.
I analyze this hypothesis by: (1) briefly reviewing the strategic setting
that led to the battle of Dien Bien Phu; (2) reviewing the strategic setting
after the battle which led to the subsequent American involvement; and (3)
based on the previous analysis, provide an alternative outcome that might have
led to a resolution of the conflict instead of trading one outside power for a
stronger one.
In reviewing the French
strategic setting of the battle of Dien Bien Phu prior to the battle, the
situation had changed considerably after 1949 with the advent of Communist
China. "Especially damaging was the
loss of French outposts along the Chinese border."[1] In particular, the Chinese overland routes
gave the Viet Minh access to a free flow of Chinese supplies and establishment
of base areas. "It brought a
fundamental change in the nature of the war - henceforth, any expansion of
Western forces in Vietnam or Laos could be readily offset by Viet Minh force
escalation.[2]
Thus the French faced a
protracted war that they had little chance of winning they had been searching
for a situation in which to bring the Viet Minh into battle. Previously, the Viet Minh had been waging a
guerrilla war against the French. The
French hoped to decisively defeat the Viet Minh in conventional operations,
destroy it as a political movement, and retain their colonies in Indochina. The plan they came up with to accomplish was
the Navarre Plan of March-April 1953, named after France's last general in
Vietnam, General Henri Navarre. The
Navarre Plan envisioned that the "Vietnamese army was to assume a larger
role, with the United States assuming the financial burden."[3] The French forces, with American equipment,
would emphasize mobility operations, designed to entrap Giap's forces and
engage it in pitched battle. The French
were unable to trap Giap's forces in a series of operations, so Navarre decided
to build an airhead in Giap's territory, the mountains of Tonkin. Navarre believed that he could lure Giap's
elite forces into "meat-grinder" battles. He did lure the Viet Minh into the
"meat-grinder" but it was the French that were consumed for the
reasons that we discussed during the student presentations.
The Viet Minh's strategic
view and desired end state in seeking battle against the French was that
General Giap had become convinced that the protracted people's war being waged
by the Vietminh against the French had entered into its third stage, general
counterattack.[4] Giap had now three-hundred thousand troops
who were organized along conventional lines into battalions, regiments, and
divisions. These units were well
supplied with Russian and Chinese equipment, and O&M supplies which were
carried by a stream of peasant porters to the operational divisions. Their objective was simple: destroy the garrison at Dien Bien Phu and
drive the French out of Indochina.
General Giap's message to his troops on the eve of the battle said: "Master fear and pain, overcome
obstacles, unite your efforts, fight to the very end, annihilate the enemy at
Dien Bien Phu, win a great victory!"[5]
The strategic setting after
battle as a result of the Geneva Accords was only a military ceasefire between
France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Vietnam remained divided along the 17th
parallel, and only vision of a political future that the DRV received was a
promise of elections in two years. The French
had the opportunity to regroup their forces below the 17th parallel, and
expected to continue to exert their influence on South Vietnam, but their
involvement in Vietnam was finished. The
ultimate result of the Geneva Conference was the beginning of direct American
involvement in Vietnam.
The United States became
involved in Vietnam because it saw France's defeat as a blow to the West and a
victory for communism. In the aftermath
of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the French military defeat at
Dien Bien Phu signified a victory for Chinese communism over the West. This Chinese Communist expansion could not be
tolerated, thus the US did not support the outcome of the Geneva
Conference. What the US did do was to
"embark on a course designed to make the purely military arrangements
serve as the basis of a de facto political settlement."[6] The US also did not promise to observe the
promised elections but rather not to use force to break them up. Effectively vetoing the elections through
this clause, the US sought to shore up Ngo Dihn Diem's government in South
Vietnam, and thereby making Vietnam's division permanent. The US believed that France pusillanimous
policy in Vietnam, poor military planning, and colonial past had been the
reasons for their defeat. Not burdened
by any of the above sins, the US sought to fight communism in Vietnam through
Diem.
Given the political accords
reached as a result of Dien Bien Phu, clearly it did not produce a great
strategic result or victory: Vietnam
remained divided, and the US became directly involved taking the place of
France. One may argue that the
Vietnamese might have been able to achieve more at the conference table had it
not been for American intransigence and duplicity. On the other hand, it can be equally argued
that it was the benign nature of the political demands that the accords placed
on France (and the US) that led to the agreement in the first place. This remains conjectural but if the demands
had been the immediate reunification of Vietnam under DRV rule, the accords
might have not been signed. The point
here is that the military victory of the Viet Minh over the French at Dien Bien
Phu did not translate into a political victory but a great political defeat for
the Viet Minh and Ho Chi Minh.
An alternative outcome
occurred in the Algerian War of independence where there were no French defeats
in large-scale military operations, but France subsequently withdrew and there
was no American involvement although Ben Bella was also espousing a 'socialist
program', employing Marxist rhetoric, and enticing the Soviet-bloc nations for
political and material aid. Why did the
US not become involved in the Algerian case which was similar in nature to the
Vietnamese case, and in an area which was, geographically, much closer to vital
American security interests such as Europe?[7] The answer to this issue lies in the
political perspective that a military defeat may result in. In Dien Bien Phu, the French were
ignominiously defeated and humiliated.
As perceived by the Americans, their defeat was a result of the lack of
military prowess, an inability to supply troops in the field, and lack of
aircraft and technology; essentially a managerial problem subject to a quick
resolution if one is tough to see it through.
This is was a national security issue which the United States viewed as
tailor-made for its foreign policy due to its ability to manage and solve
technological problems, which this was if seen through this prism, in an
expeditious and efficient manner.
Addition-ally, the policy of containment had recently become the motive
force behind American rhyme and reason, and led to the Truman Administration's
decision to begin military aid to Indochina was taken in "more or
less" within the overall policy of containment in the world without
evaluating the merit of each individual case.[8]
In the Algerian case, as
France did not suffer any major military defeats of note, the American's viewed
French operations there as ongoing, and when the negotiated settlement did
occur in 1962 there was no stigma of a military defeat for France (although in
fact it was a great strategic defeat), and the US did not perceive the
communists as being able to pummel the West politically through another Western
military disaster.
In conclusion, I posit that the battle of Dien Bien Phu was not the great
strategic victory but rather a failure.
The reasons for its strategic failure are that the Americans did not
want to see the French humiliated by a "communist" movement; did not
want another "communist" government in Asia; the outcome of Dien Bien
Phu represented Western weakness as opposed if it had been a conscious French
choice to withdraw as was in Algeria which did not lead to American
involvement.
Another conclusion, that may be tentatively posited for further
observation is that a military victory may not lead to a political victory, or
that a military defeat (or a least the absence of victory) may still yield
political victory. The object of war is not to win battles but to win wars; and objectives of wars are defined in political terms.
By: Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.)
[4]
The other two phases of Mao Zedong's people's war, adapted by Giap to
Vietnamese conditions, are: (1)
defensive phase where the survival of the revolutionary forces is the prime
objective; (2) the second phase's objective is to further demoralize the enemy
and increase the ranks of the guerrillas.
Cited in Ibid., pp 48-49.
Tuesday, December 24, 2013
NSC-68 Version 2013: Balance of Power. Schema & Notes for Part 2
IV. Underlying
Conflicts Among Nations
V. Potential
Threats and Capabilities—Actual and Potential
VI. U. S.
Intentions and Capabilities
“When a country abjures its intention of exploiting a
conflict between two other parties, it is in fact signaling that it has the
capacity to do so and that both parties would do well to work at preserving
their neutrality. So too, when a nation
expresses its “deep concern” over a military contingency, it is conveying that
it will assist—in some as yet unspecified way—the victim of what is has defined
as aggression.” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 724)
VII. Present
Risks
Risk One. Wars of
National Union/Reunion (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Two. Wars of
Democratization and Nationalist Secession (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Three. Wars of
Great Power Geopolitical Competition (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Four. Wars of
Nuclear Proliferation (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Five. Wars of
Regional Hegemony (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Six. Transnational Wars Against Non-State Actors.
Transnational wars refer to wars
transcending existing national borders against non-state actors, such as
Al-Qaeda and others.
VIII. Nuclear
Proliferation and Risk of War
The fact is that whether we like it or
not, nuclear weapons establish a balance of power. Admission to the nuclear
club provides an insurance policy against external aggression; though not
internal (and often centrifugal) forces such as in the case of Pakistan.
IX. Possible
Causes of Action
Foreign Policy
A. The
First Course—Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently
Projected Programs for Carrying out These Projects
B. The
Second Course—Isolation
C. The
Third Course—Continuous Military Intervention
D. The Fourth Course—Dependence on International
Institutions
The problem with the guarantee of
rights in international law is that the rights of the strong are those which
are guaranteed at the expense of the weak or the vanquished. For example, Henry Kissinger explains that for
Count Metternich, rights existed in the nature of things. “Whether they were affirmed in law or by
constitution was an essentially technical question which had nothing to do with
bringing about freedom. Metternich
considered guaranteeing rights to be a paradox.
“Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they
emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements… Objects mistakenly made subject
to legislation result only in their limitation, if not the complete annulment,
of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.” (Kissinger,
1994, pp. 84-85)
E. The
Remaining Course—Balance of Power Policies Combining the Above Policies as
Necessity Dictates
CONCLUSIONS
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