PLEASE FEEL FREE TO OFFER ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE.
ALL ARE APPRECIATED
FIRST DRAFT
In the ‘The Mouse that Roared’ a
1955 novel by Irish
writer Leonard Wibberley is about a tiny
country in Europe that feels compelled to declare war against the United States
in order to be defeated and get aid.
Instead, through a series of mishappenings, Fenwick acquires a prototype
doomsday device—the Q Bomb—and defeats the United States.
The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter “North Korea” or “DRPK”) is
indeed a modern-day Fenwick, a mouse that roars in the international arena,
except that (i) it is very much real; (ii) regime defeat may not be a viable an
option; and (iii) its “Q Bomb” arsenal of real nuclear weapons and missiles is
not humorous.
U.
S. President George W. Bush came close
to drawing a red line on the North Korean nuclear issue in May 2003, when he
declared that the United States and South Korea “will not tolerate nuclear
weapons in North Korea.”[1] Three years later President Bush’s tolerance
had grown…
It
is the responsibility of U.S. policymakers is to secure the safety of the
homeland. If a nuclear North Korea is seen
as a threat to the vital security interests of the United States, it is a
problem that must be addressed in earnest.[2]
Much has been
written on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.[3] I do not offer any comments on the writings;
they speak for themselves. There appears,
however, a lack of historical context or comparative framework with which to
better assess North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and prospects. As a firm believer in never reinventing the
wheel, it is worthwhile to review the strategic literature of the Cold War to
understand North Korea’s capabilities and prospects in a historical context.
Preliminarily, North
Korea’s ‘songun’ (military first) ideology and derivative policies are ideal
for military development. “Songun
politics is rooted in the military-priority ideology that embodies the Juche
idea.”[4] “The
Juche idea means, in a nutshell, that the masters of the revolution and
construction are the masses of the people and that they are also the motive
force of the revolution and construction.”[5] In more practical terms this means that “The
Korean people value the independence of the country and nation and, under the
pressure of imperialists and dominationsts [sic], have thoroughly implemented
the principle of independence, self-reliance and self-defence [sic], defending
the country’s sovereignty and dignity firmly.”[6]
At the first
session of the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK In
September 1998, Kim Jong Il declared that the politics of the DPRK is Songun politics
“and established full the mode of Songun politics”[7]
with the National Defense Commission as its focus. “It is like this, that the Songun politics of
the party is the main political mode of socialism…”[8]
As I have argued elsewhere, North Korea clearly
has chosen to pursue nuclear-based security to prevent itself from being
coerced politically and militarily by the United States, and gain political
respect and legitimacy as a regional power. The nuclear option is insurance
against defeat and/or humiliation at the hands of the United States, South
Korea, or anyone else.[9]
So how does the
Songun ideology translate and provide strategic direction and guidance to the
DPRK’s leadership? In order to address
this question, it is useful to do a comparative study with respect to Soviet
weapons procurement and security policies particularly in the 1950s and early
1960s as the DPRK’s current development is at a similar stage.
In examining the
factors affecting Soviet military procurement and actions in the early 1970s,
Carl Jacobsen observed that concern for Chinese (or Japanese) capabilities and
prospects did not figure extensively in this calculus because of several
considerations.[10] These same considerations apply to 2017 North
Korea: North Korea’s nuclear warheads
are neither sophisticated nor numerous; her missiles are first generational
with regard to vulnerability, operational and in-flight control and
accuracy—they have a high rate of failure expectancy (degradation factors); it
does not possess the technology to either build a protective ballistic missile
defense complex, or to penetrate even a limited BMD deployed by an
opponent. North Korea’s technology is at
a level of the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. It is vulnerable to a take-out first strike
by the United States.[11]
Further, Jacobsen
makes a very important point:
“[C]apabilities do not necessarily mirror intentions.” [12] The paraphrase Jacobsen, the new power and
sophistication of the DPRK might in fact reflect a determination to achieve
security and flexibility usually associated with superpowers. [13]
Translated into political terms, this equates to regime security and
survival. “It does not justify
inferences of aggressive designs, whether based on nationalism or ideology.”[14] In this regard, as it was for the Soviet
Union, it is likely that in the DPRK, “[n]either nationalistic impulses nor
ideological aspirations are permitted to obscure strategic realities.”[15]
Clearly, the North
Korean leadership from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un is very much aware of the
strategic realities of American power “(political leaders must know the
potentialities of strategy…’)”[16]
In 2006 the Korean People’s Army General Staff issued statements declaring in
no uncertain terms that the DPRK would not suffer the same “miserable fate” of
Iraq.[17] Again in January 2017, the Korean People’s
Army General Staff issued statements declaring in no uncertain terms that the
DPRK would not suffer the same “miserable fate” of Iraq and other Middle East
countries.[18] The continuity in declaratory policies have
been made certain by strategic initiatives that followed: acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities in
2006 and the acquisition of long-range delivery systems for its nuclear weapons
in 2017.[19]
The evolution of
the DPRK’s armed forces similarly parallel to some degree those of the Soviet
Union.[20]
Upon acquiring nuclear weapons, the DPRK’s capabilities were largely confined
to the Korean Peninsula and perhaps Japan.
Unlike the Soviet
Union, however, the DPRK has not sought long-range strike capabilities through
bomber forces, for the obvious reason that South Korea is very close and the
vulnerability of such a force to US attack. Rather, the DPRK opted for missile development
and particularly long-range missile developments. Such capability relates “primarily to
first-strike calculations.”[21] Like the USSR in the late 1950s and early
1960s, the DPRK is developing a ‘force de frappe’; it has not attained an
assured second-strike force.[22] Thus,
the DPRK’s strategic priority is that of developing an effective first-strike deterrence
against what it sees as its most dangerous threat: the United States.
Interestingly
another reason why Khrushchev opted for missile development was the
demobilization of particularly the land forces of the Soviet armed forces which
took place at that time.[23] The reasons for such demobilization were
largely economic: the need for manpower
and financial resources for economic development.[24] Such
reasons must likewise have been factored into the DPRK’s strategic
assessments. In this regard, one factor
that has not been addressed is the impact of the 1990s famines on military
manpower pool. Estimates vary but
according to a report issued by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, “Between
1996 and 1999, it is estimated that between 450,000 and 2 million people
starved to death.”[25] Given that DPRK’s estimated population is 25,248,140[26],
this means that between 1.8 percent to 7.9 percent of the population of the
DPRK perished. Regardless whether the
high or low is correct (the answer is probably somewhere in between) the point
is that this must have a significant impact on the availability of military-age
manpower vis-à-vis the manpower requirements of the economy.
Moreover, despite
Songun ideology there appear to be indicators that this is precisely what Kim
Jong Un is planning; and that in fact he is a good economic manager. Kim Jong Un reformed agriculture (similar to
Lenin’s New Economic Policy with a rise in NEPmen) and has encouraged private
markets.[27] Moreover, despite the closing of the Kaesong
Economic Zone by former South Korean President Park Kuen Hae and the ongoing
sanctions, last year the gross domestic product (GDP) of the DPRK grew by
around 3.9 percent.[28] What is of particular interest in this area is
that the Korean Worker’s Party held its 7th Party Congress from May
6 to May 9, 2016, after a 36-year hiatus.
Frank Ruediger of the University of Vienna most appropriately titled the
Congress “A Return to a New Normal.”[29]
Kim Jong
Un refrained from following the typical socialist fallacy of promoting producer
goods over consumer goods. Rather, he emphasized the need for a balanced
development of the sectors of the national economy. In fact, he even sounded
slightly critical of past economic policies when he stressed that past
investments, which were mainly in the economy’s foundations, need to translate
into actual improvements of the people’s lives. Developmental economists will
feel reminded of the debate between supporters of balanced and unbalanced
growth in the 1960s. Once again, we see that many of North Korea’s problems are
far from unique.[30]
In any case, if
historical parallel is a guide, it will be interesting to see whether the DPRK
begins to demobilize its large land forces.
On the other hand, given the proximity of South Korea with its own large
forces, demobilization of DPRK’s land forces may not necessarily be a foregone
conclusion. It is hoped that the
intelligence collection agencies of the United States, Republic of Korea, and
other interested parties are closely monitoring the annual military service
conscription calls as well as individual units status.
Another benefit of
the DPRK’s ‘force de frappe’ is perhaps an aura of ‘superpower’ status, a
political benefit sought by a regime who lacks a sense of security. What can be said is that at the very least,
it adds credibility to the DPRK’s partly illusory strength assertions, with the
intentions of bolstering its deterrent image.
Concluding thought: At this stage, the problem we face with a nuclear-armed
North Korea is the possibility that in a confrontation, a weaker North Korea may
opt for the grave risk of mutual devastation to unilateral defeat. Furthermore,
if Soviet strategic history is a guide, the ‘what can be expected next’ is the
development of the DPRK’s true counter-force capabilities.
[1]
David E. Sanger, “For U.S., a Strategic Jolt After North Korea’s Test”, The New
York Times, October 11, 2006 http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20061011wednesday.html
(accessed on December 26, 2016)
[2] Other views contend that after the fall of the Soviet
Union, we are in search of enemies. If
North Koreans did not exist, we would have invented them. For purposes of this
paper, I assume North Korea nuclear weapons to be a vital security threat to
the United States.
[3] For example, North Korea's nuclear weapons: What now? “Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists” http://thebulletin.org/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-what-now, accessed September 7, 2017;
Arms
Control Association, Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile
Diplomacy, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron, accessed September 7, 2017; Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea’s Nuclear Year In Review—And
What’s Next (December 20. 2016), http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-koreas-nuclear-year-reviewand-whats-next/, accessed September 7, 2017; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military
and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
2015, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF, accessed September 7, 2017; Joel S. Wit, The Way
Ahead: North Korea Policy Recommendations for the Trump Administration,
December 2016, Korea Institute SAIS. See
also Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press,
The New Era of Counterforce Technological Change and the Future of
Nuclear Deterrence, International Security, (Spring 2017) Vol. 41 No. 4.
[4] Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Official Webpage
of the DPR of Korea, Songun Politics, http://www.korea-dpr.com/songun.html accessed September 10, 2017.
[5] Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Official
Webpage of the DPR of Korea, Juche Ideology, http://www.korea-dpr.com/juche_ideology.html accessed September 10, 2017.
[6] Id.
[7] Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Official
Webpage of the DPR of Korea, Songun Politics, http://www.korea-dpr.com/songun.html accessed September 10, 2017.
[8] Id/
[9] “North Korea's Nuclear Security: The Third
Alternative in Nuclear Confrontation”, in National Security and Strategy Blog
(October 14, 2012) http://nationalsecurityandstrategy.blogspot.com/2012/10/north-koreas-nuclear-security-third.html
[10] Carl G. Jacobsen, Soviet
Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy: Military
Considerations Affecting Soviet Policy-Making (Glascow: Robert McLehose
& Co. Ltd. The University Press, 1972), p. 9.
[11] Soviet
Strategy, at 9.
[12] Soviet Strategy,
at 24.
[13] Soviet
Strategy, at 24.
[14] Soviet
Strategy, at 24.
[15] Soviet
Strategy, at 25.
[17] Citation _____
[18] Citation _____
[19] Citation _____
[20] Soviet
Strategy, at 25.
[21] Soviet
Strategy, at 25.
[22] Soviet
Strategy, at 25.
[25] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed
findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (7 February 2014) ¶ 140, at 39, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx, accessed on September 9, 2017.
[26] CIA World Factbook, North Korea, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html, accessed on September 9, 2017.
[27]
Andrei Lankov, Kim Jong-un's recipe for success: private enterprise and public
executions, The Guardian, (October 7, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/07/north-korea-recipe-for-success-economic-liberalisation-public-executions,
accessed on September 10, 2017; Andrei Lankov, Kim Jong Un Is a Survivor, Not a Madman, Foreign Policy (April
26, 2017) http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/26/kim-jong-un-is-a-survivor-not-a-madman/
accessed on
September 10, 2017.
[28] North Korea's economic growth climbs to 17-year high in 2016 despite
sanctions targeting nuclear program, Reuters, July 20, 2017 https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/north-koreas-economic-growth-climbs-to-17-year-high-in-2016-despite-sanctions-targeting-nuclear-program.html
accessed on September 10, 2017; Voice of America News, In North Korea, Rise of Consumer Culture is the Real Revolution (August 18, 2017) https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-consumer-culture-real-revolution/3990832.html
accessed on September 10, 2017.
[29] Frank Ruediger, The 7th Party Congress in North
Korea: A Return to a New Normal, 38
North (May 20, 2016) http://www.38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016/
accessed on September 10, 2016.
[30] Reudiger, Id.
