FIRST DRAFT
ANY AND ALL COMMENTS ARE APPRECIATED
In Part I, I
discussed how the development of the DRPK’s nuclear and missile programs
were similar to those of the USSR; and why it was important to revisit the
strategic debates of the 1950s and 1960s.
As
we move into what some have described as a Second Nuclear Age it would be
wise to follow the examples set by administrations early in the “First Nuclear
Age”—the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, in particular. These
administrations engaged some of our nation’s finest strategic thinkers to
ensure that they had thought through, as best they could, the enormous
consequences of making the right decisions regarding our nuclear force posture.
Despite the
similarities between Soviet and DPRK strategic procurement and programs, some
significant differences exist as well:
The DPRK’s
strategic posture is unlike that of the USSR in a number of ways:
1.
DPRK does not claim the mantle of leadership for
an international communist movement, or any leading role therein.
The strategic culture of the DPRK revolves
entirely upon the survival of the Kim regime
,
now in its third generation;
2.
Notwithstanding bombastic rhetoric, there is no
overriding search for strategic military parity with the United States.
“
Due
to the growing obsolescence of North Korea’s conventional military
capabilities, North
Korea has pivoted towards a national security strategy based on asymmetric
capabilities and weapons of mass destruction.” The fact is that like the USSR in the
late 1950s, for the DRPK the “development of the … ICBM promised release from
the straightjacket of ultimately inferiority.”
As the Indian Army Chief of Staff said after
the 1990-1991 Gulf War, any nation that fights the United States must have
nuclear weapons.
3.
Significantly, nuclear warfighting doctrine and
offensive nuclear operations do not appear to be directed at the Republic of
Korea but rather at the United States’ homeland. DPRK does not need long-range missiles
against ROK. DPRK does not view ROK as
threat but only the US;
4.
No interventionary doctrine in distant
areas.
Interestingly, Carl Jacobsen
observes that Khrushchev’s search to “secure a ‘cheap’ augmentation of
strategic capabilities”
led
him to place missiles in Cuba, to procure a more credible deterrent.
“Intermediate-range missiles in Cuba would
have a range covering the US heartland. They would therefore have the same
effect on the strategic balance as an otherwise far more costly increase in
ICBM numbers.”
Unlike the USSR, the DPRK lacks the ability
of cheaply augmenting its strategic capabilities.
There are no Cubas in the DPRK’s politico-military
arsenal where it can base missiles to threaten the US homeland.
Moreover, Khrushchev’s policy almost led the
Soviet Union to war with the United States; as well as a major reason for his
downfall.
Thus, this policy option is
neither available nor likely desirable to the DPRK in general and Kim Jong Un
in particular.
5.
Despite the claims of some that the DRPK’s
motives in developing nuclear weapons and missiles is for financial purposes
such as foreign sales of such weapons
,
the security of the regime and the homeland is the number one priority of
regime efforts in the development of nuclear capabilities and means of delivery
of same.
The DPRK’s distant power
projection capabilities are only based on first-strike missile capability.
It is clearly a strategic defensive posture.
What is more, like the Soviet Union in 1964,
once the regime feels secure that its deterrent has been secured, a drastic
shift in resources towards development of the domestic economy is likely.
Moreover, it
cannot be ignored that the US bears some fault for DPRK insecurity.
US intervention across the globe has given
DPRK’s paranoia full faith and effect.
For
example, today more than 60 percent of the US Navy’s deterrent patrols by its
nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) patrol the Pacific Ocean
area, reflecting the increased war planning against both China and the DPRK.
More recently, US B-1 bombers flew very close
to border of DPRK, prompting the DPRK to claim that the US had declared war on
them.
What is
significant is that like the USSR, the DPRK “… has always been acutely aware of
the fact that military power in peacetime is only useful to the extent that it
can be translated into political influence.”
This is particularly true of nuclear forces.
Like Khrushchev in
the late 1950s, the DPRK sees “the solution in the utilization and advance of
early missile technology achievements”
to the problem of economic strain to the country and its diminished population
resources.
Further, DPRK’s
damage infliction capability is low as missile degradation factors remain
high.
Manufacturing defects, storage
problems, firing preparation, command and control take-off and in-flight
malfunctions all combine to severely degrade the operational readiness of the
DPRK’s nuclear forces.
For example, Carl Jacobsen states that
calculations of the early Soviet nuclear missile forces readiness provided for
degradation of 90 percent; meaning that only 10 percent of the missiles would
actually launch and, hopefully, hit their intended targets.
Given the failure rates of 45 or so percent
of the DPRK’s launches,
under optimum peacetime conditions, such calculations are likely applicable as
well to the DPRK’s operational readiness of its missile forces in a time of
heightened tensions or pre-war period.
However, the DPRK
may entertain overoptimistic expectations of damage-inflicting capability, but
like the Soviet Union, it realizes that this only relates to a
first-strike.
The DPRK does not at this
time have a second-strike or counterforce capability to be an effective
deterrent to the US.
As US President
Donald J. Trump told the United Nations in no uncertain terms: “
The United States has great strength and patience, but if it
is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally
destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his
regime. The United States is ready, willing, and able, but hopefully this will
not be necessary.”
Therefore, the DRPK’s
likely response to its vulnerability is the same response that Khrushchev
developed to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces.
“More sophisticated, better protected, and in
some cases mobile, rockets [are needed] to provide a more dependable deterrent
with significant first strike survivability capacity.”
Andrew F.
Krepinevich, Jr., U.S. Nuclear Requirements In An Era Of Defense
Austerity: Testimony Before The House
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee On Strategic Forces (HHRG-113-AS29-Wstate-KrepinevichA-20130319.pdf,
March 6, 2013), p. 16.
Carl G. Jacobsen, Soviet
Strategic Initiatives: Challenge and
Response (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. xii.
Carl G. Jacobsen, Soviet
Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy: Military
Considerations Affecting Soviet Policy-Making (Glascow: Robert McLehose
& Co. Ltd. The University Press, 1972), p. 47.
