CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DENUCLEARIZATION OF NORTH KOREA

Ultimately, the successful denuclearization of North Korea will likely require the following conditions as a minimum:

 

·      Kim Jong Un’s commitment to denuclearization and his ability to actualize such a policy within the DPRK without opposition.  This is not as simple as it appears.  The DPRK has invested heavily in its nuclear weapons programs, and presumably, there are interest groups within national security and military-industrial organs who could oppose giving up weapons.  While it appears that Kim Jong Un has control over party and military structure (any opposition appears to have not fared too well so far) the possibility nevertheless exists of the emergence of serious opposition to actual denuclearization

·      South Korean commitment not to alter or destabilize political structure of DPRK,

-       No direct or indirect challenges to regime legitimacy and political structure

-       North Korea will likely evolve into Chinese-style communism, i.e., closed political structure with open economy

-       Human rights to be overlooked for a time.  China can help North Korea in this regard.  Not likely to be a problem for South Korea itself

·      DPRK’s need for South Korean and American investment and technology to develop its mineral resources and economy, which will not be forthcoming unless the country agrees to denuclearize.  The value of these golden carrots must be seen in context of Kim Jong Un’s speech before the 7^th Korean Worker’s Party Congress from May 6 to May 9, 2016, after a 36-year hiatus.  Frank Ruediger of the University of Vienna most appropriately titled the Congress “A Return to a New Normal.”[1]  In his speech:

Kim Jong Un refrained from following the typical socialist fallacy of promoting producer goods over consumer goods. Rather, he emphasized the need for a balanced development of the sectors of the national economy. In fact, he even sounded slightly critical of past economic policies when he stressed that past investments, which were mainly in the economy’s foundations, need to translate into actual improvements of the people’s lives. Developmental economists will feel reminded of the debate between supporters of balanced and unbalanced growth in the 1960s. Once again, we see that many of North Korea’s problems are far from unique.[2]

·      China’s determination to ensure a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula, and willingness to cooperate with the United States, North Korea and South Korea in pursuit of that goal,

·      Security guarantee to DPRK provided by the United States, China, and perhaps Russia.  In Kazakhstan’s case, security assurances were provided by Permanent Five (P-5) states of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC)[3],

-       Will likely require an iron-clad guarantee and some security mechanism as remedy for a breach thereof

-       May require US to remove forces from South Korea as a security guarantee to North.  On the other hand, Soviets agreed to German unification without requiring unified Germany withdrawal from NATO

·      The personal involvement of senior-level policy officials on all sides, and

·      U.S. technical and financial assistance through the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to support the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure and expand the scope of U.S.-DPRK relations.  While originally “created for the purpose of securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in the former states of the Soviet Union … CTR assistance has expanded to non-Soviet countries such as the South Asia region, Iraq, Afghanistan, China, and African nations such as Djibouti, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda.” [4]  The CTR provides a credible and time-tested mechanism for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

·      As was the case in Kazakhstan, it will be Kim Jong Un’s “support for, and ability to lead the political process without domestic opposition”[5], as well as his ability to implement the process that will be keys to successful denuclearization. 

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[1] Frank Ruediger, The 7th Party Congress in North Korea: A Return to a New Normal,  38 North (May 20, 2016) http://www.38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016/ accessed on September 10, 2016.

[2] Reudiger, Id.

[3] Dena Sholk, The Denuclearization of Kazakhstan (1991-1995), Georgetown University INAD 912, April 30, 2013; https://isd.georgetown.edu/sites/isd/files/JFD_Sholk_Denuclearization.pdf (accessed on January 8, 2017), p. 3

[4] Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,  June 1, 2014;

 https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-program/  accessed April 10, 2018.

[5] Sholk, p. 3.

Russian-American Relations 2014: Mistakes Repeated

George Kennan in discussing American foreign policy and democracy notes that we made two big boo-boos during the cold war.  (1) to attribute to the “Soviet leadership aims and intentions it did not really have; in jumping to conclusion that the Soviet leaders were just like Hitler and his associates…” with the same aspirations, timetable, and who could only be dealt with in the same manner as Hitler was. [1]  (2)  The second postwar mistake was to embrace the nuclear weapon “the mainstay of our military posture, and the faith we placed in it to assure our military and political ascendancy in this postwar era.”[2] 

"It is from these two great mistakes that there has flowed, as I see it, the extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this postwar age. And this is a militarization that has had profound effects not just on our foreign policies but also on our own society… And this habit—the habit of pouring so great a part of our gross national product year after year into sterile and socially negative forms of production—has now risen to the status of what I have ventured to call a genuine national addiction. We could not now break ourselves of the habit without the serious of withdrawal symptoms. Millions of people, is addition to those other millions who are in uniform, have become accustomed to deriving their livelihood from the military-industrial complex. Thousands of firms have become dependent on it, not to mention labor unions and communities. It is the main source of our highly destabilizing budgetary deficit. An elaborate and most unhealthy bond has been created between those who manufacture and sell the armaments and those in Washington who buy them. We have created immense vested interests in the maintenance of a huge armed establishment in time of peace and in the export of great quantities of arms to other peoples—great vested interests, in other words, in the Cold War. We have made ourselves dependent on this invidious national practice; so much so that it may fairly be said that if we did not have the Russians and their alleged iniquities to serve as a rationalization for it, we would have to invent some adversary to take their place—which would be hard to do.[3][My highlight]"

In 2014 it appears that the United States repeated these mistakes (1) to attribute to the Russian leadership aims and intentions that it does not really have; in jumping to conclusion that Putin is just like Stalin and communists. (2) The second mistake it to embrace military instrument of national power as the mainstay of our politico-diplomatic posture despite its limitations in a geopolitical heartland largely outside our strategic reach and capabilities to affect political outcomes.

Question for policy makers: “Is it possible that we may be expecting of Russia [or an other country] higher standards of international conduct than our own?” (Vera Micheles Dean, “Is Russia Alone to Blame?” Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXV, March 8, 1946).[4]

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[1] George F. Kennan,  At a Century’s Ending.  Reflections 1982-1995 (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), p. 130.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Idid., pp. 130-131

[4] Direct cite from Kenneth W. Thompson, Interpreters and Critics of the Cold War.  Wash. DC: University Press of America (1978), p. iv