Some Comments to 'We Fail Better' Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military

Re October 20, 2015 Foreign Policy podcast 

The E.R.: ‘We Fail Better’ Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military  David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake, and Tom Ricks wrestle with America's recent legacy in the Middle East and what's broken with the last superpower's armed forces.   

In the podcast, among other things, Tom Ricks said that he disagreed with exit strategy requirement of the [General Colin] Powell Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine provides that:

Military force used as last resort

Clear-cut military objective

We can measure that the military objective has been reached (end state)

Military force should be use in overwhelming fashion

The Powell Doctrine was subsequently renounced by the Clinton. For example, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin concluded that such constraint would limit the military usefulness in “achieving policy objectives”. It “could lead to the military becoming like nuclear weapons in the Cold War - important, but not useful”.   Successive administrations concurred.

ISSUE

Isn’t an exit strategy exactly what is necessary to determine whether a military objective has been reached, the end state?    

Discussion

Von Clausewitz observed that:

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration.  Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.  Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92.

Sun Tzu illustrates the consequences of failure:

Victory is the main object in war.  If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 3.

When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.  (The Art of War, Book II, Par. 4)

Hence, what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.  And therefore the general who understands war is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny.  The Art of War, Book II, Par. 21.

Gulf Conflict.  The Powell Doctrine was given full effect during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; and it was a great success militarily and its clearly stated and limited political objectives:  Iraq must get out of Kuwait—nothing more was required of Saddam Hussein.  Politically, some argue that it was a failure because we did not pursue the Iraqi Army into Iraq proper; thus allowed Saddam Hussein to survive and requiring our greater effort at a later date.   In responding to the issue, I defer to Clausewitz: 

Modifying Condition 3:  In War the Result is Never Final

 Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final.  The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.  It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80.

The fact remains that this was a very successful American military operation the likes of which have not been repeated since—as the podcast discussion clearly addressed.

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The Iraq and Afghan wars share that common trait that they’re largely “expeditionary military operations in hostile territories.”  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision:  America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p. 67

Moreover, we could not formulate an end state (much less an exit strategy) because we did not, and still do not, understand the complexity of the environment.  As a result, the Bush as well as the Obama administrations have been unable formulate realistic military and political objectives.

“In both cases, the Bush [and the Obama] administration showed little regard for the complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts within conflicts, dangerously unsettled regional neighborhoods (especially involving Pakistan and Iran), and the unresolved territorial disputes, al of which severely complicated US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and ignited wider regional anti-American passions.”  (Id.)

CONCLUSION

The Powell Doctrine needs to be reexamined in light of our largely unsuccessful expeditionary military operations into areas where our vital interests are clearly not involved. 

Law of Victory in War?

LAW OF VICTORY?[1]

What we ought to be looking at is whether there is a recipe for success in both war and peace that can be brought to light.

Q:    What is the secret of success in combat, in an operation?

      How is victory achieved?

      Is there still that “magic key” which opens the “magic box of victory”?

      Maybe everything is decided by the talent of the military leader?

      Is the answer contained in the formula “the fittest wins”?

      Is there a law of victory and if there is, what is it?[2]

Basic Law of War:  The course and outcome of war is determined by the political objectives of war and the correlation of all forces of the warring sides.  The latter are understood as the sum total of the state’s (coalition of states) military, economic, scientific and technical and spiritual potentials.

Basic formulation of a Law of Victory:  The course and outcome of war is determined by the political goals and correlation of the aggregate forces of the warring sides, as well as by the ability of the latter to take into account the effects of the laws of war and warfare.[1]

      Analysis:  law of victory incorporates a triad:  formulation of a goal; creation of a corresponding troop grouping; and expert use of the available forces.

      Law of victory incorporates an objective and subjective side

      Objective:  the goal and the correlation of forces is a permanent constituent of victory, reflecting the need to prepare in advance

      Subjective:  the essence of the law of victory (in a narrow sense).  As a variable constituent of victory, it reflects that cognized freedom of action which is retained by military leaders ( commanders) of the opposing sides in the context of an abjective limitation of forces already in the course of war (operation or combat).    Freedom is realized through the ability  and skill to make an efficient use of their forces and fires, as well as other objective factors (time, space, terrain features, climactic and weather conditions, and so forth) which assume the form of “degrees of freedom” so that their effects favorable for the troops are strengthened and the unfavorable minimized.  This is in fact military art - the art of using the laws of warfare in the interest of victory.[2] 

A characteristic of the law of victory is its certain logical transcendence as it incorporates all the laws of war and warfare.  “ This means that the law of victory is impossible to represent in a manifest and unequivocal form:  It is a “thing in itself”, as it were.  This means that its cognition is inconceivable without studying the laws of warfare.[3]

The problem is not to prove the dependence of the course and outcome of warfare on the knwoledge and creative use of its objective laws - this is obvious, but to elicit, in a concrete situation, those laws whose effect objectively contribute to victory, and, by making and executing corresponding decisions, use them actively - by engaging in “creative work” in the battlefield.

---

    [1]  Ibid., p. 33.

    [2]  Ibid., p. 34.

    [3]  Ibid., pp. 34-35.

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    [1]  Lt Col V. V. Kruglov, "Is There a Law of Victory", Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), No. 1, January 1994, pp. 32-37.

    [2]  Ibid., p. 32.

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu Reconsidered

      Throughout history some battles have had tremendous strategic effects beyond those of immediate tactical success.  For example, the German defeat at the battle of Stalingrad placed the Germans on the strategic defensive for the remainder of the war.  Germany never conducted large-scale offensives after Stalingrad.  

       Was Dien Bien Phu an example of a battle achieving large strategic ends?  On the one hand the victory succeeded in removing the French from Vietnam.  On the other hand its success ultimately led to the American intervention, furthering the conflict for another twenty years.  If the Viet Minh had not achieved such a decisive military victory over them, the French, whose goals were vastly overambitious given both available resources and national will, would have eventually withdrawn their forces and acceded to the Viet Minh's quest for independence as they subsequently did in Algeria.  It is worthy to note that in Algeria there was no Dien Bien Phu equivalent, the French withdrew, and there was no American intervention. 

      I contend that Dien Bien Phu, while being a great tactical victory, was a strategic failure because it created more problems for the Viet Minh than it solved as battlefield success led to strategic failure, i.e., American involvement.  I analyze this hypothesis by:  (1) briefly reviewing the strategic setting that led to the battle of Dien Bien Phu; (2) reviewing the strategic setting after the battle which led to the subsequent American involvement; and (3) based on the previous analysis, provide an alternative outcome that might have led to a resolution of the conflict instead of trading one outside power for a stronger one.

      In reviewing the French strategic setting of the battle of Dien Bien Phu prior to the battle, the situation had changed considerably after 1949 with the advent of Communist China.  "Especially damaging was the loss of French outposts along the Chinese border."[1]  In particular, the Chinese overland routes gave the Viet Minh access to a free flow of Chinese supplies and establishment of base areas.  "It brought a fundamental change in the nature of the war - henceforth, any expansion of Western forces in Vietnam or Laos could be readily offset by Viet Minh force escalation.[2] 

      Thus the French faced a protracted war that they had little chance of winning they had been searching for a situation in which to bring the Viet Minh into battle.  Previously, the Viet Minh had been waging a guerrilla war against the French.  The French hoped to decisively defeat the Viet Minh in conventional operations, destroy it as a political movement, and retain their colonies in Indochina.  The plan they came up with to accomplish was the Navarre Plan of March-April 1953, named after France's last general in Vietnam, General Henri Navarre.  The Navarre Plan envisioned that the "Vietnamese army was to assume a larger role, with the United States assuming the financial burden."[3]  The French forces, with American equipment, would emphasize mobility operations, designed to entrap Giap's forces and engage it in pitched battle.  The French were unable to trap Giap's forces in a series of operations, so Navarre decided to build an airhead in Giap's territory, the mountains of Tonkin.  Navarre believed that he could lure Giap's elite forces into "meat-grinder" battles.  He did lure the Viet Minh into the "meat-grinder" but it was the French that were consumed for the reasons that we discussed during the student presentations.

      The Viet Minh's strategic view and desired end state in seeking battle against the French was that General Giap had become convinced that the protracted people's war being waged by the Vietminh against the French had entered into its third stage, general counterattack.[4]  Giap had now three-hundred thousand troops who were organized along conventional lines into battalions, regiments, and divisions.  These units were well supplied with Russian and Chinese equipment, and O&M supplies which were carried by a stream of peasant porters to the operational divisions.  Their objective was simple:  destroy the garrison at Dien Bien Phu and drive the French out of Indochina.  General Giap's message to his troops on the eve of the battle said:  "Master fear and pain, overcome obstacles, unite your efforts, fight to the very end, annihilate the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, win a great victory!"[5]

     The strategic setting after battle as a result of the Geneva Accords was only a military ceasefire between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).  Vietnam remained divided along the 17th parallel, and only vision of a political future that the DRV received was a promise of elections in two years.  The French had the opportunity to regroup their forces below the 17th parallel, and expected to continue to exert their influence on South Vietnam, but their involvement in Vietnam was finished.  The ultimate result of the Geneva Conference was the beginning of direct American involvement in Vietnam.

      The United States became involved in Vietnam because it saw France's defeat as a blow to the West and a victory for communism.  In the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the French military defeat at Dien Bien Phu signified a victory for Chinese communism over the West.  This Chinese Communist expansion could not be tolerated, thus the US did not support the outcome of the Geneva Conference.  What the US did do was to "embark on a course designed to make the purely military arrangements serve as the basis of a de facto political settlement."[6]   The US also did not promise to observe the promised elections but rather not to use force to break them up.  Effectively vetoing the elections through this clause, the US sought to shore up Ngo Dihn Diem's government in South Vietnam, and thereby making Vietnam's division permanent.  The US believed that France pusillanimous policy in Vietnam, poor military planning, and colonial past had been the reasons for their defeat.  Not burdened by any of the above sins, the US sought to fight communism in Vietnam through Diem.

      Given the political accords reached as a result of Dien Bien Phu, clearly it did not produce a great strategic result or victory:  Vietnam remained divided, and the US became directly involved taking the place of France.   One may argue that the Vietnamese might have been able to achieve more at the conference table had it not been for American intransigence and duplicity.  On the other hand, it can be equally argued that it was the benign nature of the political demands that the accords placed on France (and the US) that led to the agreement in the first place.  This remains conjectural but if the demands had been the immediate reunification of Vietnam under DRV rule, the accords might have not been signed.  The point here is that the military victory of the Viet Minh over the French at Dien Bien Phu did not translate into a political victory but a great political defeat for the Viet Minh and Ho Chi Minh.

      An alternative outcome occurred in the Algerian War of independence where there were no French defeats in large-scale military operations, but France subsequently withdrew and there was no American involvement although Ben Bella was also espousing a 'socialist program', employing Marxist rhetoric, and enticing the Soviet-bloc nations for political and material aid.  Why did the US not become involved in the Algerian case which was similar in nature to the Vietnamese case, and in an area which was, geographically, much closer to vital American security interests such as Europe?[7]  The answer to this issue lies in the political perspective that a military defeat may result in.  In Dien Bien Phu, the French were ignominiously defeated and humiliated.  As perceived by the Americans, their defeat was a result of the lack of military prowess, an inability to supply troops in the field, and lack of aircraft and technology; essentially a managerial problem subject to a quick resolution if one is tough to see it through.  This is was a national security issue which the United States viewed as tailor-made for its foreign policy due to its ability to manage and solve technological problems, which this was if seen through this prism, in an expeditious and efficient manner.  Addition-ally, the policy of containment had recently become the motive force behind American rhyme and reason, and led to the Truman Administration's decision to begin military aid to Indochina was taken in "more or less" within the overall policy of containment in the world without evaluating the merit of each individual case.[8]

      In the Algerian case, as France did not suffer any major military defeats of note, the American's viewed French operations there as ongoing, and when the negotiated settlement did occur in 1962 there was no stigma of a military defeat for France (although in fact it was a great strategic defeat), and the US did not perceive the communists as being able to pummel the West politically through another Western military disaster.

      In conclusion, I posit that the battle of Dien Bien Phu was not the great strategic victory but rather a failure.  The reasons for its strategic failure are that the Americans did not want to see the French humiliated by a "communist" movement; did not want another "communist" government in Asia; the outcome of Dien Bien Phu represented Western weakness as opposed if it had been a conscious French choice to withdraw as was in Algeria which did not lead to American involvement.

     Another conclusion, that may be tentatively posited for further observation is that a military victory may not lead to a political victory, or that a military defeat (or a least the absence of victory) may still yield political victory.  The object of war is not to win battles but to win wars; and objectives of wars are defined in political terms.

By:  Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.)

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     [1] Bruce Palmer, Jr. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (New York:  Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), p. 5.

     [2]  Ibid.

     [3]  Edward Doyle, et. al., Passing the Torch.  The Vietnam Experience Series. (Boston:  Boston Publishing Company, 1981), p. 62.

     [4]  The other two phases of Mao Zedong's people's war, adapted by Giap to Vietnamese conditions, are:  (1) defensive phase where the survival of the revolutionary forces is the prime objective; (2) the second phase's objective is to further demoralize the enemy and increase the ranks of the guerrillas.    Cited in Ibid., pp 48-49.

     [5]  Giap, in Doyle, op. cit., p. 65.

     [6]  Ibid., p. 84.

     [7]  Cold-war security interests.

     [8]  Palmer, p. 5.

Clausewitz On War, Book 2 Chapter One

Notes to Carl von Clausewitz, On War.  Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.  Princeton University Press, 1976

On War Book 2:  On the Theory of War

While Book 2 is not considered complete, yet it is so important to understanding Clausewitz’s study of war, that it cannot be disregarded.  Thefore I offer the following notes. 

2.1    Chapter One: Classifications of the Art of War

With respect to what is war, Clausewitz offers an elemental observation that can some-times be forgotten in everyday use. We speak of ‘war on drugs,’ of ‘wars’ on something or another but: 

Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war.  Fighting, in turn, is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 127) 

Fighting has determined the nature of the weapons employed.  These in turn influence the combat; thus an interaction exists between the two.

But fighting itself still remains a distinct activity; the more so as it operates in a peculiar element—that of danger. (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 127) 

[I]f one accepts the idea of an armed and equipped fighting force as given: a means about which one does not need to know anything except its chief effects in order to use it properly.  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 127) 

Essentially, then, the art of war is the art of using the given means in combat; there is no better term for it than the conduct of war.  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 127)

The conduct of war, then consists in the planning and conduct of fighting… [because war does not consists in a single act as shown in Book one but rather a series of engagements] This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war.  One has been called tactics, and the other strategy.   (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 128) 

We have to remember that strategy may pursue a wide variety of objectives:  anything that seems to offer an advantage can be the purpose of an engagement, and the maintenance of the instrument of war will often itself become the object of a particular strategic combination.  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 130)

            In speaking of the other activities characteristic of war such as logistics, engineering, etc.  these “[M]ay be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparations for war, and war proper. The same distinction must be made in theory as well.”  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 131) 

[T]he maintenance of troops in camps or billets may call for activities that do not constitute a use of the fighting forces, such as the building of shelters, the pitching of tents, and supply and sanitary services.  These are neither tactical nor strategic in nature.  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 131)

While the organization and administration of forces must include such matters as artillery, fortification, etc. these are necessary for the creation, training and maintenance of fighting forces.  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 132)

The theory of war proper, on the other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purposes of the war.  All that it requires from the first group is the end product, an understanding of their main characteristics.  That is what we call “the art of war” in a narrower sense… 

The art of war in the narrower sense must now in its turn be broken down into tactics and strategy.  The first is concerned with the form of the individual engagement, the second with its use…

The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were confused and entangled.  (Book Two, Chapter One, p. 132)

            The statesman or general should manage campaign exactly to suit resources, doing neither too much nor too little.  (David Jablonsky, ‘Why is Strategy Difficult’ in US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (June 2006), p. 115-125).

At the tactical level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory.” For the strategic, however, Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.” [internal citations omitted]

Thus, strategy was “the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of the war.” And only the political or policy level could determine that objective. “To bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy,”… (Jablonsky, p. 115-116).

Notes to Clausewitz's On War, Book 3, Part I

Notes to Carl von Clausewitz, On War.  Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.  Princeton University Press, 1976

On War Book 3:  On Strategy In General

It’s important to note that only Book One of On War is the only book that Clausewitz considered as complete.  Books Three (On Strategy in General) and Eight (On War Plans): Peter Paret considers the most beneficial and integrated with respect to Book One.

“The Enduring legacy of Clausewitz is that he ignored question of “how” “posed by modern science since the 17^th century and returned to earlier questions, the Platonic “what is” and the Aristotelian “what for,” which are more valid ones for investigating social phenomena like strategy and war.”  (Creveld, pp. 42-43)

3.1    Chapter One: Strategy

Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 177)  Strategic theory must therefore study the engagement in terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course.  (Id.) 

The strategist… will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it:  he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements… The strategist, in short, must maintain control throughout.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 177)

Strategic theory, therefore, deals with planning; or rather, it attempts to shed light on the components of war and their interrelationships, stressing those few principles or rules that can be demonstrated. (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 177)

A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little.  But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole.  What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only becomes evident in final success.  (Book Three, Chapter One, pp. 177-178)

In fact, the means and forms that the strategist employs are so very simple, so familiar from constant repetition, that it seems ridiculous in the light of common sense when critics discuss them, as they do so often, with pompous solemnity.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178)

 

In other words, in was as in politics results count.  Clausewitz states that strategy cannot be reduced to examining only material factors as it cannot exist outside the moral realm.  Contrary to the beliefs of some operations analysts [number crunchers] and academic theorists [who usually have no military experience other than reading books] it cannot just be reduced to “a few mathematical formulas of equilibrium and superiority, of time and space, limited by a few angles and lines.”  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178)

The relations between the material factors are all very simple; what is more difficult to grasp are the intellectual factors involved.  Even so, it is only in the highest realms of strategy that intellectual complications and extreme diversity of factors and relationships occur.  At that level, there is little or no difference between strategy, policy, and statesmanship … there their influence is greater in questions of quantity and scale that in forms of execution.  Where execution is dominant, as it is in the individual events of a war whether great or small, then intellectual factors are reduced to a minimum.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178)

The Charge of the Light Brigade

Alfred, Lord Tennyson

1.

Half a league, half a league,
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
"Forward, the Light Brigade!
"Charge for the guns!" he said:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

2.

"Forward, the Light Brigade!"
Was there a man dismay'd?
Not tho' the soldier knew
Someone had blunder'd:
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

Clausewitz observes that “Everything in strategy is simple, but that does not mean that everything is easy.”  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178) This is the equivalent of the modern observation that it is easy to start a war but it is not so easy to complete it successfully.  Why?

Once is has  been determined, from the political conditions, what a war is meant to achieve and what it can achieve, it is easy to chart the course.  But great strength of character, as well as great lucidity and firmness of mind, is required in order to follow through steadily, to carry out the plan, and not to be thrown off course by thousands of diversions.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178)

Clausewitz states that it takes “more strength of will to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics.”  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178)  The reason for this is that there is more time for deliberation and “ample room for apprehensions, one’s own and those of others; for objections and remonstrations and, in consequence, for premature regrets.”  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 178)   It takes a person of strong will to make strategic decisions which will affect the course of the war.  However, strong will is not enough.  It has to be combined with knowledge of what you are doing.  Saddam Hussein had a strong will and made disastrous strategic decisions because he didn’t know what he was doing. 

The other aspect to be admired concerns the difficulties of execution.  Maneuvers designed to turn a flank are easily planned.  It is equally easy to conceive a plan for keeping a small force concentrated so that it can meet a scattered enemy on equal terms at any point, and to multiply its strength by rapid movement.  There is nothing admirable about the ideas themselves.  Faced with such simple concepts, we have to admit that they are simple.

            But let a general try to imitate Frederick! [the Great] (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 179)

This is the part of strategy that most would-be generals fail to understand.  The concepts of strategy are in of themselves simple. Their execution is what separates a Frederick the Great or a Napoleon from a Saddam Hussein.

Another difficult of execution involves exertions and great hardships imposed on the armed forces.  Clausewitz states that during Frederick the Great’s Campaign of 1760 against the Austrians and the Russians, his army was constantly on the move and had to be ready to fight on a moment’s notice.  Under these conditions, he decisively defeated the Austrians at Leignitz and at Torgau.  (McCleod, p. 322)

Could this be done without subjecting the military machine to serious friction?  Is a general, by sheer force of intellect, able to produce such mobility with the ease of a surveyor manipulating an astrolabe?  Are the generals and supreme commander not moved by the sight of the misery suffered by their pitiful, hungry, and thirsty comrades in arms?  Are complaint and misgivings about such conditions not reported to the high command?  Would an ordinary made date to ask for such sacrifices, and would these not automatically lower the morale of the troops, corrupt their discipline, in short undermine their fighting spirit unless an overwhelming belief in the greatness and infallibility of their commander outweighed all other considerations?  It is this which commands our respect; it is these miracles of execution that we have to admire.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 180)

Clausewitz own experience is in the Napoleonic Wars.  Napoleon made the same point in his maxims:  “XV.  The first consideration with a general who offers battle should be the glory and honour [sic] of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former that the latter will most assuredly be found.” (Chandler, p. 60)

In strategy:

We are constantly brought back to the question:  what, at any given stage of the war or campaign, will be the likely outcome of all major and minor engagements that the two sides can offer one another?  In the planning of a campaign or a war, this alone will decide the measures that have to be taken from the outset.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 182)

If we do not learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves,  we are liable to regard them as windfall profits … [W]e also ignore the possibility that their possession may later lead to definite disadvantages… [J]ust as a businessman cannot take the profit from a single transaction and put it into a separate account, so an isolated advantage gained in war cannot be assessed separately from the over result…

By looking on each engagement as part of a series, at least insofar as events are predictable, the commander is always on the high road to his goal.  (Book Three, Chapter One, p. 182)

Thus war is a continuum both in time and space and breadth as well.  The strategist must be able to link these engagements into one whole sequence in order to succeed. 

Bibliography

Chandler, D. G. (1988). The Military Maxims of Napoleon. New York: Macmillan Publishing Complany.

Creveld, M. v. (1986). Eternal Clausewitz. In M. I. Handel (Ed.), Clausewtiz and Modern Strategy. London: Frank Cass.

McCleod, T. (2001). Fredrick II 'the Great', King of Prussia. In R. Holmes (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Military History (pp. 321-323). London: Oxford University Press.