Ultimately, the successful denuclearization of North Korea will
likely require the following conditions as a minimum:
·
Kim Jong Un’s commitment to denuclearization and
his ability to actualize such a policy within the DPRK without opposition. This is not as simple as it appears. The DPRK has invested heavily in its nuclear
weapons programs, and presumably, there are interest groups within national
security and military-industrial organs who could oppose giving up weapons. While it appears that Kim Jong Un has control
over party and military structure (any opposition appears to have not fared too
well so far) the possibility nevertheless exists of the emergence of serious
opposition to actual denuclearization
·
South Korean commitment not to alter or destabilize
political structure of DPRK,
-
No direct or indirect challenges to regime
legitimacy and political structure
-
North Korea will likely evolve into
Chinese-style communism, i.e., closed political structure with open economy
-
Human rights to be overlooked for a time. China can help North Korea in this regard. Not likely to be a problem for South Korea
itself
·
DPRK’s need for South Korean and American investment
and technology to develop its mineral resources and economy, which will not be
forthcoming unless the country agrees to denuclearize. The value of these golden carrots must be
seen in context of Kim Jong Un’s speech before the 7th Korean
Worker’s Party Congress from May 6 to May 9, 2016, after a 36-year hiatus. Frank Ruediger of the University of Vienna
most appropriately titled the Congress “A Return to a New Normal.”[1] In his speech:
Kim Jong Un refrained from following the typical socialist fallacy of
promoting producer goods over consumer goods. Rather, he emphasized the need
for a balanced development of the sectors of the national economy. In fact, he
even sounded slightly critical of past economic policies when he stressed that
past investments, which were mainly in the economy’s foundations, need to
translate into actual improvements of the people’s lives. Developmental
economists will feel reminded of the debate between supporters of balanced and
unbalanced growth in the 1960s. Once again, we see that many of North Korea’s
problems are far from unique.[2]
·
China’s determination to ensure a
nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula, and willingness to cooperate with the United
States, North Korea and South Korea in pursuit of that goal,
·
Security guarantee to DPRK provided by the
United States, China, and perhaps Russia.
In Kazakhstan’s case, security assurances were provided by Permanent
Five (P-5) states of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC)[3],
-
Will likely require an iron-clad guarantee and
some security mechanism as remedy for a breach thereof
-
May require US to remove forces from South Korea
as a security guarantee to North. On the
other hand, Soviets agreed to German unification without requiring unified
Germany withdrawal from NATO
·
The personal involvement of senior-level policy
officials on all sides, and
·
U.S. technical and financial assistance through
the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to support the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) infrastructure and expand the scope of U.S.-DPRK relations. While originally “created for
the purpose of securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their
associated infrastructure in the former states of the Soviet Union … CTR
assistance has expanded to non-Soviet countries such as the South Asia region,
Iraq, Afghanistan, China, and African nations such as Djibouti, Kenya, South Africa
and Uganda.” [4] The CTR provides a credible and time-tested
mechanism for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
·
As was the case in Kazakhstan, it will be Kim
Jong Un’s “support for, and ability to lead the political process without
domestic opposition”[5], as
well as his ability to implement the process that will be keys to successful
denuclearization.
[1] Frank Ruediger, The 7th Party Congress in North
Korea: A Return to a New Normal, 38
North (May 20, 2016) http://www.38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016/ accessed on September 10, 2016.
[2] Reudiger, Id.
[3] Dena Sholk, The Denuclearization of Kazakhstan
(1991-1995), Georgetown University INAD 912, April 30, 2013; https://isd.georgetown.edu/sites/isd/files/JFD_Sholk_Denuclearization.pdf
(accessed on January 8, 2017), p. 3
[4] Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program. The Center for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation, June 1,
2014;
https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-program/ accessed April 10, 2018.
[5] Sholk, p. 3.
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