IV. Underlying
Conflicts Among Nations
V. Potential
Threats and Capabilities—Actual and Potential
VI. U. S.
Intentions and Capabilities
“When a country abjures its intention of exploiting a
conflict between two other parties, it is in fact signaling that it has the
capacity to do so and that both parties would do well to work at preserving
their neutrality. So too, when a nation
expresses its “deep concern” over a military contingency, it is conveying that
it will assist—in some as yet unspecified way—the victim of what is has defined
as aggression.” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 724)
VII. Present
Risks
Risk One. Wars of
National Union/Reunion (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Two. Wars of
Democratization and Nationalist Secession (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Three. Wars of
Great Power Geopolitical Competition (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Four. Wars of
Nuclear Proliferation (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Five. Wars of
Regional Hegemony (Evera S. V., 1996)
Risk Six. Transnational Wars Against Non-State Actors.
Transnational wars refer to wars
transcending existing national borders against non-state actors, such as
Al-Qaeda and others.
VIII. Nuclear
Proliferation and Risk of War
The fact is that whether we like it or
not, nuclear weapons establish a balance of power. Admission to the nuclear
club provides an insurance policy against external aggression; though not
internal (and often centrifugal) forces such as in the case of Pakistan.
IX. Possible
Causes of Action
Foreign Policy
A. The
First Course—Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently
Projected Programs for Carrying out These Projects
B. The
Second Course—Isolation
C. The
Third Course—Continuous Military Intervention
D. The Fourth Course—Dependence on International
Institutions
The problem with the guarantee of
rights in international law is that the rights of the strong are those which
are guaranteed at the expense of the weak or the vanquished. For example, Henry Kissinger explains that for
Count Metternich, rights existed in the nature of things. “Whether they were affirmed in law or by
constitution was an essentially technical question which had nothing to do with
bringing about freedom. Metternich
considered guaranteeing rights to be a paradox.
“Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they
emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements… Objects mistakenly made subject
to legislation result only in their limitation, if not the complete annulment,
of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.” (Kissinger,
1994, pp. 84-85)