1.3 Book One, Chapter 3: On Military Genius
GIV COMMENT: This is an important chapter from a practical point of view and is not dependent on historical analysis or setting. Genius does not have any special meaning other than an ordinary meaning, “in which “genius” refers to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 100.)
[I]t is precisely the essence of military genius that it does not consist in a single appropriate gift—courage, for example—while the other qualities of mind or temperament are wanting or are not suite to war. Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements, in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be conflict with the rest.
[T]he terms refers to a special cast of mental or moral powers which can rarely occur in an army when a society has to employ its abilities in many different areas. The smaller the ranges of activities of a nation and the more the military factor dominate, the greater will be the incidence of military genius. This, however, is true only of its distribution, not of its quality. The latter depends on the general intellectual development of a given society. In any primitive, warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common that among civilized peoples. It is possessed by almost every warrior: but in civilized societies only necessity will stimulate it in the people as a whole, since they lack the natural disposition for it. On the other hand, we will never find a savage who is truly a great commander, and very rarely one who would be considered a military genius, since this requires a degree of intellectual powers beyond anything that a primitive people can develop. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 100.)
Possession of military genius coincides with the higher degrees of civilization: the most highly developed societies produce the most brilliant soldiers, as the Romans and the French have shown us.
COMMENT: In accord with the Platonic virtues of courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. Clausewitz suggests that the most evenly balance produces military genius.
Examining the qualities of Military genius:
War is the realm of danger; therefore courage is the first quality of a warrior. [GIV COMMENT: As Plato reminds us, a lion can lead an army of rabbits; but an army of lions cannot be led by a rabbitt. The Republic]
Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility… [Clausewitz only discusses the first]
Courage in the face of personal danger is also of two kinds. It may be indifference to danger, which could be due to the individual’s constitution, or to his holding life cheap, or to habit… Alternatively, courage may result from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind…
These two kinds of courage act in different ways. The first is the more dependable; having become second nature, it will never fail. The other will often achieve more… The highest kind of courage is a compound of both.
War is the real of physical exertion and suffering. These will destroy us unless we can make ourselves indifferent to them and for this birth or training must provide us with a certain strength of body and soul… it is exactly these qualities that primitive and semicivilized peoples usually possess.
If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to the region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for…
War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 101.)
If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d’oeil; the second is determination. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 102.)
GIV COMMENT: In this regard, Sidney Hook’s comment is apropos at this juncture: “One of the most conspicuous expressions of political insight is the sense of timing. Without it, great intelligence can be ineffective. Coupled with strong will, it can carry a mediocre mind to the heights.” The Hero in History, 1943.
The aspect of war that has always attracted the greatest attention is the engagement. Because time and space are important elements of the engagement… the idea of a rapid and accurate decision was first based on an evaluation of time and space…
Coup d’oeil therefore refers not alone to the physical but, more commonly to the inward eye… the concept merely refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 102.)
GIV COMMENT: This is the O[bservation] O[rientation] part of Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop decision-making matrix
[Determination] Intelligence alone is not courage; we often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 102.)
COMMENT: Interesting to read Clausewitz’s observation along side Neitzsche’s: “Courageous, untroubled, mocking, violent—that is what wisdom wants us to be: wisdom is a woman and loves only a warrior. […]
Since in the rush of event a man is governed by feelings rather than by thought, the intellect needs to arouse the quality of courage, which then supports and sustains it in action… [T]he role of determination is to limit the agonies of doubt and the perils of hesitation when the motives for action are inadequate. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 102-103.)
Determination, which dispels doubt, is a quality that can be aroused only by the intellect, and by a specific case of mind at that… it is engendered only by a metal act; the mind tells man that boldness is required, and thus gives direction to his will. [men of low intelligence cannot possess military genius because] They may act without hesitation in a crisis, but if they do, they act without reflection; and a man who acts without reflection cannot, of course, be torn by doubt. [Kornilov—heart of a lion with brains of a sheep] From time to time action of this type may even be appropriate; but… it is the average result that indicates the existence of military genius. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 103.)
[D]etermination proceeds from a special type of mind, from a strong rather than a brilliant one. We can give further proof of this interpretation by pointing to the many examples of men who show great determination as junior offices, but lose it as they rise in rank. Conscious of the need to be decisive, they also recognize the risks entailed by a wrong decision; since they are unfamiliar with the problems now facing them, their mind loses their former incisiveness. The more used they had been to instant action, the more their timidity increases as they realize the dangers of the vacillation that ensnares them.
[a related subject to coup d’oeil and determination]: “presence of mind.” This must play a great role in war, the domain of the unexpected, since it is nothing but an increased capacity of dealing with the unexpected. [Determination] Intelligence alone is not courage; we often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 103.)
The expression “presence of mind” precisely conveys the speed and immediacy of the help provided by the intellect.
A quick retort shows wit; resourcefulness in sudden danger calls, above all, for steady nerve.
Four elements make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance. [then discusses the interplay of psychological forces at play]
To begin with, clear thought demands that we keep one point in mind: of the weight, the burden, the resistance—call it what you like—that challenges the psychological strength of the soldier, only a small part is the direct result of the enemy’s activity, his resistance, or his operations.
A second way in which the enemy’s resistance directly affects the commander is the loss that is cause by prolonged resistance and the influence this exerts on his sense of responsibility.
So long as a unit fights cheerfully, with spirit and élan, great strength of will is rarely needed; but once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, things no longer run like a well-oiled machine. The machine itself begins to resist, and the commander needs tremendous will-power to overcome this resistance. [Determination] Intelligence alone is not courage; we often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 104.)
Of all the passions that inspire man in battle, none, we have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honor and renown… It is primarily this spirit of endeavor on the part of commanders at all levels, this inventiveness, energy, and competitive enthusiasm, which vitalizes an army and make it victorious.
Staunchness indicates the will’s resistance to a single blow; endurance refers to prolonged resistance.
Strength of mind or of character -- “[T]he ability to keep one’s head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion. Could strength of intellect alone account for such a faculty? We doubt it. [Determination] Intelligence alone is not courage; we often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 105.)
We repeat again: strength of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one’s balance in spite of them. Even with the violence of emotion, judgment and principle must still functions like a ship’s compass, which records the slightest variations however rough the sea. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 107.)
We say a man has strength of character, or simply has character, if he sticks to his own convictions, whether these derive from his own opinions or someone else’s, whether they represent principles, attitudes, sudden insights, or any other mental force. Such firmness cannot show itself, of course, if a man keeps changing his mind… Obviously a man whose opinions are constantly changing, even though this is in response to his own reflections, would not be called a man of character. The term is applied only to men whose views are stable and constant. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 107.)
Action can never be based on anything firmer than instinct, a sensing of the truth. Nowhere, in consequence, are differences of opinion so acute as in war, and fresh opinions never cease to batter at one’s convictions. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 108.)
Often there is a gap between principles and actual events that cannot always be bridged by a succession of logical deductions…. Frequently nothing short of an imperative principle will suffice, which is not par of the immediate thought-process, but dominates it: that principle is in all doubtful case to stick to one’s first opinion and to refuse to change it unless forced to do so by a clear conviction. (Id., p. 108.)
Strength of character can degenerate into obstinacy.
Obstinacy is not an intellectual defect; it comes from reluctance to admit that one is wrong… Obstinacy is a fault of temperament. Stubbornness and intolerance of contradiction result from a special kind of egotism, which elevates above everything else the pleasure of its autonomous intellect, to which others must bow. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 108.)
We would therefore argue that strength of character turns to obstinacy as soon as a man resists another point of view not from superior insight or attachment to some higher principle, but because he objects instinctively. (Book One, Chapter Three, pp. 108-109.)
Appropriate talent is needed at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed. But history and posterity reserve the name of “genius” for those who have excelled in the highest positions—as commanders-in-chief—since here the demands for intellectual and moral powers are vastly greater. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 111.)
[A] commander-in-chief must also be a statesman, but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 112.)
Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated—mostly in the light of probabilities alone… What this task requires in the way of higher intellectual gifts is a sense of unity and a power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities which an ordinary mind would labor to identify and wear itself out in so doing. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 112.)
Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability. The most powerful springs of action in men lie in his emotions. He derives his most vigorous support… from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character.
If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius, experience and observation will both tell us that it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country. (Book One, Chapter Three, p. 112.)
L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace. General George S. Patton
Thursday, August 9, 2012
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
On War, Part IV: Purpose and Means in War
1.2 Book One, Chapter 2: Purpose and Means in War
[P]ure concept of war… the political purpose of war had no connection with war itself; for if war is an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will its aim would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disarm him. That aim is derived from the theoretical concept of war… (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 90).
[T]hree broad objectives , which between them cover everything: the armed forces, the country, and the enemy’s will...
The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a conditions that can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the phrase “destruction of the enemy’s forces” this alone is what we mean.
The country must be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces.
[S]o long as the enemy’s will has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 90).
Be that as it may, we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved and its business is at an end. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 90-91).
Since of the three objectives named, it is the fighting forces that assure the safety of the country, the natural sequence would be to destroy them first, and then subdue the country. Having achieved these two goals and exploiting our own position of strength, we can bring the enemy to the peace table. As a rule, destroying the enemy’s forces tends to be a gradual process, as does the ensuing subjugation of the country.
But the aim of disarming the enemy (the object of war in the abstract, the ultimate means of accomplishing the war’s political purpose, which should incorporate all the rest) is in fact not always encountered in reality, and need not be fully achieved as a condition of peace. On no account should theory raid it to the level of a law. May treaties have been concluded before on of the antagonists could be called powerless—even before the balance of power had been seriously altered. What is more, a review of actual case shows a whole category of wars in which the very idea of defeating the enemy is unreal: those in which the enemy is substantially the stronger power. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 91).
COMMENT: One example of this is the Vietnam War or even the war in Afghanistan [in 2012]; in which the US is the far stronger power. Obviously, the Vietnamese did not disarm the US and the Afghans will not disarm the US—unless we speak of disarming metaphorically thus losing precision and meaning.
[Theoretical object of war is sometimes inappropriate to actual conflict] If war were what pure theory postulates, a war between states of markedly unequal strength would be absurd, and so impossible. At most, material disparity could not go beyond the amount that moral factors could replace; and social conditions being what they are in Europe today, moral forces would not go far. [I wonder what Islamic fanatics would think of that]. But wars have in fact been fought between states of very unequal strength, for actual war is often far removed from the pure concept postulated by theory. Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 91).
Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. If from the very start the other side feels that this is probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take the long way round and totally defeat the enemy. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 91).
Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92).
[T]he original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences.
The questions now arises how can success be made more likely. One way, of course, is to choose objectives that will incidentally bring about the enemy’s collapse—the destruction of his armed forces and the conquest of his territory; but neither is quite what it would be if our real object were the total defeat of the enemy… If we wish to gain total victory, then the destruction of his armed forces is the most appropriate action and the occupation of his territory only a consequence… If on the other hand we do not aim at destroying the opposing army, and if we are convinced that the enemy does not seek a brutal decision, but rather is an advantage in itself; and should this advantage be enough to make the enemy fear for the final outcome, it can be considered as a short cut on the road to peace.
But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to operations that heave direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92).
The second question is how to influence the enemy’s expenditure of effort; in other words, how to make the war more costly to him.
The enemy’s expenditure of effort consists in the wastage of his forces—our destruction of them; and in his loss of territory—our conquest. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 93).
[I]n practice, when strong motives are not present, the slightest nuances often decide between the different uses of force. (id.)
In addition, there are three other methods directly aimed at increasing the enemy’s expenditure of effort. The first of these is invasion, that is the seizure of enemy territory; not with the object of retaining it but in order to exact financial contributions, or even to lay it to waste. The immediate object here is neither to conquer the enemy country nor to destroy its army, but simply to cause general damage. The second method is to give priority to operations that will increase the enemy’s suffering… The third, and far the most important method, judging from the frequency of its use, is to wear down the enemy… Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.
[GIV COMMENT: Can we separate physical and moral resistance. Should we? Clearly this is what is at play in today [2012] in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Pakistan]
If we intend to hold out longer that our opponent we must be content with the smallest possible objects, for obviously a major object requires more effort than a minor one. The minimum object is pure self-defense; in other words, fighting without a positive purpose… But resistance is a form of action, aimed at destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions. Every single act of our resistance is directed to that act alone, and that is what makes our policy negative. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 93)… What is lacks in immediate effectiveness it must make up for in its use of time, that is by prolonging the war. Thus the negative aim, which lies at the heart of pure resistance, is also the natural formula for outlasting the enemy, for wearing him down. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 93-94).
Here lies the origin of the distinction that dominates the whole of war: the difference between attack and defense… that from the negative purpose derive all the advantages, all the more effective forms, of fighting, and that in it is expressed the dynamic relationship between the magnitude and the likelihood of success.
If a negative aim—that is, the use of every means available for pure resistance—gives an advantage in war, the advantage need only be enough to balance any superiority the opponent may possess: in the end his political object will not seem worth the effort it costs.
We can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy’s attacks… One further kind of action, of shortcuts to the goal, needs mention: one could call them arguments ad hominem. In there a field of human affairs where personal relations do not count, where the sparks they strike do not leap across all practical considerations? The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 94)
[means of war] There is only one: combat… it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat.
Everything that occurs in war results from the existence of armed forces: but whenever armed forces, that is armed individuals, are used, the idea of combat must be present.
Combat in war is not a contest between individuals. It is a whole made up of many parts, and in that whole two elements may be distinguished, one determined by the subject, the other by the objective… Moreover, combat itself is made an element of war by its very purpose, by its objective.
COMMENT: Review Soviet laws of armed conflict.
The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.
[T]he destruction of the enemy is not the only means of attaining the political object, when there are other objectives for which the war is waged. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 95)
There is only one means in war: combat. But the multiplicity of forms that combat assumes leas us in as many different directions as are created by the multiplicity of aims, so that our analysis does not seem to have made any progress. But that is not so: the fact that only one means exists constitutes a strand that runs through the entire web of military activity and really holds it together. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 96)
[the importance of destruction of the enemy’s forces relative to other purposes] In any given case the answer will depend on circumstances…
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it cam to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 97)
COMMENT: The Soviets recognized this principle in their correlation of forces analysis.
[W]e can only say destruction of the enemy is more effective if we can assume that all other conditions are equal… Greater effectiveness relates not to the means but to the end; we are simply comparing the effect of different outcomes.
When we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered… The advantage that the destruction of the enemy possesses over all other means is balanced by its cost and danger; and it is only in order to avoid these risks that other policies are employed.
That the method of destruction cannot fail to be expensive is understandable; other thing being equal, the more intent we are on destroying the enemy’s forces, the greater our own efforts must be.
The danger of this method is that the greater the success we seek, the greater will be the damage if we fail. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 97)
COMMENT: Operation Desert Storm – failure to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard allowed Saddam to put down the Shiite rebellion in the South; and caused the Kurds to be displaced. As a result, we were stuck in Northern Iraq from 1991 to 2003; 12 years of phony war – like 1939-1940. This is significant for future war.
If he were to seek the decision through a major battle, his choice would force us against our will to do likewise… Two objectives, neither of which is part of the other, are mutually exclusive: one force cannot simultaneously be used for both.
The effort to destroy the enemy’s forces has a positive purpose and leads to positive results, whose final aim is the enemy’s collapse. Preserving our own forces has a negative purpose; it frustrated the enemy’s intentions—that is, it amounts to pure resistance, whose ultimate aim can only be to prolong the war until the enemy is exhausted.
The policy with a positive purpose calls the act of destruction into being; the policy with a negative purpose waits for it.
[A] policy of waiting must never become passive endurance, that any action involved in it may just as well seek the destruction of the opposing forces as any other objective. It would be a fundamental error to imagine that a negative aim implies a preference for a bloodless decision over the destruction of the enemy. A preponderantly negative effort may of course lead to such a choice, but always at the risk that if is not the appropriate course: that depends on factors that are determined not by us but by the opponent. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 98)
The one certain effect a preponderantly negative policy will have is to retard the decision: in other words, action is transposed into waiting for the decisive moment. This usually means that action is postponed in time and space to the extent that space is relevant and the circumstances permit. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 98-99.)
COMMENT: Crucially, Clausewitz comments that while there are many different roads to lead to a goal, “to the attainment of the political object, fighting is the only possible means. Everything is governed by a supreme law, the decision by force of arms… To sum up: of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces always appears as the highest. (Book One, Chapter 2, p. 99.) This is the second point of Mao Zedong’s dictum: “The first law of war is to protect ourselves and then destroy the enemy.”
These conclusions concerning the nature of war and the function of its purposes and means; the manner in which war in practice deviates in varying degrees from its basic, rigorous concept, as to a supreme law; all these points must be kept in mind in our subsequent analyses if we are to perceive the real connection between all aspects of war, and the same true significance of each; and if we wish to avoid constantly falling into the wildest inconsistencies with reality and even with our own arguments. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 99)
[P]ure concept of war… the political purpose of war had no connection with war itself; for if war is an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will its aim would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disarm him. That aim is derived from the theoretical concept of war… (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 90).
[T]hree broad objectives , which between them cover everything: the armed forces, the country, and the enemy’s will...
The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a conditions that can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the phrase “destruction of the enemy’s forces” this alone is what we mean.
The country must be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces.
[S]o long as the enemy’s will has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 90).
Be that as it may, we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved and its business is at an end. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 90-91).
Since of the three objectives named, it is the fighting forces that assure the safety of the country, the natural sequence would be to destroy them first, and then subdue the country. Having achieved these two goals and exploiting our own position of strength, we can bring the enemy to the peace table. As a rule, destroying the enemy’s forces tends to be a gradual process, as does the ensuing subjugation of the country.
But the aim of disarming the enemy (the object of war in the abstract, the ultimate means of accomplishing the war’s political purpose, which should incorporate all the rest) is in fact not always encountered in reality, and need not be fully achieved as a condition of peace. On no account should theory raid it to the level of a law. May treaties have been concluded before on of the antagonists could be called powerless—even before the balance of power had been seriously altered. What is more, a review of actual case shows a whole category of wars in which the very idea of defeating the enemy is unreal: those in which the enemy is substantially the stronger power. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 91).
COMMENT: One example of this is the Vietnam War or even the war in Afghanistan [in 2012]; in which the US is the far stronger power. Obviously, the Vietnamese did not disarm the US and the Afghans will not disarm the US—unless we speak of disarming metaphorically thus losing precision and meaning.
[Theoretical object of war is sometimes inappropriate to actual conflict] If war were what pure theory postulates, a war between states of markedly unequal strength would be absurd, and so impossible. At most, material disparity could not go beyond the amount that moral factors could replace; and social conditions being what they are in Europe today, moral forces would not go far. [I wonder what Islamic fanatics would think of that]. But wars have in fact been fought between states of very unequal strength, for actual war is often far removed from the pure concept postulated by theory. Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 91).
Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. If from the very start the other side feels that this is probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take the long way round and totally defeat the enemy. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 91).
Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92).
[T]he original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences.
The questions now arises how can success be made more likely. One way, of course, is to choose objectives that will incidentally bring about the enemy’s collapse—the destruction of his armed forces and the conquest of his territory; but neither is quite what it would be if our real object were the total defeat of the enemy… If we wish to gain total victory, then the destruction of his armed forces is the most appropriate action and the occupation of his territory only a consequence… If on the other hand we do not aim at destroying the opposing army, and if we are convinced that the enemy does not seek a brutal decision, but rather is an advantage in itself; and should this advantage be enough to make the enemy fear for the final outcome, it can be considered as a short cut on the road to peace.
But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to operations that heave direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92).
The second question is how to influence the enemy’s expenditure of effort; in other words, how to make the war more costly to him.
The enemy’s expenditure of effort consists in the wastage of his forces—our destruction of them; and in his loss of territory—our conquest. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 93).
[I]n practice, when strong motives are not present, the slightest nuances often decide between the different uses of force. (id.)
In addition, there are three other methods directly aimed at increasing the enemy’s expenditure of effort. The first of these is invasion, that is the seizure of enemy territory; not with the object of retaining it but in order to exact financial contributions, or even to lay it to waste. The immediate object here is neither to conquer the enemy country nor to destroy its army, but simply to cause general damage. The second method is to give priority to operations that will increase the enemy’s suffering… The third, and far the most important method, judging from the frequency of its use, is to wear down the enemy… Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.
[GIV COMMENT: Can we separate physical and moral resistance. Should we? Clearly this is what is at play in today [2012] in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Pakistan]
If we intend to hold out longer that our opponent we must be content with the smallest possible objects, for obviously a major object requires more effort than a minor one. The minimum object is pure self-defense; in other words, fighting without a positive purpose… But resistance is a form of action, aimed at destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions. Every single act of our resistance is directed to that act alone, and that is what makes our policy negative. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 93)… What is lacks in immediate effectiveness it must make up for in its use of time, that is by prolonging the war. Thus the negative aim, which lies at the heart of pure resistance, is also the natural formula for outlasting the enemy, for wearing him down. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 93-94).
Here lies the origin of the distinction that dominates the whole of war: the difference between attack and defense… that from the negative purpose derive all the advantages, all the more effective forms, of fighting, and that in it is expressed the dynamic relationship between the magnitude and the likelihood of success.
If a negative aim—that is, the use of every means available for pure resistance—gives an advantage in war, the advantage need only be enough to balance any superiority the opponent may possess: in the end his political object will not seem worth the effort it costs.
We can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy’s attacks… One further kind of action, of shortcuts to the goal, needs mention: one could call them arguments ad hominem. In there a field of human affairs where personal relations do not count, where the sparks they strike do not leap across all practical considerations? The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 94)
[means of war] There is only one: combat… it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat.
Everything that occurs in war results from the existence of armed forces: but whenever armed forces, that is armed individuals, are used, the idea of combat must be present.
Combat in war is not a contest between individuals. It is a whole made up of many parts, and in that whole two elements may be distinguished, one determined by the subject, the other by the objective… Moreover, combat itself is made an element of war by its very purpose, by its objective.
COMMENT: Review Soviet laws of armed conflict.
The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.
[T]he destruction of the enemy is not the only means of attaining the political object, when there are other objectives for which the war is waged. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 95)
There is only one means in war: combat. But the multiplicity of forms that combat assumes leas us in as many different directions as are created by the multiplicity of aims, so that our analysis does not seem to have made any progress. But that is not so: the fact that only one means exists constitutes a strand that runs through the entire web of military activity and really holds it together. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 96)
[the importance of destruction of the enemy’s forces relative to other purposes] In any given case the answer will depend on circumstances…
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it cam to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 97)
COMMENT: The Soviets recognized this principle in their correlation of forces analysis.
[W]e can only say destruction of the enemy is more effective if we can assume that all other conditions are equal… Greater effectiveness relates not to the means but to the end; we are simply comparing the effect of different outcomes.
When we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered… The advantage that the destruction of the enemy possesses over all other means is balanced by its cost and danger; and it is only in order to avoid these risks that other policies are employed.
That the method of destruction cannot fail to be expensive is understandable; other thing being equal, the more intent we are on destroying the enemy’s forces, the greater our own efforts must be.
The danger of this method is that the greater the success we seek, the greater will be the damage if we fail. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 97)
COMMENT: Operation Desert Storm – failure to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard allowed Saddam to put down the Shiite rebellion in the South; and caused the Kurds to be displaced. As a result, we were stuck in Northern Iraq from 1991 to 2003; 12 years of phony war – like 1939-1940. This is significant for future war.
If he were to seek the decision through a major battle, his choice would force us against our will to do likewise… Two objectives, neither of which is part of the other, are mutually exclusive: one force cannot simultaneously be used for both.
The effort to destroy the enemy’s forces has a positive purpose and leads to positive results, whose final aim is the enemy’s collapse. Preserving our own forces has a negative purpose; it frustrated the enemy’s intentions—that is, it amounts to pure resistance, whose ultimate aim can only be to prolong the war until the enemy is exhausted.
The policy with a positive purpose calls the act of destruction into being; the policy with a negative purpose waits for it.
[A] policy of waiting must never become passive endurance, that any action involved in it may just as well seek the destruction of the opposing forces as any other objective. It would be a fundamental error to imagine that a negative aim implies a preference for a bloodless decision over the destruction of the enemy. A preponderantly negative effort may of course lead to such a choice, but always at the risk that if is not the appropriate course: that depends on factors that are determined not by us but by the opponent. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 98)
The one certain effect a preponderantly negative policy will have is to retard the decision: in other words, action is transposed into waiting for the decisive moment. This usually means that action is postponed in time and space to the extent that space is relevant and the circumstances permit. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 98-99.)
COMMENT: Crucially, Clausewitz comments that while there are many different roads to lead to a goal, “to the attainment of the political object, fighting is the only possible means. Everything is governed by a supreme law, the decision by force of arms… To sum up: of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces always appears as the highest. (Book One, Chapter 2, p. 99.) This is the second point of Mao Zedong’s dictum: “The first law of war is to protect ourselves and then destroy the enemy.”
These conclusions concerning the nature of war and the function of its purposes and means; the manner in which war in practice deviates in varying degrees from its basic, rigorous concept, as to a supreme law; all these points must be kept in mind in our subsequent analyses if we are to perceive the real connection between all aspects of war, and the same true significance of each; and if we wish to avoid constantly falling into the wildest inconsistencies with reality and even with our own arguments. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 99)
Sunday, July 29, 2012
On War, Part 3
Consequences for Theory [Clausewitz’ Trinity]
War is more that a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of [i] primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [ii] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [iii] of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. (Book One, Chapter One, § 28, p. 89).
The first of these three aspects mainly concern the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. (Book One, Chapter One, § 28, p. 89).
COMMENT: Clausewitz’ Trinity of War
• People—violence, passion
• Commander and Army—chance
• Government—establishes policies for war and ensures subordination to policy
War is more that a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of [i] primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [ii] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [iii] of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. (Book One, Chapter One, § 28, p. 89).
The first of these three aspects mainly concern the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. (Book One, Chapter One, § 28, p. 89).
COMMENT: Clausewitz’ Trinity of War
• People—violence, passion
• Commander and Army—chance
• Government—establishes policies for war and ensures subordination to policy
Sunday, June 3, 2012
On War Part II
Modifications in Practice [from abstract extremes].
COMMENT: Clausewitz acknowledges that extremes are logical results of theoretical terms, which themselves are useless in actual action. In this regard, nuclear threats imply new global perception of threat (the end of sovereignty and neutrality). Forces are geared to air defense with expanded view of defense to a much wider area. Martin van Creveld "Eternal Clausewitz" in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. by Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 42-43). Thermonuclear threats imply greater destruction and numbers of weapons. Options more limited. Nuclear war moved from Clausewitz’ definition of absolute war from a Platonic ideal to a physical possibility, i.e., war consisting of single short but massive blow. (David Jablonski, Why Strategy is Difficult)
Without limitations on new technology, Clausewitz’ connection between military strategy at the apex of a vertical continuum; and policy represented by sum total of national strategy on a horizontal plane is broken. Thus victory in total war becomes meaningless. For example, with respect to nuclear weapons, “a people saved by us through our free use of nuclear weapons over their territories would probably be the last that would ever ask us to help them.” (Bernard Brodie, “More About Limited War,” World Politics 10, no. 1 (October 1957), 117).
Thus in the field of abstract thought although the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme, for here it is dealing with an extreme; a clash of forcers freely operating and obedient to no law but their own. (Book One, Chapter One, § 6, p. 78).
Clausewitz recognizes that when one moves from the abstract world to the real world things look different.
In the abstract world, optimism was all-powerful and forced us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it. Would this ever be the case in practice? Yes, it would if: (a) was were wholly an isolated act, occurring suddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world; (b) it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones; (c) the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, influenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about.
Modifying Condition 1: War is Never and Isolated Act
Of the conditions described in (a) to (c) above, first, the power of resistance of neither opponent is an entire unknown, not even the power of will.
The will [of each opponent] is not a wholly unknown factor [to the other opponent]; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it spread instantaneously… Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides and therefore constitute a moderating force. (Book One, Chapter One, § 7, p. 78).
Modifying Condition 2: War Does Not Consist of a Single Short Blow
But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
[A]s soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes and, if for no other reason, the interaction of the tow sided tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
By resources in question, Clausewitz is referring to “the fighting forces proper, the country with its physical features and population, and its allies.” [italics in original] (id.)
the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces… Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real, objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts, and the tendency towards extremes is once again reduced by this interaction. (Book One, Chapter One, § 8, p. 80).
Modifying Condition 3: In War the Result is Never Final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80).
Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be applied. Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Naturally probabilities are based on assessments of the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of affairs of each side relative the other—war is interactive. What applies to one side applies to the other in correlative fashion. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Political Object Now Comes to the Fore Again
The law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless overshadows the political object of war.
But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, pp. 80-81).
The political object –the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement… We can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. [the outcome cannot be calculated with mathematical fashion]… Between two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect—a real explosion.
This is equally true of the efforts a political object is expected to arous in either state, and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes the political and military objective is the same—for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations…
Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases in predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistence wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, p. 81).
GIV Comment: See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 87 [cite]. Aristotle says that political science is the most authoritative—determines what sciences are necessary in states. Strategy is subordinate to it—a subset. Politics makes use of strategy as rules what people may or may not do. Clausewitz, in my estimate, gets the idea of politics guiding war from Aristotle.
Only One Consideration Can Suspend Military Action, And It Seems That It Can Never Be Present on More Than One Side
If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover so long as they remain under arms (do not negotiate a settlement) that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it: a desire to wait for a better settlement before acting…
But an absolute balance of forces cannot bring about a standstill, for if such a balance should exists the initiative would necessarily belong to the side with the positive purpose—the attacker.
One could, however, conceive of a state of balance in which the side with the positive aim (the side with the stronger grounds for action) was the one that had the weaker forces. The balance would then result from the combined effects of aim and strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 13, p. 82).
Continuity Would Thus Be Brought About in Military Action and Would Again Intensify Everything
If this continuity were to really exist in the campaign its effect would again be to drive everything to extremes… But war, of course, seldom if ever shows such continuity. In numerous conflicts only a very small paart of the time is occupied by action, while the rest is spent in inactivity. This cannot always be an anomaly. Suspension of action in war must be possible; in other words, it is not a contradiction in terms. (Book One, Chapter One, § 14, p. 83).
Principle of Polarity
By thinking that the interests of the two commanders are opposed in equal measure to each other, we have assumed a genuine polarity… The principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same object, in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another out. In a battle each side aims at victory; that is a case of true polarity, since the victory of one side excludes the victory of the other. When, however, we are dealing with two different things that have a common relation external to themselves, the polarity lies not in the things but in their relationship. (Book One, Chapter One, § 15, p. 83).
Attack and Defense Being Things Different in Kind and Unequal in Strength, Polarity Cannot Be Applied to Them
[I]f the only differences between attack and defense lay in the fact that attack has a positive aim whereas defense does not, and the forms of fighting were identical; then every advantage gained by one side would be a precisely equal disadvantage to the other—true polarity would exist. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 83).
GIV COMMENT: This is debatable because a defense can have a positive aim, e.g., wear down the enemy in order to bleed him and prepare for a counter attack as was the case in the Battle of Moscow between October and December 1941. This is Mao Zedong’s premise for guerrilla war.
But there are two distinct forms of action in war: attack and defense… the two are very different and unequal in strength. Polarity, then, does not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both seek to achieve: the decision. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 84).
The Superiority of Defense over Attack Often Destroys the Effect of Polarity, and This Explains the Suspension of Military Action
[D]efense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. Consequently we must ask whether the advantage of postponing a decision is as great for one side as the advantage of defense is for the other… the superiority of the defensive… explains without any inconsistency most periods of inaction that occur in war. The weaker the motives for the action, the more will they be overlaid and neutralized but this disparity between attack and defense, and the more frequently will action be suspended—as indeed experience shows. (Book One, Chapter One, § 17, p. 84).
A Second Cause is Imperfect Knowledge of the Situation
There is still another fact that can bring military action to a standstill: imperfect knowledge of the situation… it must rank among the natural causes which, without entailing inconsistency, can bring military activity to a halt. Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy’s strength too high than too low, such is human nature… The possibility of inaction has a further moderating effect on the progess of the war by diluting it, so to speak, in time by delaying danger, and by increading the means of restoring a balance between the two sides. The greater the tensions that have led to a war, and the greater the consequent war effort, the shorter these periods of inaction. Inversely, the weaker the motive for conflict, the longer the intervals between actions. For the stronger motive increases willpower, and will power, as we know, is always both an element in and the product of strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 18, p. 84-85).
Frequent Periods of Inaction Remove War Still Further from the Realm of the Absolute and Make it Even More a Matter of Assessing Probabilities
The slower the progress and the more frequent the interruptions of military action the easier it is to retrieve a mistake, the bolder will be the general’s assessments, and the more likely he will be to avoid theoretical extremes and to base his plans on probability and inference. Any given situation requires that probabilities be calculated in the light of circumstances, and the amount of time available for such calculation will depend on the pace with which operations are taking place. (Book One, Chapter One, § 19, p. 85).
Therefore Only the Element of Chance is Needed to Make War a Gamble, and That Element is Never Absent
[T]he objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble—chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 20, p. 85).
Not Only Its Objective But Also its Subjective Nature Makes War a Gamble
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war—the means by which war has to be fought—it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which was exists is danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 85).
In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 86).
COMMENT: Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasili I. Chuikov “The Battle for Stalingrad”—“But for success in battle beautifully drawn maps count for very little. A good strategic or operational plan needs to be implemented in good time, needs good tactics and the flexible handling of armies. But when a decision is taken late, it will inevitably be carried out in haste. In such cases, there will as a rule be a lack of organization and co-ordination.” This is the reality of war: maps and calculations count for very little.
How in General This Best Suits Human Nature
Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating… Should theory leave us here, and cheerfully go on elaborating absolute conclusions and prescriptions? Then it would be no use at all in real life. No, it must also take the human factor into account, and find room for courage, boldness, even foolhardiness. The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as in the smallest. With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be through into the other to correct the balance. The greater they are, the greater the margin that can be left for accidents. Thus courage and self confidence are essential in war, and theory should propose only rules that give ample scope to these finest and least dispensable of military virtues, in all their degrees and variations. (Book One, Chapter One, § 22, p. 86).
But War is Nonetheless a Serious Means to a Serious End: A More Precise Definition of War
When whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy… War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy… If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process with can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 23, p. 86-87).
War is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains particular to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object if the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. (Book One, Chapter One, § 24, p. 87).
The Diverse Nature of War
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the close will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political [as opposed to military] in character. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 87-88).
[re emotions may be aroused to the point that the political factor cannot control them] Yet such a conflict will not occur very often, for if the motivations are so powerful there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. [jus in bellum—proportionality of means] On the other hand, if policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 88).
The Effect of This Point of View on the Understanding of Military History and the Foundations of Theory
[All wars can be considered an act of policy (§ 26)] First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88).
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander must have to make it to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88-89).
COMMENT: Clausewitz acknowledges that extremes are logical results of theoretical terms, which themselves are useless in actual action. In this regard, nuclear threats imply new global perception of threat (the end of sovereignty and neutrality). Forces are geared to air defense with expanded view of defense to a much wider area. Martin van Creveld "Eternal Clausewitz" in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. by Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 42-43). Thermonuclear threats imply greater destruction and numbers of weapons. Options more limited. Nuclear war moved from Clausewitz’ definition of absolute war from a Platonic ideal to a physical possibility, i.e., war consisting of single short but massive blow. (David Jablonski, Why Strategy is Difficult)
Without limitations on new technology, Clausewitz’ connection between military strategy at the apex of a vertical continuum; and policy represented by sum total of national strategy on a horizontal plane is broken. Thus victory in total war becomes meaningless. For example, with respect to nuclear weapons, “a people saved by us through our free use of nuclear weapons over their territories would probably be the last that would ever ask us to help them.” (Bernard Brodie, “More About Limited War,” World Politics 10, no. 1 (October 1957), 117).
Thus in the field of abstract thought although the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme, for here it is dealing with an extreme; a clash of forcers freely operating and obedient to no law but their own. (Book One, Chapter One, § 6, p. 78).
Clausewitz recognizes that when one moves from the abstract world to the real world things look different.
In the abstract world, optimism was all-powerful and forced us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it. Would this ever be the case in practice? Yes, it would if: (a) was were wholly an isolated act, occurring suddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world; (b) it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones; (c) the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, influenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about.
Modifying Condition 1: War is Never and Isolated Act
Of the conditions described in (a) to (c) above, first, the power of resistance of neither opponent is an entire unknown, not even the power of will.
The will [of each opponent] is not a wholly unknown factor [to the other opponent]; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it spread instantaneously… Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides and therefore constitute a moderating force. (Book One, Chapter One, § 7, p. 78).
Modifying Condition 2: War Does Not Consist of a Single Short Blow
But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
[A]s soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes and, if for no other reason, the interaction of the tow sided tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
By resources in question, Clausewitz is referring to “the fighting forces proper, the country with its physical features and population, and its allies.” [italics in original] (id.)
the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces… Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real, objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts, and the tendency towards extremes is once again reduced by this interaction. (Book One, Chapter One, § 8, p. 80).
Modifying Condition 3: In War the Result is Never Final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80).
Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be applied. Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Naturally probabilities are based on assessments of the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of affairs of each side relative the other—war is interactive. What applies to one side applies to the other in correlative fashion. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Political Object Now Comes to the Fore Again
The law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless overshadows the political object of war.
But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, pp. 80-81).
The political object –the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement… We can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. [the outcome cannot be calculated with mathematical fashion]… Between two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect—a real explosion.
This is equally true of the efforts a political object is expected to arous in either state, and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes the political and military objective is the same—for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations…
Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases in predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistence wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, p. 81).
GIV Comment: See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 87 [cite]. Aristotle says that political science is the most authoritative—determines what sciences are necessary in states. Strategy is subordinate to it—a subset. Politics makes use of strategy as rules what people may or may not do. Clausewitz, in my estimate, gets the idea of politics guiding war from Aristotle.
Only One Consideration Can Suspend Military Action, And It Seems That It Can Never Be Present on More Than One Side
If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover so long as they remain under arms (do not negotiate a settlement) that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it: a desire to wait for a better settlement before acting…
But an absolute balance of forces cannot bring about a standstill, for if such a balance should exists the initiative would necessarily belong to the side with the positive purpose—the attacker.
One could, however, conceive of a state of balance in which the side with the positive aim (the side with the stronger grounds for action) was the one that had the weaker forces. The balance would then result from the combined effects of aim and strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 13, p. 82).
Continuity Would Thus Be Brought About in Military Action and Would Again Intensify Everything
If this continuity were to really exist in the campaign its effect would again be to drive everything to extremes… But war, of course, seldom if ever shows such continuity. In numerous conflicts only a very small paart of the time is occupied by action, while the rest is spent in inactivity. This cannot always be an anomaly. Suspension of action in war must be possible; in other words, it is not a contradiction in terms. (Book One, Chapter One, § 14, p. 83).
Principle of Polarity
By thinking that the interests of the two commanders are opposed in equal measure to each other, we have assumed a genuine polarity… The principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same object, in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another out. In a battle each side aims at victory; that is a case of true polarity, since the victory of one side excludes the victory of the other. When, however, we are dealing with two different things that have a common relation external to themselves, the polarity lies not in the things but in their relationship. (Book One, Chapter One, § 15, p. 83).
Attack and Defense Being Things Different in Kind and Unequal in Strength, Polarity Cannot Be Applied to Them
[I]f the only differences between attack and defense lay in the fact that attack has a positive aim whereas defense does not, and the forms of fighting were identical; then every advantage gained by one side would be a precisely equal disadvantage to the other—true polarity would exist. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 83).
GIV COMMENT: This is debatable because a defense can have a positive aim, e.g., wear down the enemy in order to bleed him and prepare for a counter attack as was the case in the Battle of Moscow between October and December 1941. This is Mao Zedong’s premise for guerrilla war.
But there are two distinct forms of action in war: attack and defense… the two are very different and unequal in strength. Polarity, then, does not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both seek to achieve: the decision. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 84).
The Superiority of Defense over Attack Often Destroys the Effect of Polarity, and This Explains the Suspension of Military Action
[D]efense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. Consequently we must ask whether the advantage of postponing a decision is as great for one side as the advantage of defense is for the other… the superiority of the defensive… explains without any inconsistency most periods of inaction that occur in war. The weaker the motives for the action, the more will they be overlaid and neutralized but this disparity between attack and defense, and the more frequently will action be suspended—as indeed experience shows. (Book One, Chapter One, § 17, p. 84).
A Second Cause is Imperfect Knowledge of the Situation
There is still another fact that can bring military action to a standstill: imperfect knowledge of the situation… it must rank among the natural causes which, without entailing inconsistency, can bring military activity to a halt. Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy’s strength too high than too low, such is human nature… The possibility of inaction has a further moderating effect on the progess of the war by diluting it, so to speak, in time by delaying danger, and by increading the means of restoring a balance between the two sides. The greater the tensions that have led to a war, and the greater the consequent war effort, the shorter these periods of inaction. Inversely, the weaker the motive for conflict, the longer the intervals between actions. For the stronger motive increases willpower, and will power, as we know, is always both an element in and the product of strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 18, p. 84-85).
Frequent Periods of Inaction Remove War Still Further from the Realm of the Absolute and Make it Even More a Matter of Assessing Probabilities
The slower the progress and the more frequent the interruptions of military action the easier it is to retrieve a mistake, the bolder will be the general’s assessments, and the more likely he will be to avoid theoretical extremes and to base his plans on probability and inference. Any given situation requires that probabilities be calculated in the light of circumstances, and the amount of time available for such calculation will depend on the pace with which operations are taking place. (Book One, Chapter One, § 19, p. 85).
Therefore Only the Element of Chance is Needed to Make War a Gamble, and That Element is Never Absent
[T]he objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble—chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 20, p. 85).
Not Only Its Objective But Also its Subjective Nature Makes War a Gamble
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war—the means by which war has to be fought—it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which was exists is danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 85).
In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 86).
COMMENT: Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasili I. Chuikov “The Battle for Stalingrad”—“But for success in battle beautifully drawn maps count for very little. A good strategic or operational plan needs to be implemented in good time, needs good tactics and the flexible handling of armies. But when a decision is taken late, it will inevitably be carried out in haste. In such cases, there will as a rule be a lack of organization and co-ordination.” This is the reality of war: maps and calculations count for very little.
How in General This Best Suits Human Nature
Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating… Should theory leave us here, and cheerfully go on elaborating absolute conclusions and prescriptions? Then it would be no use at all in real life. No, it must also take the human factor into account, and find room for courage, boldness, even foolhardiness. The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as in the smallest. With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be through into the other to correct the balance. The greater they are, the greater the margin that can be left for accidents. Thus courage and self confidence are essential in war, and theory should propose only rules that give ample scope to these finest and least dispensable of military virtues, in all their degrees and variations. (Book One, Chapter One, § 22, p. 86).
But War is Nonetheless a Serious Means to a Serious End: A More Precise Definition of War
When whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy… War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy… If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process with can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 23, p. 86-87).
War is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains particular to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object if the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. (Book One, Chapter One, § 24, p. 87).
The Diverse Nature of War
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the close will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political [as opposed to military] in character. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 87-88).
[re emotions may be aroused to the point that the political factor cannot control them] Yet such a conflict will not occur very often, for if the motivations are so powerful there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. [jus in bellum—proportionality of means] On the other hand, if policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 88).
The Effect of This Point of View on the Understanding of Military History and the Foundations of Theory
[All wars can be considered an act of policy (§ 26)] First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88).
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander must have to make it to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88-89).
Saturday, May 26, 2012
NOTES TO ON WAR BY CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT: As a B-52 Electronic Warfare Officer in the former Strategic Air Command, U. S. Air Force, I remember the first time I saw a nuclear bomb: A B28FI with a 1.1 Mt warhead. (Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vo1. 1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. Ballinger, 1984, p. 42). My first thoughts were “This is it? This is all there is to it?” I can say without doubt that this remains the most anti-climatic experience I’ve had as an individual. Yet even then I knew that the “wimpy” visual belied a truly awesome and frightening possibility: If ordered by national command authorities, we would fly and drop this thing; which would destroy the assigned target…
As I developed professionally, the answer to those questions grew ever more complex and meanings more shaded. But its basis remains: What is war? What is the meaning of war in the nuclear age? The answer begins with Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.Princeton University
On War by Carl von Clausewitz
It’s important to note that only Book One of “On War” is the only book that Clausewitz considered as complete. Peter Paret considers Books Three (On Strategy in General) and Eight (On War Plans) as the most beneficial and integrated with respect to Book One.
1.0 BOOK ONE: ON THE NATURE OF WAR
Chapter One: What is War?
Definition. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.
COMMENT: Clausewitz does not believe in international law and custom as a means to limit war:
Attached to force as certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force—that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law—is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. (Book One, Chapter One, § 2, p. 75)
The Maximum Use of Force. COMMENT: Interesting comment particularly apropos to those who dismiss Clausewitz in favor of the (apparent) bloodless wars advocated by Sun Tzu as the epitome of military art.
Kind-hearted people might of course there was some ingenious way to disarm of defeat and enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 75)
Extremes. COMMENT: Clausewitz’ concept of each side driving the other to extremes. From the 20th century forward, the development of nuclear weapons thus their possible and/or probable use, forces us to grapple with the theoretical concept of extremes.
If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 75-76)
Incompatibility of Moderation in Theory of War. COMMENT: Clausewitz does not contend that moderation does not exist in war. These are the forces that give rise to the war, and likewise “circumscribe and moderate it.” Rather he says that these forces cannot be part of the theory of war—because these forces exist before the fighting starts.
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. … To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: Given the horrific destructive global wars of the 20th century, one can surely debate the culturally-affected opening sentence of the paragraph above. However, it is clear of what Clausewitz is referring to—social conditions affect the methods of war. What he did not predict is the effect of technology on wars as a destroyer of worlds.
Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter, since it is the universal element. … Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth … Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: The Nazi experience speaks for itself on this point.
Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces—comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
Theorists were already beginning to think along such lines when the recent wars taught them a lesson. If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, but they will still affect it to some degree, and the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization but on how important the conflicting interests are an on how long their conflicts lasts. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
First Case of Interaction and First Extreme.
The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.
The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels an opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first “extreme” [italics in original] we meet with. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 76-77)
Aim is to Disarm the Enemy: Second Case of Interaction and Second Extreme.
The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. If follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him … must always be the aim of warfare. (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77)
War [says Clausewitz is not between a living force and a lifeless mass – total non resistance is not war] but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. This is the second case of interaction and it leads to the second “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77).
Maximum Exertion of Strength. Third Extreme.
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will … Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes. This is the third case of interaction and the third “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 5, p. 77).
COMMENT: The idea of total war approaches Clausewitz’s concept of extremes in war. As the entry for “total war [sic]”in the Oxford Companion to Military History states: “total war is one in which the whole population and all the resources of the combatants are committed to complete victory and thus become legitimate military targets.” (TheOxford Oxford University
Next Entry to Follow: Modifications in Practice [from abstract extremes].
As I developed professionally, the answer to those questions grew ever more complex and meanings more shaded. But its basis remains: What is war? What is the meaning of war in the nuclear age? The answer begins with Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
On War by Carl von Clausewitz
It’s important to note that only Book One of “On War” is the only book that Clausewitz considered as complete. Peter Paret considers Books Three (On Strategy in General) and Eight (On War Plans) as the most beneficial and integrated with respect to Book One.
1.0 BOOK ONE: ON THE NATURE OF WAR
Chapter One: What is War?
Definition. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.[italics in original] (On War, Book One, Chapter One, § 2, p. 75)
COMMENT: Clausewitz does not believe in international law and custom as a means to limit war:
Attached to force as certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force—that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law—is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. (Book One, Chapter One, § 2, p. 75)
The Maximum Use of Force. COMMENT: Interesting comment particularly apropos to those who dismiss Clausewitz in favor of the (apparent) bloodless wars advocated by Sun Tzu as the epitome of military art.
Kind-hearted people might of course there was some ingenious way to disarm of defeat and enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 75)
Extremes. COMMENT: Clausewitz’ concept of each side driving the other to extremes. From the 20th century forward, the development of nuclear weapons thus their possible and/or probable use, forces us to grapple with the theoretical concept of extremes.
If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 75-76)
Incompatibility of Moderation in Theory of War. COMMENT: Clausewitz does not contend that moderation does not exist in war. These are the forces that give rise to the war, and likewise “circumscribe and moderate it.” Rather he says that these forces cannot be part of the theory of war—because these forces exist before the fighting starts.
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. … To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: Given the horrific destructive global wars of the 20th century, one can surely debate the culturally-affected opening sentence of the paragraph above. However, it is clear of what Clausewitz is referring to—social conditions affect the methods of war. What he did not predict is the effect of technology on wars as a destroyer of worlds.
Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter, since it is the universal element. … Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth … Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: The Nazi experience speaks for itself on this point.
Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces—comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
Theorists were already beginning to think along such lines when the recent wars taught them a lesson. If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, but they will still affect it to some degree, and the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization but on how important the conflicting interests are an on how long their conflicts lasts. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
First Case of Interaction and First Extreme.
The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.
The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels an opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first “extreme” [italics in original] we meet with. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 76-77)
Aim is to Disarm the Enemy: Second Case of Interaction and Second Extreme.
The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. If follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him … must always be the aim of warfare. (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77)
War [says Clausewitz is not between a living force and a lifeless mass – total non resistance is not war] but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. This is the second case of interaction and it leads to the second “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77).
Maximum Exertion of Strength. Third Extreme.
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will … Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes. This is the third case of interaction and the third “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 5, p. 77).
COMMENT: The idea of total war approaches Clausewitz’s concept of extremes in war. As the entry for “total war [sic]”in the Oxford Companion to Military History states: “total war is one in which the whole population and all the resources of the combatants are committed to complete victory and thus become legitimate military targets.” (The
Next Entry to Follow: Modifications in Practice [from abstract extremes].
Monday, May 21, 2012
Aims and Lessons of War
The Aim of War is to Achieve Political Objectives
Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Shaposhnikov captured the essence of war in military-political terms:
"[A] war must begin with the defeat of the strongest and most dangerous enemy, and it must not be diverted by successes over a weak one by leaving the stronger to hang over one’s neck... It must be not forgotten that for the resolution of a war, it is important to have not only military successes, but also obtain political success, that is, win a victory over a politically important enemy ... Otherwise, only after an extended period accompanied even by military successes, will we be forced to return to the same fight against the main enemy against which we initially were only on the defensive." (David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 42.)
Lessons of the Cold War
George Kennan in discussing American foreign policy and democracy notes that we made two big boo-boos dugint the cold war. (1) to attribute to the “Soviet leadership aims and intentions it did not really have; in jumping to conclusion that the Soviet leaders were just like Hitler and his associates…” with the same aspirations, timetable, and who could only be dealt with in the same manner as Hitler was. (2) The second postwar mistake was to embrace the nuclear weapon “the mainstay of our military posture, and the faith we placed in it to assure our military and political ascendancy in this postwar era.” (George F. Kennan, At a Century’s Ending. Reflections 1982-1995 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), p. 130.)
It is from these two great mistakes that there has flowed, as I see it, the extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this postwar age. And this is a militarization that has had profound effects not just on our foreign policies but also on our own society… And this habit—the habit of pouring so great a part of our gross national product year after year into sterile and socially negative forms of production—has now risen to the status of what I have ventured to call a genuine national addiction. We could not now break ourselves of the habit without the serious of withdrawal symptoms. Millions of people, is addition to those other millions who are in uniform, have become accustomed to deriving their livelihood from the military-industrial complex. Thousands of firms have become dependent on it, not to mention labor unions and communities. It is the main source of our highly destabilizing budgetary deficit. An elaborate and most unhealthy bond has been created between those who manufacture and sell the armaments and those in Washington who buy them. We have created immense vested interests in the maintenance of a huge armed establishment in time of peace and in the export of great quantities of arms to other peoples—great vested interests, in other words, in the Cold War. We have made ourselves dependent on this invidious national practice; so much so that it may fairly be said that if we did not have the Russians and their alleged iniquities to serve as a rationalization for it, we would have to invent some adversary to take their place—which would be hard to do. [My highlight]
Kennan notes that the problem is made worse by the unnecessary wastefulness of it all, the lack of coherent relationship between the way Congress figures out civilian and military costs.
It sometimes seems to me that those of us not involved in this great military-industrial enterprise are in danger of becoming, in the figurative sense, a nation of camp followers, like the pathetic civilian stragglers who trailed along behind the European armies of earlier centuries in the hopes of picking up remnants from the relative abundance of the military resources of food and clothing which the armies disposed.
And because of these requirements we need to keep demonizing our opponent and giving him qualities which make them 10 feet tall in order to justify the military-industrial requirements which become self-generating.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Shaposhnikov captured the essence of war in military-political terms:
"[A] war must begin with the defeat of the strongest and most dangerous enemy, and it must not be diverted by successes over a weak one by leaving the stronger to hang over one’s neck... It must be not forgotten that for the resolution of a war, it is important to have not only military successes, but also obtain political success, that is, win a victory over a politically important enemy ... Otherwise, only after an extended period accompanied even by military successes, will we be forced to return to the same fight against the main enemy against which we initially were only on the defensive." (David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 42.)
Lessons of the Cold War
George Kennan in discussing American foreign policy and democracy notes that we made two big boo-boos dugint the cold war. (1) to attribute to the “Soviet leadership aims and intentions it did not really have; in jumping to conclusion that the Soviet leaders were just like Hitler and his associates…” with the same aspirations, timetable, and who could only be dealt with in the same manner as Hitler was. (2) The second postwar mistake was to embrace the nuclear weapon “the mainstay of our military posture, and the faith we placed in it to assure our military and political ascendancy in this postwar era.” (George F. Kennan, At a Century’s Ending. Reflections 1982-1995 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), p. 130.)
It is from these two great mistakes that there has flowed, as I see it, the extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this postwar age. And this is a militarization that has had profound effects not just on our foreign policies but also on our own society… And this habit—the habit of pouring so great a part of our gross national product year after year into sterile and socially negative forms of production—has now risen to the status of what I have ventured to call a genuine national addiction. We could not now break ourselves of the habit without the serious of withdrawal symptoms. Millions of people, is addition to those other millions who are in uniform, have become accustomed to deriving their livelihood from the military-industrial complex. Thousands of firms have become dependent on it, not to mention labor unions and communities. It is the main source of our highly destabilizing budgetary deficit. An elaborate and most unhealthy bond has been created between those who manufacture and sell the armaments and those in Washington who buy them. We have created immense vested interests in the maintenance of a huge armed establishment in time of peace and in the export of great quantities of arms to other peoples—great vested interests, in other words, in the Cold War. We have made ourselves dependent on this invidious national practice; so much so that it may fairly be said that if we did not have the Russians and their alleged iniquities to serve as a rationalization for it, we would have to invent some adversary to take their place—which would be hard to do. [My highlight]
Kennan notes that the problem is made worse by the unnecessary wastefulness of it all, the lack of coherent relationship between the way Congress figures out civilian and military costs.
It sometimes seems to me that those of us not involved in this great military-industrial enterprise are in danger of becoming, in the figurative sense, a nation of camp followers, like the pathetic civilian stragglers who trailed along behind the European armies of earlier centuries in the hopes of picking up remnants from the relative abundance of the military resources of food and clothing which the armies disposed.
And because of these requirements we need to keep demonizing our opponent and giving him qualities which make them 10 feet tall in order to justify the military-industrial requirements which become self-generating.
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
Some Thoughts on Future War
North Korea clearly has chosen to pursue nuclear-based security to prevent itself from being coerced politically and militarily by the United States, and gain political respect and legitimacy as a regional power. The nuclear option is insurance against defeat and/or humiliation at the hands of the United States, South Korea, or anyone else. It is worth pondering that as the force structure and technological capabilities that the United States displayed in recent wars are beyond the capacity of any nation in the foreseeable future, the only recourse available to a developing power is the cheaper and more accessible nuclear/ballistic missile option.
Paradoxically, America's search for a conventional combat capability in order to preclude nuclear war has proven so successful, that others seek to counter this capability through nuclear forces. Iraq could have drastically altered the outcome of the war, politically in particular, had they used SCUD attacks earlier and with more powerful warheads. Iraq's missile force structure was both logical and affordable; its poor execution and lack of punch is what rendered it ineffective. We cannot use this lack of combat effectiveness as a planning factor, for other nations may prove better capable of effective employment.
For example, during the Falklands War, Argentina successfully used their very limited number of Exocet missiles to cause considerable damage to the British Nave. Despite recent failures, North Korea's missiles are bound to perform better after failures are studied and corrected. Massive strikes, properly timed and combining alternate conventional, chemical, and/or nuclear warheads can create widespread damage, both in military terms and more importantly in political terms which will dictate the war's tempo and determine what outcome will follow. Strategically, a nation equipped with a missile force which is facing a far better armed and more capable opponent will seek to retain a retaliatory capability, with a secure reserve force which will guarantee unacceptable pain, or cause sufficient doubt as to intentions and capabilities upon the enemy, thus allowing for the maximum room for political maneuver. Our future adversaries will combine mobile missiles for offensive operations, dispersing them in depth, using active deception measures for protection and ensuring its operational capacity. This is the face of future war.
A key doctrinal question that we must answer in future war is what will air superiority do for us against an opponent who combines a nuclear missile force with moderate war aims? Another question we must address is how will we be able to deal with a strategic fait-accompli, such as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, before being able to deploy our assets? We must focus on building missile targeting and guidance capabilities, and defenses against missiles rather than stressing the role which airpower played in the Gulf and in Iraq/Afghanistan. In this area space forces can be most useful, providing real-time target updates, reconnaissance, and course correction/guidance to anti-ballistic missiles or offensive weapons.
Warfare is Darwinistic by nature; survival of the fittest is what it is all about. In future war, an opponent may alternately seek to withstand initial blows through dispersion of forces/maskirovka, and selectively attack high value targets with weapons of mass destruction or launch early preemptive attacks against our base/staging areas. On the other hand, it may engage in more subtle operations designed to wear us down politically as was done in Vietnam. In many respects, Maoist protracted guerrilla war strategy is most apropos for this type of future warfare by deception, using missile forces for political effects through military coercion: the enemy attacks, we retreat; the enemy encamps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy flees, we pursue. What will superior technology/air superiority do for us?
Victory in war does not guarantee future success. Airpower has matured and we can take pride in its merits, but these merits cannot blind us to its limitations vis a vis the changing complexion of war. As our defense budget decreases along with our military-industrial capabilities, is an air campaign the answer to future warfare against a nuclear missile armed adversary? We must address these issues now; tomorrow they will be upon us.
Paradoxically, America's search for a conventional combat capability in order to preclude nuclear war has proven so successful, that others seek to counter this capability through nuclear forces. Iraq could have drastically altered the outcome of the war, politically in particular, had they used SCUD attacks earlier and with more powerful warheads. Iraq's missile force structure was both logical and affordable; its poor execution and lack of punch is what rendered it ineffective. We cannot use this lack of combat effectiveness as a planning factor, for other nations may prove better capable of effective employment.
For example, during the Falklands War, Argentina successfully used their very limited number of Exocet missiles to cause considerable damage to the British Nave. Despite recent failures, North Korea's missiles are bound to perform better after failures are studied and corrected. Massive strikes, properly timed and combining alternate conventional, chemical, and/or nuclear warheads can create widespread damage, both in military terms and more importantly in political terms which will dictate the war's tempo and determine what outcome will follow. Strategically, a nation equipped with a missile force which is facing a far better armed and more capable opponent will seek to retain a retaliatory capability, with a secure reserve force which will guarantee unacceptable pain, or cause sufficient doubt as to intentions and capabilities upon the enemy, thus allowing for the maximum room for political maneuver. Our future adversaries will combine mobile missiles for offensive operations, dispersing them in depth, using active deception measures for protection and ensuring its operational capacity. This is the face of future war.
A key doctrinal question that we must answer in future war is what will air superiority do for us against an opponent who combines a nuclear missile force with moderate war aims? Another question we must address is how will we be able to deal with a strategic fait-accompli, such as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, before being able to deploy our assets? We must focus on building missile targeting and guidance capabilities, and defenses against missiles rather than stressing the role which airpower played in the Gulf and in Iraq/Afghanistan. In this area space forces can be most useful, providing real-time target updates, reconnaissance, and course correction/guidance to anti-ballistic missiles or offensive weapons.
Warfare is Darwinistic by nature; survival of the fittest is what it is all about. In future war, an opponent may alternately seek to withstand initial blows through dispersion of forces/maskirovka, and selectively attack high value targets with weapons of mass destruction or launch early preemptive attacks against our base/staging areas. On the other hand, it may engage in more subtle operations designed to wear us down politically as was done in Vietnam. In many respects, Maoist protracted guerrilla war strategy is most apropos for this type of future warfare by deception, using missile forces for political effects through military coercion: the enemy attacks, we retreat; the enemy encamps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy flees, we pursue. What will superior technology/air superiority do for us?
Victory in war does not guarantee future success. Airpower has matured and we can take pride in its merits, but these merits cannot blind us to its limitations vis a vis the changing complexion of war. As our defense budget decreases along with our military-industrial capabilities, is an air campaign the answer to future warfare against a nuclear missile armed adversary? We must address these issues now; tomorrow they will be upon us.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)