Sunday, December 13, 2015
Problem of Historical Backwardness
From: Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.
A backward country assimilates the material and intellectual conquests of the advanced countries. But this does not mean that it follows them slavishly, reproduces all the stages of their past. The theory of the repetition of historic cycles – Vico and his more recent followers – rests upon an observation of the orbits of old pre-capitalist cultures, and in part upon the first experiments of capitalist development. A certain repetition of cultural stages in ever new settlements was in fact bound up with the provincial and episodic character of that whole process. Capitalism means, however, an overcoming of those conditions. It prepares and in a certain sense realises the universality and permanence of man’s development. By this a repetition of the forms of development by different nations is ruled out. Although compelled to follow after the advanced countries, a backward country does not take things in the same order. The privilege of historic backwardness – and such a privilege exists – permits, or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages. Savages throw away their bows and arrows for rifles all at once, without travelling the road which lay between those two weapons in the past. The European colonists in America did not begin history all over again from the beginning. The fact that Germany and the United States have now economically outstripped England was made possible by the very backwardness of their capitalist development. On the other hand, the conservative anarchy in the British coal industry – as also in the heads of MacDonald and his friends - is a paying-up for the past when England played too long the role of capitalist pathfinder.
The development of historically backward nations leads necessarily to a peculiar combination of different stages in the historic process. Their development as a whole acquires a planless, complex, combined character.
The possibility of skipping over intermediate steps is of course by no means absolute. Its degree is determined in the long run by the economic and cultural capacities of the country. The backward nation, moreover, not infrequently debases the achievements borrowed from outside in the process of adapting them to its own more primitive culture. In this the very process of assimilation acquires a self-contradictory character. Thus the introduction of certain elements of Western technique and training, above all military and industrial, under Peter I, led to a strengthening of serfdom as the fundamental form of labour organisation. European armament and European loans – both indubitable products of a higher culture - led to a strengthening of tzarism, which delayed in its turn the development of the country.
The laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism. Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms. Without this law, to be taken of course, in its whole material content, it is impossible to understand the history of Russia, and indeed of any country of the second, third or tenth cultural class.
Saturday, December 12, 2015
Requiem for America's Long Wars
A plain without a feature, bare and brown,
No blade of grass, no sign of neighborhood,
Nothing to eat and nowhere to sit down,
Yet, congregated on its blankness, stood
An unintelligible multitude,
A million eyes, a million boots in line,
Without expression, waiting for a sign.
Out of the air a voice without a face
Proved by statistics that some cause was just
In tones as dry and level as the place:
No one was cheered and nothing was discussed;
Column by column in a cloud of dust
They marched away enduring a belief
Whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to grief.
From 'The Shield of Achilles' by W. H. Auden
No blade of grass, no sign of neighborhood,
Nothing to eat and nowhere to sit down,
Yet, congregated on its blankness, stood
An unintelligible multitude,
A million eyes, a million boots in line,
Without expression, waiting for a sign.
Out of the air a voice without a face
Proved by statistics that some cause was just
In tones as dry and level as the place:
No one was cheered and nothing was discussed;
Column by column in a cloud of dust
They marched away enduring a belief
Whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to grief.
From 'The Shield of Achilles' by W. H. Auden
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
Some Comments to 'We Fail Better' Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military
Re
October 20, 2015 Foreign Policy podcast
The
E.R.: ‘We Fail Better’ Should Not Be the Motto of the U.S. Military David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake, and
Tom Ricks wrestle with America's recent legacy in the Middle East and what's
broken with the last superpower's armed forces.
In
the podcast, among other things, Tom Ricks said that he disagreed with exit strategy
requirement of the [General Colin] Powell Doctrine. The Powell Doctrine provides that:
Military force used as last
resort
Clear-cut military objective
We can measure that the
military objective has been reached (end state)
Military force should be use
in overwhelming fashion
The Powell Doctrine was subsequently
renounced by the Clinton
ISSUE
Isn’t
an exit strategy exactly what is necessary to determine whether a military
objective has been reached, the end state?
Discussion
Von Clausewitz observed
that:
Since war
is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object,
the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the
value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must
follow. Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92.
Sun Tzu illustrates the consequences of
failure:
Victory is
the main object in war. If this is long
delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength
will be exhausted. The Art of War, Book
II, Par. 3.
When the
army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not
suffice. (The Art of War, Book II, Par.
4)
Hence,
what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations. And therefore the general who understands war
is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny. The Art of War, Book II, Par. 21.
Gulf Conflict. The Powell Doctrine was given full effect
during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; and it was a great success militarily and its
clearly stated and limited political objectives: Iraq
must get out of Kuwait Iraq
Modifying
Condition 3: In War the Result is Never
Final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is
not always to be regarded as final. The
defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for
which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later
date. It is obvious how this, too, can
slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. Book One, Chapter One, § 9,
p. 80.
The fact
remains that this was a very successful American military operation the likes
of which have not been repeated since—as the podcast discussion clearly
addressed.
Moreover,
we could not formulate an end state (much less an exit strategy) because we did
not, and still do not, understand the complexity of the environment. As a result, the Bush as well as the Obama
administrations have been unable formulate realistic military and political
objectives.
“In both
cases, the Bush [and the Obama] administration showed little regard for the
complex cultural settings, deeply rooted ethnic rivalries generating conflicts
within conflicts, dangerously unsettled regional neighborhoods (especially
involving Pakistan and Iran), and the unresolved territorial disputes, al of
which severely complicated US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and ignited wider
regional anti-American passions.” (Id.
CONCLUSION
The Powell
Doctrine needs to be reexamined in light of our largely unsuccessful
expeditionary military operations into areas where our vital interests are
clearly not involved.
Sunday, October 11, 2015
Two War Stories on Leadership
Leadership…
There’s a plethora of books, articles, comments, blogs… you name it there
something on it. I offer no comments on
the merits of each, they speak for themselves.
I just share a couple of war stories based on personal experience.
Tale
1
As
a young captain in the Air Force, I began to look forward to promotion
opportunities. Being appointed the commander of a unit, any unit, is usually a
good way to get you on the promotion list.
So I spoke to my Wing Commander about it. Not being risk averse, I told him ‘give me
your toughest job’ and I will do it. He
told me one of the organizational maintenance squadrons was having a tough time
and needed new blood. “I’ll do it” says
I.
Organizational
maintenance is the heart of Air Force flight operations. The crew chiefs perform the most important
and most thankless jobs in the Air Force.
They take care of the aircraft, get them gassed, clean them, inspect
them, you name it and the crew chiefs do it.
This particular squadron was responsible for our bomb wing’s KC-135A and
KC-135Rs air refueling tankers.
As
I began to work there and got acquainted with these airmen [male and female]
and the jobs they had to do, I truly appreciated them infinitely more than I
did when I just flew in the aircraft.
These airmen work incredibly long days, don’t get paid a lot, yet take
such pride in what they do that it was truly a humbling experience. I committed to myself to do the very best
possible job in order to earn their respect.
About
a month into the job, I was tasked for weekend duty. I was the Officer-In-Charge of the entire
squadron responsible for the operational maintenance of over 45 aircraft and
about 300 airmen. I have to admit that I
was feeling… good. I was going to be ‘DA
MAN’ that weekend. That Friday, I
briefed the senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) on what were the most
important tasks that weekend, etc. They
knew all this better than me did but we had to follow protocol and standard
procedures.
On
Saturday morning, at 0700 I was at ‘MY FLIGHTLINE’ I was the ranking officer in charge and it was all mine – like in Braveheart when
Stephen of Ireland says “It’s my island” [re Ireland
Suddenly
on the radio: “ATTENTION,
ATTENTION. THIS IS NOT AN EXERCISE. Massive fuel spill on parking spot __,
aircraft ____. “ This was repeated a couple of more times.
‘This
is it’ I thought, my command moment…
I turned on the flashing lights on the truck
and sped to the appropriate spot. The
senior NCO in charge of the flight of aircraft was already there; nothing
appeared amiss. I drove up to him, and
very formally asked him to appraise me of the situation, what steps had been
taken, etc. Now this particular NCO was…
a bit on the mild-mannered side. He gave
me a detailed explanation of what had happened and his actions.
Not
fully understanding what he was saying, I declared in a baritone and
authoritative command voice, that we should tow all of the aircraft away from
this aircraft to ensure safety of the flightline, clear the area, etc.
etc.
He then
very seriously asked “Sir, so do you want me to tow all of the aircraft to
another area, etc, etc?” And he was
ready to do this….
[
MOMENT OF SILENCE ]
Have you ever had one of those Whiskey Tango
Foxtrot moments where you are jolted into a clarity of thought and vision
wherein everything else fades … and only stark reality remains?
I
suddenly felt that a fog had been lifted from my mind: I didn’t have a clue of what I was talking
about yet this NCO was ready to do whatever I told him to do.
“NO!” I said, “No.
Just continue to follow the appropriate procedures and let me know when
its cleared.” I then promptly
left.
I
drove back to my office, sat down, and thanked God for having jolted me into
reality. I was really shaken up. I
couldn’t believe what had just happened… I didn’t know any of the procedures
regarding massive fuel spills (hell, I didn’t even know what constituted a
massive fuel spill), yet this NCO was ready to do whatever I requested.
As
it turns out, ‘massive’ fuel spills are not at all unusual with tanker aircraft
and what is called ‘massive’ may, in reality, not be quite massive at all. There are well-settled standard procedures
to deal with these incidents known to all maintenance personnel who work on
these aircraft.
Well,
I didn’t know that…
I
sat at my desk for the rest of the day … promising myself to study and prepare
so that I would never again issue orders without knowing what I was talking
about. Somebody might actually do what I
requested. A very scary thought when
you don’t know what you are talking about…
Tale
2
So
there I was… After about a year in the Organizational Maintenance Squadron, our
wing was tasked with participating in an exercise wherein we were supposed to
generate aircraft [prepare aircraft for flying] in a simulated chemical warfare
environment. In English, we are supposed
to do our jobs while wearing chemical warfare equipment, and pretending that
this was a real world situation.
I
was appointed the on-site commander for the exercise. I was responsible for
both the tanker and bomber aircraft that were part of the exercise. I had to ensure that all of the aircraft
assigned to the exercise were operationally ready to perform their
mission. Naturally, all actions were
being monitored by our commanders who in turn had to report our status at
various times throughout the exercise.
If you fail to meet a particular milestone, it reflects on the unit, as
well as yourself… this is not a good thing.
Wearing
chemical warfare gear is not fun… I was driving around in my command truck
monitoring the operations. The aircrews that were going to fly the aircraft
came out to their aircraft, completed their preflight and engine runs.
Everything appeared to be going well and that we would meet our timelines.
Suddenly,
there’s a radio message stating that bomber so and so has a fuel leak and is
grounded. In essence, our wing would be
unable to accomplish its mission, NOT GOOD.
I
drove over to the particular aircraft.
As I came up to it, one of our young lieutenants jumped into my truck—it
was supposed to be free of chemicals, so I didn’t have to wear the gas
mask. She took off her gas mask, and
told me the aircraft had a fuel leak on one of the line and had been grounded.
Again
clarity came over me… I told her to think about the situation. We were supposed to be preparing to fly an
operational mission; the usual normal peacetime rules of operations do not
apply in such a situation. I told her
that I wanted the aircraft to be buttoned up for a one-time flight so that it
could be declared mission ready. I also
told her that if the aircraft could not be flown even one time, to let me know
that as well.
Now
this particular lieutenant was a really smart person, with a degree in electrical
engineering from MIT. She looked at me
with a look of wonder and clarity… ‘wow, I never thought of it in that
way’. Without a word, she left the
truck. Thirty minutes later, the bomber
dispatcher called out on the radio that the aircraft had been buttoned up for a
one-time flight and was ready to go. Our
wing was 100 percent operationally ready to accomplish the specified
mission. We passed the exercise…
Later
our deputy commander for maintenance gave me thumbs up. I felt
good about this one. Yes, I was no
longer scared that someone would follow my orders…
Sunday, September 6, 2015
Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism
Saudi Arabian Support for Terrorism -- Sources
- Ahmed
Rashid, Descent to Chaos: The
- Lori
Plotkin Boghardt, ‘Saudi Funding of
- Josh Rogin, ‘
- Steve Clemons, 'Thank God for
the Saudis': ISIS,
- Salim Mansur, ‘ISIS,
- Vicky Nanjappa, ‘Why Does
- Michael Stephens, ‘Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support?, BBC News, September 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253
- Patrick
Cockburn, ‘
- Joshua Keating, ‘Why the Iraq Mess Is So Awkward for
- Kim Sengupta, ‘
- Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Our Radical Islamic BFF,
- Ben Norton, Saudi Arabia funds and exports Islamic extremism: The truth behind the toxic U.S. relationship with the theocratic monarchy, Salon, January 6, 2016 http://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/saudi_arabia_funds_and_exports_islamic_extremism_the_truth_behind_the_toxic_u_s_relationship_with_the_theocratic_nation/
- Ishaan Tharoor, 'The Saudi Origins of Belgium's Islamist Threat', The Washington Post, March 23, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/23/the-roots-of-belgiums-islamist-threat-reach-back-to-saudi-arabia/
Sunday, August 2, 2015
War as Continuation of Politics: For Whose Benefit?
The Soviets were great writers on
military affairs. The United States Air
Force translated a number of Soviet military works under the series Soviet
Military Thought.
One interesting
volume is ‘The Philosophical Heritage of
V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow
The authors expand Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’: Precisely because all wars are, and each given war is, a continuation of politics, they are essentially not only identical but are also profoundly disparate from one another, and frequently complete opposites. This occurs because the political content of war is determined by the social character of the classes waging it, their political goals and a number of other concretely historical conditions. (p. 25).
The authors expand Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’: Precisely because all wars are, and each given war is, a continuation of politics, they are essentially not only identical but are also profoundly disparate from one another, and frequently complete opposites. This occurs because the political content of war is determined by the social character of the classes waging it, their political goals and a number of other concretely historical conditions. (p. 25).
[COMMENT] This is important because particularly in the
US
US or the US Central Asia ? What
are we doing there?
Are we really military adventurists the Soviets accused us of being? These are basic questions but seem apropos to our actions post-SovietUnion —or
even before. We invaded Grenada in 1983, Lebanon
1983, Panama 1988; Gulf War
1990-91; Haiti , 1994; Somalia 1992; Bosnia United States
[COMMENT] For example, the problem with the Syrian civil war is the
socio-economic and political conditions of the initial stages of the war, that
is, the opponents of President Assad versus government forces was changed
essentially by the advent of ISIS Daesh,
transforming it from a just war against an oppressive government to Assad’s
just war against a worse and more unjust threat. The justice of the cause is from the point of
view of the eye of the beholder. The Syrian civil was whose
character was that of a just war, became an unjust war because ISIS is worse threat. The US
and its ‘allies’ [joke] have fought or opposed Assad and Iran Iran
Militarism. As a weapon serving the ruling classes to
crush all (political and economic) movements.
(p. 65). [COMMENT] Why do we fight these wars? Follow the money, i.e., whose interests are
being advanced? Who benefits from these
wars? Certainly not the Are we really military adventurists the Soviets accused us of being? These are basic questions but seem apropos to our actions post-Soviet
Sunday, July 26, 2015
Role and Place of Ideological Struggle in Modern Warfare
1) The
stability of troop morale depends on the conviction of the rank-and-file masses
as to the just nature of the war in which they sacrifice their lives. If they recognize the cause for which they
struggle to be just, they fight with enthusiasm. (‘The
Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War’ (Moscow
In contrast. The bourgeoisie attempts to pass off its own
mercenary interests as the interest of all the people. The problem is to reveal to the soldiers and
the entire populace of a given country the criminal goals of the bourgeois
government and incite the masses to refuse to be accomplices of the crime. (Phil. Her., p. 207).
[COMMENT] In the fight against ISIS and derivatives thereof , US ISIS on the other hand is a poster child for the above
statement. Politically, it recruits from
disaffected Muslims and foreign fighters who do not share the West’s value systems or its aspirations.
2)
Lenin—Revolutionary deeds are performed by millions of individuals at a
moment of special upsurge and exertion of all human capabilities, when all
their consciousness, will, enthusiasm and fantasy are mobilized… their
extensive _____ possesses proletarian instinct, proletarian comprehension and
awareness of duty.” (Phil. Her., p. 188). [COMMENT: ISIS –
religion] “The spiritual capability of
revolutionary masses to stand and win in a savage clash with the class enemy is
based on the profoundly just character of the struggle being wages by the
proletariat and its army. We can wage
war because the masses know what they are fighting for …” Imperialist armies lack this source. (Phil. Her., p. 188).
[COMMENT] The above observation is the bottom line of why ISIS / derivatives are winning —they are in their own neighborhoods and the US armed forces are
far from home and without real focus, e.g., ‘Why we fight’ series in Word War
Two. Slogans like ‘fighting for
democracy’ are just as bland and useless as were Soviet calls for proletarian
sentiment. But the theory and
observations stated above correctly assess the issue. In 2015, ISIS
bases its appeal on religion and Muslim victimization.
3) It’s
not so much that ISIS achieves military
objectives – it achieves political objectives. Under a chapter titled ‘Tactical
Victory, Strategic Defeat’ Col. Harry Summers recalls a conversation in Hanoi Israel
4)
Even a strong will which is not enlightened by elevated communist
ideals [or religious, ideological fervor, etc.] may become a counterfeit jewel,
for will without principles or ideals is blind.
(Phil. Her., p. 189). [US armed
forces in 2015 with respect to fight against ISIS ,
Al-Qaeda, etc.?]
Why is the United States
Moral
forces in war provide legitimacy to the struggle.
Sunday, February 8, 2015
A Tale of Two Commanders...
Leadership… There’s a plethora of books, articles, comments,
blogs… you name it there's something on it.
I offer no comments on the merits of each, they speak for
themselves. I just share a couple of war
stories based on personal experience.
Tale 1
There I was … [all war stories begin this way so humor me
with your patience]… a captain in the US Air Force and flying in B-52 bombers
as an electronic warfare officer [EWO].
My job was to protect the aircraft and crew from both radar and
heat-seeking threats. One eventful time my
B-52H crew was selected to participate in a Red Flag exercise. Red Flag is an advanced aerial warfare
exercise held few times a year at Nellis Air Force Base, Las Vegas,
Nevada. The Red Flag is designed to
simulate actual combat operations, i.e., fly as we fight. The Red Flag ranges contain a multitude of
threat radar simulators which mimic those of enemy systems. Further, on this particular exercise, in
addition to the usual F-5 / T-38s masquerading as MIGs, the OPFOR [opposing forces] included RAF Phantoms and Tornados.
The Commander of the exercise was a British Group Commander [0-6] from
the Royal Air Force.
“Great!” I thought, because (1) we got an opportunity to
test our training and mettle in the most realistic battlefield environment
short of actual combat; and (2) we got to spend a few days in Las Vegas.
The staff guys from our wing tactics’ shop had been sent a couple of weeks ahead to coordinate and assist with the planning. A few days prior to our deployment, we received the mission package and we began detailed mission planning. I was really excited. “I’m going to fly Red Flag!” At the time, B-52 crews included a gunner to operate the 20 mm Gatling cannon [H-models; quad .50 caliber machine guns on G-models]. My gunner and I meticulously reviewed all threat radars, enemy aircraft characteristics, and analyzed possible contingencies like, “if I’m wounded, push this button to keep the jammers active, etc.” and “There’s no way we’re going to allow our aircraft to be shot down.”
During our pre-mission briefing, we were informed of the rules
of engagement [ROEs]. During low level
penetration and bomb run, our altitude was held a few hundred feet higher than we
expected. “Whisky Tango Foxtrot?” says
I. “Why are we being held to such
non-tactical parameters?” But orders are
orders and we were to fly at such and such an altitude. “Foxtrot Tango” I was
one pissed-off [EWO].
Our flight went smoothly enough through initial low-level
penetration to terrain avoidance altitude.
As we approached the range, everything appeared peaceful enough. My
warning receivers were operating normal giving no indications of OPFOR
activity.
We arrived at the initial point and began our bomb run. The pilot revved up the aircraft to max power
and speed; even though we are wearing helmets with ear protection -- IT IS
LOUD!
“BLEEP… BLEEP…” I heard on the earphones in my helmet. My warning receivers detected the sure tale signs of
air surveillance radars. Then height-finders… “Holy Sierra” OPFOR s are there!"
Then all hell broke loose.
Every freaking bell, whistle, and flashing lights [and there are lots of
them] began to beep, flash and otherwise go bonkers. We had encountered
the forces of two OPFOR armies and all of their target-tracking radars [TTRs]
were on … us. Imagine playing ten
different video games all at the same time while playing the stereo at full blast, with the whole room shaking, and a lot more…
Under such circumstances, your mind cannot keep up with the
sensory overload; training takes over.
Before I could even digest the totality of the situation, my hands were flying
over the jammers & punching out chaff & flares to protect the aircraft
against the TTRs and heat-seekers.
We proceeded with the bomb run [start humming Wagner’s Ride of the Valkyries; or Eye of the Tiger by Survivor depending on your musical preferences]
Then I noticed the radar signal of an AWACS – directing
OPFOR fighters against us. Jam him too…
Over the radios you could hear the controllers directing Brit Phantoms against
our aircraft. I called for lower
altitude but the pilot told me we were at the lowest altitude allowed by the
ROES. “F__ the ROES” I screamed on the interphone…
but we couldn’t do that.
Suddenly my brain woke from what seemed to be a mental fog … I had a clear vision of what was going on… I had complied with every procedure called for in such a tactical operation and I did not even realize that I had done it – the value of training over and over. I could not believe I was getting paid to have this much fun!!! Even Bill Gates cannot buy such a moment… My gunner high-fived me as we completed our bomb run and began our exit from low-level altitude.
We got back to Nellis and were slapping each other on the
back for a kick butt mission. The staff
pukes told us debriefing was the following morning at 0800 hours (8:00 a. m.
for civilians); Vegas night awaited us.
Next morning at debriefing, the staff pukes from our tactics division informed us that our aircraft had been shot down by OPFOR fighters as we climbed out of low level.
“BRAVO SIERRA” I said. “There was nothing there.”
“You got shot down by an infrared missile” said a staffer.
“No way” I said. “There’s
no way we got shot down.” We kept arguing back and forth. I DEMANDED to see proof that our aircraft had
been jumped by OPFOR at low-level exit.
They produced some data showing that, indeed, aircraft had jumped us at
our low level exit point… and the pilot had yelled FOX 4 – IR missile “launch”. I was … yep… the ROES.
Next the British Group Commander came in and began to talk
about the mission and the following mission.
Not being too much of a milquetoast kind of guy, I immediately raised my
hand:
“Why were the B-52s held at XX altitude?”
His response was not what I expected. He slammed down his briefing book and began
yelling that all of this had been coordinated ahead of time with all units and
why in the bloody hell were we asking such questions… My pilot gave me a look “SHUT THE F___ UP”
Limey bastard, I thought. “With due respect to your rank , sir, if the object of the exercise
is to fly as we expect to fight, then the B-52s should be allowed to fly at
tactical altitude? If the object of the exercise is to prove a foregone
conclusion…?" I thought the Group Commander was going to
explode… then suddenly he burst out laughing…
He looked at his staff… all of them sitting with notebooks on their laps
[like those pictures of North Korean generals around Kim Jong Un]; “Why the hell didn’t any of you say this?”
Silence.
He came over and gave me a friendly slap on the back… “Well
done, Captain.”
True story…
Tale 2
In a flying wing, all operations are under the control of
the deputy commander for operations [DO].
He or she is responsible to the commander of the wing for the flight
schedule, aircrew training, flying hours and all of the support necessary to
ensure them… It’s a pretty responsible job and was particularly so during the
1980s because of the B-52s nuclear missions.
There I was one day, when our crew was selected to participate in a very
secret program. We were given some
guidance and told to develop a mission profile.
Once we did this, we were to travel to Strategic Air Command
headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska and brief the vice commander of SAC – a three-star
general. When a crew gets such an
assignment, they get bombed [no pun intended] with staff assistance from the
wing [i.e., you are going to do this in such and such a way].
Our particular DO was a new colonel who was bent on becoming
a wing commander, hence, a general. I
had seen him at a number of functions at the officer’s club. He seemed okay to
me though I had not had many interactions with him.
With staff ‘assistance’ we prepared our mission profile,
etc. in the required time. Our DO led a
team of staffers, our crew, a KC-135 crew, etc. to SAC HQ to brief
vice-CINCSAC. The briefings went well
enough… and a few days later it was time to return home.
I was based in Northern Michigan at the time, and it was
COLD. While we were gone, the base had been
through a major snowstorm and had begun to dig itself out of the snow. We flew back on a KC-135. Upon landing, there were no buses at hand to
pick us up… the temperature outside was around -15 degrees F. All of the sudden, a command car pulled right
up to the tanker. It was the DO’s
assistant. Without a word to any of us,
the DO got in the car and they drove away.
We all looked at each other… and 40 minutes later or so buses arrived to
pick us up.
A few months later, we were expecting a staff assistance
visit from SAC. A staff ‘assistance’
visit is an inspection by another name.
The higher staff ‘assists’ you by nitpicking and second-guessing
everything you do; and writes action items for you to complete by such and such
time. They are not fun.
The DO was obviously concerned about it because it is report
card. Bad grades affect your promotion
opportunities. As the staff assistance
got closer, he decided to have a DO Commander’s Call for his staff. As I was in a standardization and evaluation
crew (Stan Eval) at the time, I was directly under the DO’s command. In the Air Force duty days run from 0730 to
1630 hrs (7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.). Commanders’ Calls, attendance is mandatory,
are held by unit commanders to inform all unit personnel of various activities,
recognize people, and such things. I had
never heard of a DO having a commander’s call—as this is a staff unit. Whatever…
The DO Commanders’ Call was set for 1530 hours [3:30 p.m.]. At 3:00 p.m., we received a call saying that
it had been moved to 4:30 p.m. because the DO was busy…
At 4:30 p.m., all of the DO staff gathered at the base theater
[about 100 people] for the commanders’ call. The DO began speaking telling us all how
important this visit was and in order to inform everyone of what was going on,
he tasked each DO division to brief us on its mission [oy vey…] I settled
deeper in my seat…
For the next hour or so the meeting droned on an on with no
end in sight. Around 5:40 p.m., one of
the division chiefs got up to brief. He
said he did not know what this was about, and had not prepared anything, so he
had a pre-canned briefing of about 100 slides … [collective GROAN...]
I then noticed a young airman looking glumly at his watch…. “Airman,
what time does the mess hall close?” I asked quietly. “Six o’clock, sir” he responded…
There was no way we were going to be done by then… someone
had to say something.
I stood up and said to the DO: “Excuse me, sir. The mess hall is going to close at six o’clock
so we should excuse those who have to eat there.” I expected him to be understanding… they had
just forgotten the time.
His reaction was not what I expected. “THIS IS IMPORTANT” he screamed almost hysterically. Then rambled
something about how important the staff assistance visit was. I thought that our troops having dinner was important too. I had made my point so I sat down and didn’t say anything further…
And the briefing droned on…
About 10 minutes later, at 5:50 p.m., the DO grumbled “Those
who have to eat at the mess hall may leave.”
Half of the audience left… The
briefing droned on for another 5 minutes or so.
“Enough of this” the DO said. “We’re
done.” We never had another DO
commanders’ call again… and yeah, we survived the assistance visit.
That night I wondered if I had a career still left, but no
regrets. Next day, some Tanker pilot
whom I did not know came up to me and said:
“That took a lot of guts. I can’t believe how poorly he reacted…”
True story…
Monday, January 5, 2015
Russian-American Relations 2014: Mistakes Repeated
George Kennan in discussing American foreign policy and
democracy notes that we made two big boo-boos during the cold war. (1) to attribute to the “Soviet leadership
aims and intentions it did not really have; in jumping to conclusion that the
Soviet leaders were just like Hitler and his associates…” with the same
aspirations, timetable, and who could only be dealt with in the same manner as
Hitler was. [1] (2)
The second postwar mistake was to embrace the nuclear weapon “the
mainstay of our military posture, and the faith we placed in it to assure our
military and political ascendancy in this postwar era.”[2]
In 2014 it appears that the United States repeated these mistakes (1) to attribute to the Russian leadership aims and intentions that it does not really have; in jumping to conclusion that Putin is just like Stalin and communists. (2) The second mistake it to embrace military instrument of national power as the mainstay of our politico-diplomatic posture despite its limitations in a geopolitical heartland largely outside our strategic reach and capabilities to affect political outcomes.
Question for policy makers: “Is it possible that we may be expecting of Russia [or an other country] higher standards of international conduct than our own?” (Vera Micheles Dean, “Is Russia Alone to Blame?” Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXV, March 8, 1946).[4]
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