Throughout history some battles have had tremendous strategic effects beyond those of immediate tactical success. For example, the German defeat at the battle of Stalingrad placed the Germans on the strategic defensive for the remainder of the war. Germany never conducted large-scale offensives after Stalingrad.
Was Dien Bien Phu an example of a battle achieving large strategic ends? On the one hand the victory succeeded in
removing the French from Vietnam. On the
other hand its success ultimately led to the American intervention, furthering
the conflict for another twenty years.
If the Viet Minh had not achieved such a decisive military victory over
them, the French, whose goals were vastly overambitious given both available
resources and national will, would have eventually withdrawn their forces and
acceded to the Viet Minh's quest for independence as they subsequently did in
Algeria. It is worthy to note that in
Algeria there was no Dien Bien Phu equivalent, the French withdrew, and there was
no American intervention.
I contend that
Dien Bien Phu, while being a great tactical victory, was a strategic failure
because it created more problems for the Viet Minh than it solved as battlefield success led to strategic failure, i.e., American involvement.
I analyze this hypothesis by: (1) briefly reviewing the strategic setting
that led to the battle of Dien Bien Phu; (2) reviewing the strategic setting
after the battle which led to the subsequent American involvement; and (3)
based on the previous analysis, provide an alternative outcome that might have
led to a resolution of the conflict instead of trading one outside power for a
stronger one.
In reviewing the French
strategic setting of the battle of Dien Bien Phu prior to the battle, the
situation had changed considerably after 1949 with the advent of Communist
China. "Especially damaging was the
loss of French outposts along the Chinese border."[1] In particular, the Chinese overland routes
gave the Viet Minh access to a free flow of Chinese supplies and establishment
of base areas. "It brought a
fundamental change in the nature of the war - henceforth, any expansion of
Western forces in Vietnam or Laos could be readily offset by Viet Minh force
escalation.[2]
Thus the French faced a
protracted war that they had little chance of winning they had been searching
for a situation in which to bring the Viet Minh into battle. Previously, the Viet Minh had been waging a
guerrilla war against the French. The
French hoped to decisively defeat the Viet Minh in conventional operations,
destroy it as a political movement, and retain their colonies in Indochina. The plan they came up with to accomplish was
the Navarre Plan of March-April 1953, named after France's last general in
Vietnam, General Henri Navarre. The
Navarre Plan envisioned that the "Vietnamese army was to assume a larger
role, with the United States assuming the financial burden."[3] The French forces, with American equipment,
would emphasize mobility operations, designed to entrap Giap's forces and
engage it in pitched battle. The French
were unable to trap Giap's forces in a series of operations, so Navarre decided
to build an airhead in Giap's territory, the mountains of Tonkin. Navarre believed that he could lure Giap's
elite forces into "meat-grinder" battles. He did lure the Viet Minh into the
"meat-grinder" but it was the French that were consumed for the
reasons that we discussed during the student presentations.
The Viet Minh's strategic
view and desired end state in seeking battle against the French was that
General Giap had become convinced that the protracted people's war being waged
by the Vietminh against the French had entered into its third stage, general
counterattack.[4] Giap had now three-hundred thousand troops
who were organized along conventional lines into battalions, regiments, and
divisions. These units were well
supplied with Russian and Chinese equipment, and O&M supplies which were
carried by a stream of peasant porters to the operational divisions. Their objective was simple: destroy the garrison at Dien Bien Phu and
drive the French out of Indochina.
General Giap's message to his troops on the eve of the battle said: "Master fear and pain, overcome
obstacles, unite your efforts, fight to the very end, annihilate the enemy at
Dien Bien Phu, win a great victory!"[5]
The strategic setting after
battle as a result of the Geneva Accords was only a military ceasefire between
France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Vietnam remained divided along the 17th
parallel, and only vision of a political future that the DRV received was a
promise of elections in two years. The French
had the opportunity to regroup their forces below the 17th parallel, and
expected to continue to exert their influence on South Vietnam, but their
involvement in Vietnam was finished. The
ultimate result of the Geneva Conference was the beginning of direct American
involvement in Vietnam.
The United States became
involved in Vietnam because it saw France's defeat as a blow to the West and a
victory for communism. In the aftermath
of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the French military defeat at
Dien Bien Phu signified a victory for Chinese communism over the West. This Chinese Communist expansion could not be
tolerated, thus the US did not support the outcome of the Geneva
Conference. What the US did do was to
"embark on a course designed to make the purely military arrangements
serve as the basis of a de facto political settlement."[6] The US also did not promise to observe the
promised elections but rather not to use force to break them up. Effectively vetoing the elections through
this clause, the US sought to shore up Ngo Dihn Diem's government in South
Vietnam, and thereby making Vietnam's division permanent. The US believed that France pusillanimous
policy in Vietnam, poor military planning, and colonial past had been the
reasons for their defeat. Not burdened
by any of the above sins, the US sought to fight communism in Vietnam through
Diem.
Given the political accords
reached as a result of Dien Bien Phu, clearly it did not produce a great
strategic result or victory: Vietnam
remained divided, and the US became directly involved taking the place of
France. One may argue that the
Vietnamese might have been able to achieve more at the conference table had it
not been for American intransigence and duplicity. On the other hand, it can be equally argued
that it was the benign nature of the political demands that the accords placed
on France (and the US) that led to the agreement in the first place. This remains conjectural but if the demands
had been the immediate reunification of Vietnam under DRV rule, the accords
might have not been signed. The point
here is that the military victory of the Viet Minh over the French at Dien Bien
Phu did not translate into a political victory but a great political defeat for
the Viet Minh and Ho Chi Minh.
An alternative outcome
occurred in the Algerian War of independence where there were no French defeats
in large-scale military operations, but France subsequently withdrew and there
was no American involvement although Ben Bella was also espousing a 'socialist
program', employing Marxist rhetoric, and enticing the Soviet-bloc nations for
political and material aid. Why did the
US not become involved in the Algerian case which was similar in nature to the
Vietnamese case, and in an area which was, geographically, much closer to vital
American security interests such as Europe?[7] The answer to this issue lies in the
political perspective that a military defeat may result in. In Dien Bien Phu, the French were
ignominiously defeated and humiliated.
As perceived by the Americans, their defeat was a result of the lack of
military prowess, an inability to supply troops in the field, and lack of
aircraft and technology; essentially a managerial problem subject to a quick
resolution if one is tough to see it through.
This is was a national security issue which the United States viewed as
tailor-made for its foreign policy due to its ability to manage and solve
technological problems, which this was if seen through this prism, in an
expeditious and efficient manner.
Addition-ally, the policy of containment had recently become the motive
force behind American rhyme and reason, and led to the Truman Administration's
decision to begin military aid to Indochina was taken in "more or
less" within the overall policy of containment in the world without
evaluating the merit of each individual case.[8]
In the Algerian case, as
France did not suffer any major military defeats of note, the American's viewed
French operations there as ongoing, and when the negotiated settlement did
occur in 1962 there was no stigma of a military defeat for France (although in
fact it was a great strategic defeat), and the US did not perceive the
communists as being able to pummel the West politically through another Western
military disaster.
In conclusion, I posit that the battle of Dien Bien Phu was not the great
strategic victory but rather a failure.
The reasons for its strategic failure are that the Americans did not
want to see the French humiliated by a "communist" movement; did not
want another "communist" government in Asia; the outcome of Dien Bien
Phu represented Western weakness as opposed if it had been a conscious French
choice to withdraw as was in Algeria which did not lead to American
involvement.
Another conclusion, that may be tentatively posited for further
observation is that a military victory may not lead to a political victory, or
that a military defeat (or a least the absence of victory) may still yield
political victory. The object of war is not to win battles but to win wars; and objectives of wars are defined in political terms.
By: Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.)
[4]
The other two phases of Mao Zedong's people's war, adapted by Giap to
Vietnamese conditions, are: (1)
defensive phase where the survival of the revolutionary forces is the prime
objective; (2) the second phase's objective is to further demoralize the enemy
and increase the ranks of the guerrillas.
Cited in Ibid., pp 48-49.
