Tuesday, December 24, 2013

NSC-68 Version 2013: Balance of Power. Schema & Notes for Part 2


IV. Underlying Conflicts Among Nations


 

V.  Potential Threats and Capabilities—Actual and Potential


 
 

VI. U. S. Intentions and Capabilities



                “When a country abjures its intention of exploiting a conflict between two other parties, it is in fact signaling that it has the capacity to do so and that both parties would do well to work at preserving their neutrality.  So too, when a nation expresses its “deep concern” over a military contingency, it is conveying that it will assist—in some as yet unspecified way—the victim of what is has defined as aggression.” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 724)
 

VII.           Present Risks


 

      Risk One.  Wars of National Union/Reunion (Evera S. V., 1996)

 

      Risk Two.  Wars of Democratization and Nationalist Secession (Evera S. V., 1996)

 

      Risk Three.  Wars of Great Power Geopolitical Competition (Evera S. V., 1996)

 

      Risk Four.  Wars of Nuclear Proliferation (Evera S. V., 1996)

 

      Risk Five.  Wars of Regional Hegemony (Evera S. V., 1996)

 

                Risk Six.  Transnational Wars Against Non-State Actors.


Transnational wars refer to wars transcending existing national borders against non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda and others.

 

 

VIII.          Nuclear Proliferation and Risk of War


 

      The fact is that whether we like it or not, nuclear weapons establish a balance of power. Admission to the nuclear club provides an insurance policy against external aggression; though not internal (and often centrifugal) forces such as in the case of Pakistan.

 

IX. Possible Causes of Action


 

      Foreign Policy

 

A.  The First Course—Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying out These Projects


 

B.  The Second Course—Isolation


C.  The Third Course—Continuous Military Intervention


D.  The Fourth Course—Dependence on International Institutions


      The problem with the guarantee of rights in international law is that the rights of the strong are those which are guaranteed at the expense of the weak or the vanquished.  For example, Henry Kissinger explains that for Count Metternich, rights existed in the nature of things.  “Whether they were affirmed in law or by constitution was an essentially technical question which had nothing to do with bringing about freedom.  Metternich considered guaranteeing rights to be a paradox.  “Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements… Objects mistakenly made subject to legislation result only in their limitation, if not the complete annulment, of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.” (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 84-85)

E.  The Remaining Course—Balance of Power Policies Combining the Above Policies as Necessity Dictates


 

CONCLUSIONS