Introduction
NSC-68 served as “America’s official statement on Cold War strategy.”
According
to NSC-68 ("A
Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950., p. 5)
The
fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the
Constitution: “to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity.” In
essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our
free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.
The
adversary, the Soviet Union and world communism, was seen as the epitome of
evil and threat to the peace and stability of the United States and the
world. “The issues that face us are
momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic
but of civilization itself.” (Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States: An
Interpretative History , 1978, p. 198)
As John Lewis Gaddis notes NSC-68 viewed that “”[B]y
developing the moral and material strength of the free world [so] that the
Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that
the pre-conditions for workable agreement can be created.”” (Gaddis,
Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States: An Interpretative History ,
1978, p. 198)
“Though NSC-68 went on to describe various military and
economic measures vital to building situations of strength, its central theme
was neither the give-and take of traditional diplomacy nor an apocalyptic final
showdown. The reluctance to use or to
threaten to use nuclear weapons during the period of American’s atomic monopoly
was rationalized in a uniquely American way:
victory in any such war would produce a transitional, hence and
unsatisfactory outcome.” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 463)
“The
chief purpose of NSC-68 had been to make the case for “flexible response”: a strategy of responding to aggression
wherever it took place, without expanding the conflict of backing away from
it.” (Gaddis, The Cold War: A New
History, 2005, p. 165)
However, President Eisenhower did not support it due to costs, instead
relying on the thr
Clausewitz, however, reminds us this is precisely what a
statesman who is considering war must keep in mind. Will the war achieve the outcomes sought or
will such a war leave an unstable and ultimately more dangerous situation? (Clausewitz, 1976)
The
best assessment of NSC-68 is made by Henry Kissinger: “What is unique about this document was it
coupling of universal claims with the renunciation of force. Never before had a
Great Power expressed objectives quite so demanding of its own resources
without any expectation of reciprocity other that the dissemination of its
national values.” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 463)
In
an era of uncertainty, the expression of objectives, claims and resources are
key points in defining our place in the world.
In order to do so, it is not necessary for us to
reinvent the wheel. NSC-68 remains a model for the United States to articulate
its vision of its place in the world.
THE WORLD OF 2013 IS NOT LIKE THE WORLD OF 1950
Analysis
In leading up to the First Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush
grandly proclaimed:
“A new partnership of nations has begun, and
we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian
Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an
historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth
objective—a new world order—can emerge: A new era—freer from the threat
of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for
peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and
south, can prosper and live in harmony.” (Bush, 1990)
As events after 1990 have shown this was not to be. The Soviet Union is gone and so is
bi-polarity of power in international relations. Some assumed the rise of a uni-polar world
with the United States as the sole superpower.
Alas, such dreams of grandeur were as illusory as they were short lived.
The world is more
complex and dangerous but less so in terms of the possibility of total war and
destructiveness. The Soviet Union is no longer and with it is gone
the threat of total mutual assured destruction. A serious confrontation like
that of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis is no longer a likely probability;
though the possibility however remote may still exist in terms of potential. The United States and Russia retain
sufficient weapons to annihilate each other and probably the rest of the world
as well.
The problem we now face with
nuclear-armed states like North Korea and possibly Iran is the possibility that
in a confrontation, a weaker North Korea or Iran may opt for the grave
risk of mutual devastation to unilateral defeat.
In discussing the risk inherent in nuclear
threats, Barry M. Blechman and Robert Powell wrote:
Before the introduction of ballistic missiles and long-range bombers armed
with atomic weapons, battles has to be won or lost on the ground before either
side considered surrendering a vital interest. Moreover, when a military
verdict finally forced the issue, the only alternative to surrender was
further intolerable damage. Military superiority was fundamentally
asymmetric: If one side had it, the other did not. Thus, the losing
side’s policymakers had only two alternatives: surrender or face continued
destruction and suffering. (Blechman &
Powell, p. 82)
In the present era, the set of alternatives available to the “loser” is
larger. Nuclear- armed missiles and bombers that can withstand an enemy’s
attack and retaliate with devastating force … have invalidated the previous asymmetry
of military verdicts. Throughout any confrontation, both sides will retain the
capability to destroy one another. Thus, policymakers on the losing side of a
military struggle have a third alternative. At any time during a confrontation,
they may attempt to coerce the opponent (and apparent victor) by beginning to
implement, and thus to make credible, the threat to destroy the other’s society
implicit in the existence of nuclear forces. Of course, such a strategy
would have to be pursued in full realization that the other side could respond
in kind, thereby leading to mutual destruction, but the risk of mutual
devastation may well seem preferable to the certainty of unilateral defeat… In
short, when faced with defeat, the prospect of, at best, a negotiated
settlement and, at worst, mutual defeat may appear the “least worst” choice
among a set of awful alternatives. Whether or not this third alternative exists
affects profoundly the utility of military superiority, because it drastically
alters the character of risk in confrontations… The crucial questions for
policymakers who perceive to be superior militarily is whether the party they
threaten might still choose the third alternative, preferring a grave risk
of mutual devastation to unilateral defeat." (Blechman & Powell, pp. 82-83)
The answer to this crucial
question remains... elusive; but must be addressed.
For
example, North Korea clearly has chosen to pursue nuclear-based security to
prevent itself from being coerced politically and militarily by the United
States, and gain political respect and legitimacy as a regional power. The nuclear option is insurance against defeat
and/or humiliation at the hands of the United States, South Korea, or anyone
else. It is worth pondering that as the
force structure and technological capabilities that the United States displayed
in recent wars are beyond the capacity of any nation in the foreseeable future,
the only recourse available to a developing power is the cheaper and more
accessible nuclear/ballistic missile option.
Paradoxically, our search for a conventional
combat capability in order to preclude nuclear war has proven so successful,
that others seek to counter this capability through nuclear forces. Iraq could
have drastically altered the outcome of the war, politically in particular, had
they used SCUD attacks earlier and with more powerful warheads. Iraq's missile force structure was both
logical and affordable; its poor execution and lack of punch is what rendered
it ineffective. We cannot use this lack
of combat effectiveness as a planning factor, for other nations may prove better
capable of effective employment.
For example, during the Falklands War, Argentina
successfully used their very limited number of Exocet missiles to cause
considerable damage to the British Navy.
Despite recent failures, North Korea's missiles are bound to perform
better after failures are studied and corrected. Massive strikes, properly
timed and combining alternate conventional, chemical, and/or nuclear warheads
can create widespread damage, both in military terms and more importantly in
political terms which will dictate the war's tempo and determine what outcome
will follow. Strategically, a nation
equipped with a missile force which is facing a far better armed and more
capable opponent will seek to retain a retaliatory capability, with a secure
reserve force which will guarantee unacceptable pain, or cause sufficient doubt
as to intentions and capabilities upon the enemy, thus allowing for the maximum
room for political maneuver. Our future adversaries will combine mobile
missiles for offensive operations, dispersing them in depth, using active
deception measures for protection and ensuring its operational capacity.
On the other hand, the danger level is lesser
than it once was.
I. Major Events 1990 – 2013: Key developments
reshaping the world system (Brzezinski, 2007, pp. 12-13) — updated fron Brzezinski
1.
The Soviet Union is forced out of Eastern
Europe and disintegrates. The United
States is on top of the world.
2.
The U.S. military victory in the first Gulf
War is politically wasted. Middle
Eastern peace is not pursued. Islamic
hostility towards the United States begins to rise.
3.
NATO and the European Union expand into
Eastern Europe. The Atlantic community
emerges as the pre-dominant influence on the world scene.
4.
Globalization is institutionalized with the
creation of the World Trade Organization, the new role of the International
Monetary Fund with its bailout fund, and the increased anticorruption agenda of
the World Bank. “Singapore issues”
become the foundation for the Doha Round of WTO negotiations.
5.
The Asian financial crisis sets the foundation
to a nascent East Asian regional community, to be characterized by Chinese
dominance or by Sino-Japanese competition.
China’s admission to the WTO encourages its ascent as a major global
economic player and a center of regional trade agreements with politically more
assertive and impatient poorer countries.
6.
Two Chechen wars, the NATO conflict in Kosovo,
and Vladimir Putin’s election as president of Russia contribute to a rise in
Russian authoritarianism and nationalism.
Russia exploits its gas and oil resources to become an assertive energy
superpower.
7.
Facing a permissive attitude from the United
States and others, India and Pakistan defy world public opinion to become
nuclear powers. North Korea and Iran intensify
their covert efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities in the face of
inconsistent and inconsequential U.S. efforts to induce their self-restraint.
8.
September 11, 2001, shocks the United States
into a state of fear and the pursuit of unilateral policies. The United States
declares war on terror.
9.
East Timor independence restored from
Indonesia 2002.
10.
The Atlantic community splits over the U.S.
war in Iraq in 2003. The European Union
fails to develop its own political identity or clout.
11.
The post-1991 worldwide impression of U.S.
global military omnipotence and Washington’s illusions about the extent of
America’s power have been shattered by U.S. failures in post-victory Iraq. The United Sates acknowledges the need for
cooperation with the European Union, China, Japan, and Russia regarding major
issues of global security. The Middle
East becomes the make-or-break test case of U.S. leadership.
12.
Barack Obama is elected President of the
United States in 2008.
13.
Russia invades Georgia in 2009. Asserts its rights in the “near abroad.”
14.
America’s longest war: Afghanistan 2001 - 2013.
15.
The so-called “Arab Spring” begins in December
2010 in
Tunisia following the self-immolation of Tarek Bouazizi a street vendor who set
himself on fire on 17 December 2010,
in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the
harassment and humiliation that he reported was inflicted on him by a municipal
official and her aides.
16.
Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak is toppled in
February 2011 and Libya’s Gaddafi is killed in October 2011. In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood candidate
Mohammed Morsi wins a runoff election to become president of Egypt in 2012.
17.
World financial crisis 2007-2012; European
financial crisis 2012-2013.
18.
Syria unravels beginning in 2012.
19.
North Korea explodes a nuclear device
unambiguously explodes a nuclear device in 2009 and launches satellite into
orbit in 2012.
20.
China’s rising does not mean that it will
choose to be integrated into the global liberal economic order. “In essence the problem is this: A rules-based system of entities competing
against each other through a commercially driven process seeks to circumscribe
the role and capacity of governments (and political parties) to intervene in
economic activity. It quarantines
economic activity from political interference by governments to the extent
possible, and it allows the logic of commercial rather than political interests
to play out. It respects ordered but
genuine markets. The CCP ultimately
seeks opposite ends.” (Lee, 2012, p. 38) “Since retaining power remains the CCP’s
paramount priority, Chinese economic entities, especially those directly owned
by the state, remain latent tools not just of statecraft but also of regime
security within its evolved “Leninist worldview.” (Lee, 2012, p.
38)
21.
As the U. S. succeeds in the “war on terror”
in the Middle East Al-Qaeda expands into Africa. In 2013 France intervenes in Mali and U. S.
sends troops to Niger.
22. April 2013, Boston Marathon bombing by two
Chechen men.
II. Fundamental
Purpose of the United States
III. The New
World [dis]Order
President Bush’s vision of a new world order has been overtaken by
the reality of world disorder. Building on the experience of Pakistan/Bangladesh
in 1971, Yugoslavia 1991, Congo Brazzavile 1993; Rwanda 1994, and predicting
events in Iraq after the U. S. invasion, Stephan van Evera observed,
“Democratization of multiethnic authoritarian states can spark civil wars…
[D]emocracies are less adept at aggregating interests and dampening inter-group
violence than authoritarian regimes.
Hence the removal of the authoritarian lid will unleash the dogs of
civil war.” (Evera S. V., 1996)
IV. Underlying Conflicts Among Nations
In Fire In The East: The Rise of Asian Military
Power and the Second Nuclear Age, an analysis of the dawning of a “second nuclear
age”, (Bracken, 1999) Yale’s Paul Bracken has drawn attention
to the ascent of blood-and-soil nationalism in Asia. In discussing the
acquisition of nuclear technology by China, Iran, India, Pakistan and other
powers on the Asian continent, he writes:
The link to
nationalism makes the second nuclear age even harder for the West to
comprehend. Nationalism is not viewed kindly in the West these days. It is seen
as nonsensical, a throwback, and, it is hoped, a dying force in the world. The
notion that the Chinese or Indians could conduct foreign policy on the
assumption of their own national superiority goes against nearly every
important trend in American and West European thought.
Bracken observes that successful
nuclear tests in places like India and Pakistan “set off public
euphoria—literally, people danced in the streets.” It was an “emotional embrace
of a technology Westerners have been taught to loathe and abhor.” Americans
forget how in the 1950s the atomic bomb “was an important source of American
pride”, so we should not “be surprised that Asian countries today feel the same
way.” Bracken thus warns:
In focusing on whether the West can keep its lead in technology, the United States is asking the wrong question. It overlooks the military advantages that accrue to societies with a less fastidious approach to violence. In such a world, the real threat to our national security may be our own lack of faith in ourselves, meaning not just faith in a God who has a special care for America, but faith in the American national enterprise itself, in whatever form. This lack of faith in turn leads to an overdependence on ever more antiseptic military technology. But our near obsession with finding ways to kill others at no risk to our own troops is a sign of strength in our eyes alone. To faithful or merely nationalist enemies, it is a sign of weakness, even cowardic
Within
this context, it is worth keeping in mind Stephen van Evera’s aphorism: “Nationalism is now and will continue to be
the atomic energy of politics.” (Evera S. V., 1996)
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