Consequences for Theory [Clausewitz’ Trinity]
War is more that a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of [i] primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [ii] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [iii] of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. (Book One, Chapter One, § 28, p. 89).
The first of these three aspects mainly concern the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. (Book One, Chapter One, § 28, p. 89).
COMMENT: Clausewitz’ Trinity of War
• People—violence, passion
• Commander and Army—chance
• Government—establishes policies for war and ensures subordination to policy
Sunday, July 29, 2012
Sunday, June 3, 2012
On War Part II
Modifications in Practice [from abstract extremes].
COMMENT: Clausewitz acknowledges that extremes are logical results of theoretical terms, which themselves are useless in actual action. In this regard, nuclear threats imply new global perception of threat (the end of sovereignty and neutrality). Forces are geared to air defense with expanded view of defense to a much wider area. Martin van Creveld "Eternal Clausewitz" in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. by Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 42-43). Thermonuclear threats imply greater destruction and numbers of weapons. Options more limited. Nuclear war moved from Clausewitz’ definition of absolute war from a Platonic ideal to a physical possibility, i.e., war consisting of single short but massive blow. (David Jablonski, Why Strategy is Difficult)
Without limitations on new technology, Clausewitz’ connection between military strategy at the apex of a vertical continuum; and policy represented by sum total of national strategy on a horizontal plane is broken. Thus victory in total war becomes meaningless. For example, with respect to nuclear weapons, “a people saved by us through our free use of nuclear weapons over their territories would probably be the last that would ever ask us to help them.” (Bernard Brodie, “More About Limited War,” World Politics 10, no. 1 (October 1957), 117).
Thus in the field of abstract thought although the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme, for here it is dealing with an extreme; a clash of forcers freely operating and obedient to no law but their own. (Book One, Chapter One, § 6, p. 78).
Clausewitz recognizes that when one moves from the abstract world to the real world things look different.
In the abstract world, optimism was all-powerful and forced us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it. Would this ever be the case in practice? Yes, it would if: (a) was were wholly an isolated act, occurring suddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world; (b) it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones; (c) the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, influenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about.
Modifying Condition 1: War is Never and Isolated Act
Of the conditions described in (a) to (c) above, first, the power of resistance of neither opponent is an entire unknown, not even the power of will.
The will [of each opponent] is not a wholly unknown factor [to the other opponent]; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it spread instantaneously… Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides and therefore constitute a moderating force. (Book One, Chapter One, § 7, p. 78).
Modifying Condition 2: War Does Not Consist of a Single Short Blow
But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
[A]s soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes and, if for no other reason, the interaction of the tow sided tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
By resources in question, Clausewitz is referring to “the fighting forces proper, the country with its physical features and population, and its allies.” [italics in original] (id.)
the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces… Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real, objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts, and the tendency towards extremes is once again reduced by this interaction. (Book One, Chapter One, § 8, p. 80).
Modifying Condition 3: In War the Result is Never Final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80).
Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be applied. Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Naturally probabilities are based on assessments of the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of affairs of each side relative the other—war is interactive. What applies to one side applies to the other in correlative fashion. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Political Object Now Comes to the Fore Again
The law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless overshadows the political object of war.
But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, pp. 80-81).
The political object –the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement… We can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. [the outcome cannot be calculated with mathematical fashion]… Between two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect—a real explosion.
This is equally true of the efforts a political object is expected to arous in either state, and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes the political and military objective is the same—for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations…
Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases in predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistence wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, p. 81).
GIV Comment: See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 87 [cite]. Aristotle says that political science is the most authoritative—determines what sciences are necessary in states. Strategy is subordinate to it—a subset. Politics makes use of strategy as rules what people may or may not do. Clausewitz, in my estimate, gets the idea of politics guiding war from Aristotle.
Only One Consideration Can Suspend Military Action, And It Seems That It Can Never Be Present on More Than One Side
If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover so long as they remain under arms (do not negotiate a settlement) that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it: a desire to wait for a better settlement before acting…
But an absolute balance of forces cannot bring about a standstill, for if such a balance should exists the initiative would necessarily belong to the side with the positive purpose—the attacker.
One could, however, conceive of a state of balance in which the side with the positive aim (the side with the stronger grounds for action) was the one that had the weaker forces. The balance would then result from the combined effects of aim and strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 13, p. 82).
Continuity Would Thus Be Brought About in Military Action and Would Again Intensify Everything
If this continuity were to really exist in the campaign its effect would again be to drive everything to extremes… But war, of course, seldom if ever shows such continuity. In numerous conflicts only a very small paart of the time is occupied by action, while the rest is spent in inactivity. This cannot always be an anomaly. Suspension of action in war must be possible; in other words, it is not a contradiction in terms. (Book One, Chapter One, § 14, p. 83).
Principle of Polarity
By thinking that the interests of the two commanders are opposed in equal measure to each other, we have assumed a genuine polarity… The principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same object, in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another out. In a battle each side aims at victory; that is a case of true polarity, since the victory of one side excludes the victory of the other. When, however, we are dealing with two different things that have a common relation external to themselves, the polarity lies not in the things but in their relationship. (Book One, Chapter One, § 15, p. 83).
Attack and Defense Being Things Different in Kind and Unequal in Strength, Polarity Cannot Be Applied to Them
[I]f the only differences between attack and defense lay in the fact that attack has a positive aim whereas defense does not, and the forms of fighting were identical; then every advantage gained by one side would be a precisely equal disadvantage to the other—true polarity would exist. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 83).
GIV COMMENT: This is debatable because a defense can have a positive aim, e.g., wear down the enemy in order to bleed him and prepare for a counter attack as was the case in the Battle of Moscow between October and December 1941. This is Mao Zedong’s premise for guerrilla war.
But there are two distinct forms of action in war: attack and defense… the two are very different and unequal in strength. Polarity, then, does not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both seek to achieve: the decision. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 84).
The Superiority of Defense over Attack Often Destroys the Effect of Polarity, and This Explains the Suspension of Military Action
[D]efense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. Consequently we must ask whether the advantage of postponing a decision is as great for one side as the advantage of defense is for the other… the superiority of the defensive… explains without any inconsistency most periods of inaction that occur in war. The weaker the motives for the action, the more will they be overlaid and neutralized but this disparity between attack and defense, and the more frequently will action be suspended—as indeed experience shows. (Book One, Chapter One, § 17, p. 84).
A Second Cause is Imperfect Knowledge of the Situation
There is still another fact that can bring military action to a standstill: imperfect knowledge of the situation… it must rank among the natural causes which, without entailing inconsistency, can bring military activity to a halt. Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy’s strength too high than too low, such is human nature… The possibility of inaction has a further moderating effect on the progess of the war by diluting it, so to speak, in time by delaying danger, and by increading the means of restoring a balance between the two sides. The greater the tensions that have led to a war, and the greater the consequent war effort, the shorter these periods of inaction. Inversely, the weaker the motive for conflict, the longer the intervals between actions. For the stronger motive increases willpower, and will power, as we know, is always both an element in and the product of strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 18, p. 84-85).
Frequent Periods of Inaction Remove War Still Further from the Realm of the Absolute and Make it Even More a Matter of Assessing Probabilities
The slower the progress and the more frequent the interruptions of military action the easier it is to retrieve a mistake, the bolder will be the general’s assessments, and the more likely he will be to avoid theoretical extremes and to base his plans on probability and inference. Any given situation requires that probabilities be calculated in the light of circumstances, and the amount of time available for such calculation will depend on the pace with which operations are taking place. (Book One, Chapter One, § 19, p. 85).
Therefore Only the Element of Chance is Needed to Make War a Gamble, and That Element is Never Absent
[T]he objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble—chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 20, p. 85).
Not Only Its Objective But Also its Subjective Nature Makes War a Gamble
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war—the means by which war has to be fought—it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which was exists is danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 85).
In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 86).
COMMENT: Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasili I. Chuikov “The Battle for Stalingrad”—“But for success in battle beautifully drawn maps count for very little. A good strategic or operational plan needs to be implemented in good time, needs good tactics and the flexible handling of armies. But when a decision is taken late, it will inevitably be carried out in haste. In such cases, there will as a rule be a lack of organization and co-ordination.” This is the reality of war: maps and calculations count for very little.
How in General This Best Suits Human Nature
Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating… Should theory leave us here, and cheerfully go on elaborating absolute conclusions and prescriptions? Then it would be no use at all in real life. No, it must also take the human factor into account, and find room for courage, boldness, even foolhardiness. The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as in the smallest. With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be through into the other to correct the balance. The greater they are, the greater the margin that can be left for accidents. Thus courage and self confidence are essential in war, and theory should propose only rules that give ample scope to these finest and least dispensable of military virtues, in all their degrees and variations. (Book One, Chapter One, § 22, p. 86).
But War is Nonetheless a Serious Means to a Serious End: A More Precise Definition of War
When whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy… War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy… If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process with can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 23, p. 86-87).
War is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains particular to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object if the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. (Book One, Chapter One, § 24, p. 87).
The Diverse Nature of War
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the close will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political [as opposed to military] in character. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 87-88).
[re emotions may be aroused to the point that the political factor cannot control them] Yet such a conflict will not occur very often, for if the motivations are so powerful there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. [jus in bellum—proportionality of means] On the other hand, if policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 88).
The Effect of This Point of View on the Understanding of Military History and the Foundations of Theory
[All wars can be considered an act of policy (§ 26)] First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88).
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander must have to make it to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88-89).
COMMENT: Clausewitz acknowledges that extremes are logical results of theoretical terms, which themselves are useless in actual action. In this regard, nuclear threats imply new global perception of threat (the end of sovereignty and neutrality). Forces are geared to air defense with expanded view of defense to a much wider area. Martin van Creveld "Eternal Clausewitz" in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. by Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 42-43). Thermonuclear threats imply greater destruction and numbers of weapons. Options more limited. Nuclear war moved from Clausewitz’ definition of absolute war from a Platonic ideal to a physical possibility, i.e., war consisting of single short but massive blow. (David Jablonski, Why Strategy is Difficult)
Without limitations on new technology, Clausewitz’ connection between military strategy at the apex of a vertical continuum; and policy represented by sum total of national strategy on a horizontal plane is broken. Thus victory in total war becomes meaningless. For example, with respect to nuclear weapons, “a people saved by us through our free use of nuclear weapons over their territories would probably be the last that would ever ask us to help them.” (Bernard Brodie, “More About Limited War,” World Politics 10, no. 1 (October 1957), 117).
Thus in the field of abstract thought although the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme, for here it is dealing with an extreme; a clash of forcers freely operating and obedient to no law but their own. (Book One, Chapter One, § 6, p. 78).
Clausewitz recognizes that when one moves from the abstract world to the real world things look different.
In the abstract world, optimism was all-powerful and forced us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it. Would this ever be the case in practice? Yes, it would if: (a) was were wholly an isolated act, occurring suddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world; (b) it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones; (c) the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, influenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about.
Modifying Condition 1: War is Never and Isolated Act
Of the conditions described in (a) to (c) above, first, the power of resistance of neither opponent is an entire unknown, not even the power of will.
The will [of each opponent] is not a wholly unknown factor [to the other opponent]; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it spread instantaneously… Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides and therefore constitute a moderating force. (Book One, Chapter One, § 7, p. 78).
Modifying Condition 2: War Does Not Consist of a Single Short Blow
But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
[A]s soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes and, if for no other reason, the interaction of the tow sided tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 79).
By resources in question, Clausewitz is referring to “the fighting forces proper, the country with its physical features and population, and its allies.” [italics in original] (id.)
the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces… Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real, objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts, and the tendency towards extremes is once again reduced by this interaction. (Book One, Chapter One, § 8, p. 80).
Modifying Condition 3: In War the Result is Never Final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort. (Book One, Chapter One, § 9, p. 80).
Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be applied. Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Naturally probabilities are based on assessments of the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of affairs of each side relative the other—war is interactive. What applies to one side applies to the other in correlative fashion. (Book One, Chapter One, § 10, p. 80).
Political Object Now Comes to the Fore Again
The law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless overshadows the political object of war.
But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, pp. 80-81).
The political object –the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement… We can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. [the outcome cannot be calculated with mathematical fashion]… Between two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect—a real explosion.
This is equally true of the efforts a political object is expected to arous in either state, and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes the political and military objective is the same—for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations…
Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases in predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistence wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. (Book One, Chapter One, § 11, p. 81).
GIV Comment: See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 87 [cite]. Aristotle says that political science is the most authoritative—determines what sciences are necessary in states. Strategy is subordinate to it—a subset. Politics makes use of strategy as rules what people may or may not do. Clausewitz, in my estimate, gets the idea of politics guiding war from Aristotle.
Only One Consideration Can Suspend Military Action, And It Seems That It Can Never Be Present on More Than One Side
If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover so long as they remain under arms (do not negotiate a settlement) that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it: a desire to wait for a better settlement before acting…
But an absolute balance of forces cannot bring about a standstill, for if such a balance should exists the initiative would necessarily belong to the side with the positive purpose—the attacker.
One could, however, conceive of a state of balance in which the side with the positive aim (the side with the stronger grounds for action) was the one that had the weaker forces. The balance would then result from the combined effects of aim and strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 13, p. 82).
Continuity Would Thus Be Brought About in Military Action and Would Again Intensify Everything
If this continuity were to really exist in the campaign its effect would again be to drive everything to extremes… But war, of course, seldom if ever shows such continuity. In numerous conflicts only a very small paart of the time is occupied by action, while the rest is spent in inactivity. This cannot always be an anomaly. Suspension of action in war must be possible; in other words, it is not a contradiction in terms. (Book One, Chapter One, § 14, p. 83).
Principle of Polarity
By thinking that the interests of the two commanders are opposed in equal measure to each other, we have assumed a genuine polarity… The principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same object, in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another out. In a battle each side aims at victory; that is a case of true polarity, since the victory of one side excludes the victory of the other. When, however, we are dealing with two different things that have a common relation external to themselves, the polarity lies not in the things but in their relationship. (Book One, Chapter One, § 15, p. 83).
Attack and Defense Being Things Different in Kind and Unequal in Strength, Polarity Cannot Be Applied to Them
[I]f the only differences between attack and defense lay in the fact that attack has a positive aim whereas defense does not, and the forms of fighting were identical; then every advantage gained by one side would be a precisely equal disadvantage to the other—true polarity would exist. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 83).
GIV COMMENT: This is debatable because a defense can have a positive aim, e.g., wear down the enemy in order to bleed him and prepare for a counter attack as was the case in the Battle of Moscow between October and December 1941. This is Mao Zedong’s premise for guerrilla war.
But there are two distinct forms of action in war: attack and defense… the two are very different and unequal in strength. Polarity, then, does not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both seek to achieve: the decision. (Book One, Chapter One, § 16, p. 84).
The Superiority of Defense over Attack Often Destroys the Effect of Polarity, and This Explains the Suspension of Military Action
[D]efense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. Consequently we must ask whether the advantage of postponing a decision is as great for one side as the advantage of defense is for the other… the superiority of the defensive… explains without any inconsistency most periods of inaction that occur in war. The weaker the motives for the action, the more will they be overlaid and neutralized but this disparity between attack and defense, and the more frequently will action be suspended—as indeed experience shows. (Book One, Chapter One, § 17, p. 84).
A Second Cause is Imperfect Knowledge of the Situation
There is still another fact that can bring military action to a standstill: imperfect knowledge of the situation… it must rank among the natural causes which, without entailing inconsistency, can bring military activity to a halt. Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy’s strength too high than too low, such is human nature… The possibility of inaction has a further moderating effect on the progess of the war by diluting it, so to speak, in time by delaying danger, and by increading the means of restoring a balance between the two sides. The greater the tensions that have led to a war, and the greater the consequent war effort, the shorter these periods of inaction. Inversely, the weaker the motive for conflict, the longer the intervals between actions. For the stronger motive increases willpower, and will power, as we know, is always both an element in and the product of strength. (Book One, Chapter One, § 18, p. 84-85).
Frequent Periods of Inaction Remove War Still Further from the Realm of the Absolute and Make it Even More a Matter of Assessing Probabilities
The slower the progress and the more frequent the interruptions of military action the easier it is to retrieve a mistake, the bolder will be the general’s assessments, and the more likely he will be to avoid theoretical extremes and to base his plans on probability and inference. Any given situation requires that probabilities be calculated in the light of circumstances, and the amount of time available for such calculation will depend on the pace with which operations are taking place. (Book One, Chapter One, § 19, p. 85).
Therefore Only the Element of Chance is Needed to Make War a Gamble, and That Element is Never Absent
[T]he objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble—chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 20, p. 85).
Not Only Its Objective But Also its Subjective Nature Makes War a Gamble
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war—the means by which war has to be fought—it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which was exists is danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 85).
In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards. (Book One, Chapter One, § 21, p. 86).
COMMENT: Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasili I. Chuikov “The Battle for Stalingrad”—“But for success in battle beautifully drawn maps count for very little. A good strategic or operational plan needs to be implemented in good time, needs good tactics and the flexible handling of armies. But when a decision is taken late, it will inevitably be carried out in haste. In such cases, there will as a rule be a lack of organization and co-ordination.” This is the reality of war: maps and calculations count for very little.
How in General This Best Suits Human Nature
Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating… Should theory leave us here, and cheerfully go on elaborating absolute conclusions and prescriptions? Then it would be no use at all in real life. No, it must also take the human factor into account, and find room for courage, boldness, even foolhardiness. The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as in the smallest. With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be through into the other to correct the balance. The greater they are, the greater the margin that can be left for accidents. Thus courage and self confidence are essential in war, and theory should propose only rules that give ample scope to these finest and least dispensable of military virtues, in all their degrees and variations. (Book One, Chapter One, § 22, p. 86).
But War is Nonetheless a Serious Means to a Serious End: A More Precise Definition of War
When whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy… War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy… If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process with can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 23, p. 86-87).
War is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains particular to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object if the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. (Book One, Chapter One, § 24, p. 87).
The Diverse Nature of War
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the close will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political [as opposed to military] in character. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 87-88).
[re emotions may be aroused to the point that the political factor cannot control them] Yet such a conflict will not occur very often, for if the motivations are so powerful there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. [jus in bellum—proportionality of means] On the other hand, if policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back. (Book One, Chapter One, § 25, p. 88).
The Effect of This Point of View on the Understanding of Military History and the Foundations of Theory
[All wars can be considered an act of policy (§ 26)] First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88).
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander must have to make it to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (Book One, Chapter One, § 27, p. 88-89).
Saturday, May 26, 2012
NOTES TO ON WAR BY CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT: As a B-52 Electronic Warfare Officer in the former Strategic Air Command, U. S. Air Force, I remember the first time I saw a nuclear bomb: A B28FI with a 1.1 Mt warhead. (Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vo1. 1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. Ballinger, 1984, p. 42). My first thoughts were “This is it? This is all there is to it?” I can say without doubt that this remains the most anti-climatic experience I’ve had as an individual. Yet even then I knew that the “wimpy” visual belied a truly awesome and frightening possibility: If ordered by national command authorities, we would fly and drop this thing; which would destroy the assigned target…
As I developed professionally, the answer to those questions grew ever more complex and meanings more shaded. But its basis remains: What is war? What is the meaning of war in the nuclear age? The answer begins with Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.Princeton University
On War by Carl von Clausewitz
It’s important to note that only Book One of “On War” is the only book that Clausewitz considered as complete. Peter Paret considers Books Three (On Strategy in General) and Eight (On War Plans) as the most beneficial and integrated with respect to Book One.
1.0 BOOK ONE: ON THE NATURE OF WAR
Chapter One: What is War?
Definition. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.
COMMENT: Clausewitz does not believe in international law and custom as a means to limit war:
Attached to force as certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force—that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law—is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. (Book One, Chapter One, § 2, p. 75)
The Maximum Use of Force. COMMENT: Interesting comment particularly apropos to those who dismiss Clausewitz in favor of the (apparent) bloodless wars advocated by Sun Tzu as the epitome of military art.
Kind-hearted people might of course there was some ingenious way to disarm of defeat and enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 75)
Extremes. COMMENT: Clausewitz’ concept of each side driving the other to extremes. From the 20th century forward, the development of nuclear weapons thus their possible and/or probable use, forces us to grapple with the theoretical concept of extremes.
If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 75-76)
Incompatibility of Moderation in Theory of War. COMMENT: Clausewitz does not contend that moderation does not exist in war. These are the forces that give rise to the war, and likewise “circumscribe and moderate it.” Rather he says that these forces cannot be part of the theory of war—because these forces exist before the fighting starts.
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. … To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: Given the horrific destructive global wars of the 20th century, one can surely debate the culturally-affected opening sentence of the paragraph above. However, it is clear of what Clausewitz is referring to—social conditions affect the methods of war. What he did not predict is the effect of technology on wars as a destroyer of worlds.
Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter, since it is the universal element. … Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth … Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: The Nazi experience speaks for itself on this point.
Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces—comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
Theorists were already beginning to think along such lines when the recent wars taught them a lesson. If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, but they will still affect it to some degree, and the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization but on how important the conflicting interests are an on how long their conflicts lasts. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
First Case of Interaction and First Extreme.
The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.
The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels an opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first “extreme” [italics in original] we meet with. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 76-77)
Aim is to Disarm the Enemy: Second Case of Interaction and Second Extreme.
The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. If follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him … must always be the aim of warfare. (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77)
War [says Clausewitz is not between a living force and a lifeless mass – total non resistance is not war] but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. This is the second case of interaction and it leads to the second “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77).
Maximum Exertion of Strength. Third Extreme.
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will … Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes. This is the third case of interaction and the third “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 5, p. 77).
COMMENT: The idea of total war approaches Clausewitz’s concept of extremes in war. As the entry for “total war [sic]”in the Oxford Companion to Military History states: “total war is one in which the whole population and all the resources of the combatants are committed to complete victory and thus become legitimate military targets.” (TheOxford Oxford University
Next Entry to Follow: Modifications in Practice [from abstract extremes].
As I developed professionally, the answer to those questions grew ever more complex and meanings more shaded. But its basis remains: What is war? What is the meaning of war in the nuclear age? The answer begins with Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
On War by Carl von Clausewitz
It’s important to note that only Book One of “On War” is the only book that Clausewitz considered as complete. Peter Paret considers Books Three (On Strategy in General) and Eight (On War Plans) as the most beneficial and integrated with respect to Book One.
1.0 BOOK ONE: ON THE NATURE OF WAR
Chapter One: What is War?
Definition. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.[italics in original] (On War, Book One, Chapter One, § 2, p. 75)
COMMENT: Clausewitz does not believe in international law and custom as a means to limit war:
Attached to force as certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force—that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law—is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. (Book One, Chapter One, § 2, p. 75)
The Maximum Use of Force. COMMENT: Interesting comment particularly apropos to those who dismiss Clausewitz in favor of the (apparent) bloodless wars advocated by Sun Tzu as the epitome of military art.
Kind-hearted people might of course there was some ingenious way to disarm of defeat and enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 75)
Extremes. COMMENT: Clausewitz’ concept of each side driving the other to extremes. From the 20th century forward, the development of nuclear weapons thus their possible and/or probable use, forces us to grapple with the theoretical concept of extremes.
If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 75-76)
Incompatibility of Moderation in Theory of War. COMMENT: Clausewitz does not contend that moderation does not exist in war. These are the forces that give rise to the war, and likewise “circumscribe and moderate it.” Rather he says that these forces cannot be part of the theory of war—because these forces exist before the fighting starts.
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. … To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: Given the horrific destructive global wars of the 20th century, one can surely debate the culturally-affected opening sentence of the paragraph above. However, it is clear of what Clausewitz is referring to—social conditions affect the methods of war. What he did not predict is the effect of technology on wars as a destroyer of worlds.
Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter, since it is the universal element. … Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth … Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
COMMENT: The Nazi experience speaks for itself on this point.
Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces—comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
Theorists were already beginning to think along such lines when the recent wars taught them a lesson. If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, but they will still affect it to some degree, and the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization but on how important the conflicting interests are an on how long their conflicts lasts. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, p. 76)
First Case of Interaction and First Extreme.
The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.
The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels an opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first “extreme” [italics in original] we meet with. (Book One, Chapter One, § 3, pp. 76-77)
Aim is to Disarm the Enemy: Second Case of Interaction and Second Extreme.
The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. If follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him … must always be the aim of warfare. (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77)
War [says Clausewitz is not between a living force and a lifeless mass – total non resistance is not war] but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. This is the second case of interaction and it leads to the second “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 4, pp. 77).
Maximum Exertion of Strength. Third Extreme.
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will … Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes. This is the third case of interaction and the third “extreme.” (Italics in original) (Book One, Chapter One, § 5, p. 77).
COMMENT: The idea of total war approaches Clausewitz’s concept of extremes in war. As the entry for “total war [sic]”in the Oxford Companion to Military History states: “total war is one in which the whole population and all the resources of the combatants are committed to complete victory and thus become legitimate military targets.” (The
Next Entry to Follow: Modifications in Practice [from abstract extremes].
Monday, May 21, 2012
Aims and Lessons of War
The Aim of War is to Achieve Political Objectives
Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Shaposhnikov captured the essence of war in military-political terms:
"[A] war must begin with the defeat of the strongest and most dangerous enemy, and it must not be diverted by successes over a weak one by leaving the stronger to hang over one’s neck... It must be not forgotten that for the resolution of a war, it is important to have not only military successes, but also obtain political success, that is, win a victory over a politically important enemy ... Otherwise, only after an extended period accompanied even by military successes, will we be forced to return to the same fight against the main enemy against which we initially were only on the defensive." (David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 42.)
Lessons of the Cold War
George Kennan in discussing American foreign policy and democracy notes that we made two big boo-boos dugint the cold war. (1) to attribute to the “Soviet leadership aims and intentions it did not really have; in jumping to conclusion that the Soviet leaders were just like Hitler and his associates…” with the same aspirations, timetable, and who could only be dealt with in the same manner as Hitler was. (2) The second postwar mistake was to embrace the nuclear weapon “the mainstay of our military posture, and the faith we placed in it to assure our military and political ascendancy in this postwar era.” (George F. Kennan, At a Century’s Ending. Reflections 1982-1995 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), p. 130.)
It is from these two great mistakes that there has flowed, as I see it, the extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this postwar age. And this is a militarization that has had profound effects not just on our foreign policies but also on our own society… And this habit—the habit of pouring so great a part of our gross national product year after year into sterile and socially negative forms of production—has now risen to the status of what I have ventured to call a genuine national addiction. We could not now break ourselves of the habit without the serious of withdrawal symptoms. Millions of people, is addition to those other millions who are in uniform, have become accustomed to deriving their livelihood from the military-industrial complex. Thousands of firms have become dependent on it, not to mention labor unions and communities. It is the main source of our highly destabilizing budgetary deficit. An elaborate and most unhealthy bond has been created between those who manufacture and sell the armaments and those in Washington who buy them. We have created immense vested interests in the maintenance of a huge armed establishment in time of peace and in the export of great quantities of arms to other peoples—great vested interests, in other words, in the Cold War. We have made ourselves dependent on this invidious national practice; so much so that it may fairly be said that if we did not have the Russians and their alleged iniquities to serve as a rationalization for it, we would have to invent some adversary to take their place—which would be hard to do. [My highlight]
Kennan notes that the problem is made worse by the unnecessary wastefulness of it all, the lack of coherent relationship between the way Congress figures out civilian and military costs.
It sometimes seems to me that those of us not involved in this great military-industrial enterprise are in danger of becoming, in the figurative sense, a nation of camp followers, like the pathetic civilian stragglers who trailed along behind the European armies of earlier centuries in the hopes of picking up remnants from the relative abundance of the military resources of food and clothing which the armies disposed.
And because of these requirements we need to keep demonizing our opponent and giving him qualities which make them 10 feet tall in order to justify the military-industrial requirements which become self-generating.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Shaposhnikov captured the essence of war in military-political terms:
"[A] war must begin with the defeat of the strongest and most dangerous enemy, and it must not be diverted by successes over a weak one by leaving the stronger to hang over one’s neck... It must be not forgotten that for the resolution of a war, it is important to have not only military successes, but also obtain political success, that is, win a victory over a politically important enemy ... Otherwise, only after an extended period accompanied even by military successes, will we be forced to return to the same fight against the main enemy against which we initially were only on the defensive." (David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 42.)
Lessons of the Cold War
George Kennan in discussing American foreign policy and democracy notes that we made two big boo-boos dugint the cold war. (1) to attribute to the “Soviet leadership aims and intentions it did not really have; in jumping to conclusion that the Soviet leaders were just like Hitler and his associates…” with the same aspirations, timetable, and who could only be dealt with in the same manner as Hitler was. (2) The second postwar mistake was to embrace the nuclear weapon “the mainstay of our military posture, and the faith we placed in it to assure our military and political ascendancy in this postwar era.” (George F. Kennan, At a Century’s Ending. Reflections 1982-1995 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), p. 130.)
It is from these two great mistakes that there has flowed, as I see it, the extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this postwar age. And this is a militarization that has had profound effects not just on our foreign policies but also on our own society… And this habit—the habit of pouring so great a part of our gross national product year after year into sterile and socially negative forms of production—has now risen to the status of what I have ventured to call a genuine national addiction. We could not now break ourselves of the habit without the serious of withdrawal symptoms. Millions of people, is addition to those other millions who are in uniform, have become accustomed to deriving their livelihood from the military-industrial complex. Thousands of firms have become dependent on it, not to mention labor unions and communities. It is the main source of our highly destabilizing budgetary deficit. An elaborate and most unhealthy bond has been created between those who manufacture and sell the armaments and those in Washington who buy them. We have created immense vested interests in the maintenance of a huge armed establishment in time of peace and in the export of great quantities of arms to other peoples—great vested interests, in other words, in the Cold War. We have made ourselves dependent on this invidious national practice; so much so that it may fairly be said that if we did not have the Russians and their alleged iniquities to serve as a rationalization for it, we would have to invent some adversary to take their place—which would be hard to do. [My highlight]
Kennan notes that the problem is made worse by the unnecessary wastefulness of it all, the lack of coherent relationship between the way Congress figures out civilian and military costs.
It sometimes seems to me that those of us not involved in this great military-industrial enterprise are in danger of becoming, in the figurative sense, a nation of camp followers, like the pathetic civilian stragglers who trailed along behind the European armies of earlier centuries in the hopes of picking up remnants from the relative abundance of the military resources of food and clothing which the armies disposed.
And because of these requirements we need to keep demonizing our opponent and giving him qualities which make them 10 feet tall in order to justify the military-industrial requirements which become self-generating.
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
Some Thoughts on Future War
North Korea clearly has chosen to pursue nuclear-based security to prevent itself from being coerced politically and militarily by the United States, and gain political respect and legitimacy as a regional power. The nuclear option is insurance against defeat and/or humiliation at the hands of the United States, South Korea, or anyone else. It is worth pondering that as the force structure and technological capabilities that the United States displayed in recent wars are beyond the capacity of any nation in the foreseeable future, the only recourse available to a developing power is the cheaper and more accessible nuclear/ballistic missile option.
Paradoxically, America's search for a conventional combat capability in order to preclude nuclear war has proven so successful, that others seek to counter this capability through nuclear forces. Iraq could have drastically altered the outcome of the war, politically in particular, had they used SCUD attacks earlier and with more powerful warheads. Iraq's missile force structure was both logical and affordable; its poor execution and lack of punch is what rendered it ineffective. We cannot use this lack of combat effectiveness as a planning factor, for other nations may prove better capable of effective employment.
For example, during the Falklands War, Argentina successfully used their very limited number of Exocet missiles to cause considerable damage to the British Nave. Despite recent failures, North Korea's missiles are bound to perform better after failures are studied and corrected. Massive strikes, properly timed and combining alternate conventional, chemical, and/or nuclear warheads can create widespread damage, both in military terms and more importantly in political terms which will dictate the war's tempo and determine what outcome will follow. Strategically, a nation equipped with a missile force which is facing a far better armed and more capable opponent will seek to retain a retaliatory capability, with a secure reserve force which will guarantee unacceptable pain, or cause sufficient doubt as to intentions and capabilities upon the enemy, thus allowing for the maximum room for political maneuver. Our future adversaries will combine mobile missiles for offensive operations, dispersing them in depth, using active deception measures for protection and ensuring its operational capacity. This is the face of future war.
A key doctrinal question that we must answer in future war is what will air superiority do for us against an opponent who combines a nuclear missile force with moderate war aims? Another question we must address is how will we be able to deal with a strategic fait-accompli, such as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, before being able to deploy our assets? We must focus on building missile targeting and guidance capabilities, and defenses against missiles rather than stressing the role which airpower played in the Gulf and in Iraq/Afghanistan. In this area space forces can be most useful, providing real-time target updates, reconnaissance, and course correction/guidance to anti-ballistic missiles or offensive weapons.
Warfare is Darwinistic by nature; survival of the fittest is what it is all about. In future war, an opponent may alternately seek to withstand initial blows through dispersion of forces/maskirovka, and selectively attack high value targets with weapons of mass destruction or launch early preemptive attacks against our base/staging areas. On the other hand, it may engage in more subtle operations designed to wear us down politically as was done in Vietnam. In many respects, Maoist protracted guerrilla war strategy is most apropos for this type of future warfare by deception, using missile forces for political effects through military coercion: the enemy attacks, we retreat; the enemy encamps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy flees, we pursue. What will superior technology/air superiority do for us?
Victory in war does not guarantee future success. Airpower has matured and we can take pride in its merits, but these merits cannot blind us to its limitations vis a vis the changing complexion of war. As our defense budget decreases along with our military-industrial capabilities, is an air campaign the answer to future warfare against a nuclear missile armed adversary? We must address these issues now; tomorrow they will be upon us.
Paradoxically, America's search for a conventional combat capability in order to preclude nuclear war has proven so successful, that others seek to counter this capability through nuclear forces. Iraq could have drastically altered the outcome of the war, politically in particular, had they used SCUD attacks earlier and with more powerful warheads. Iraq's missile force structure was both logical and affordable; its poor execution and lack of punch is what rendered it ineffective. We cannot use this lack of combat effectiveness as a planning factor, for other nations may prove better capable of effective employment.
For example, during the Falklands War, Argentina successfully used their very limited number of Exocet missiles to cause considerable damage to the British Nave. Despite recent failures, North Korea's missiles are bound to perform better after failures are studied and corrected. Massive strikes, properly timed and combining alternate conventional, chemical, and/or nuclear warheads can create widespread damage, both in military terms and more importantly in political terms which will dictate the war's tempo and determine what outcome will follow. Strategically, a nation equipped with a missile force which is facing a far better armed and more capable opponent will seek to retain a retaliatory capability, with a secure reserve force which will guarantee unacceptable pain, or cause sufficient doubt as to intentions and capabilities upon the enemy, thus allowing for the maximum room for political maneuver. Our future adversaries will combine mobile missiles for offensive operations, dispersing them in depth, using active deception measures for protection and ensuring its operational capacity. This is the face of future war.
A key doctrinal question that we must answer in future war is what will air superiority do for us against an opponent who combines a nuclear missile force with moderate war aims? Another question we must address is how will we be able to deal with a strategic fait-accompli, such as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, before being able to deploy our assets? We must focus on building missile targeting and guidance capabilities, and defenses against missiles rather than stressing the role which airpower played in the Gulf and in Iraq/Afghanistan. In this area space forces can be most useful, providing real-time target updates, reconnaissance, and course correction/guidance to anti-ballistic missiles or offensive weapons.
Warfare is Darwinistic by nature; survival of the fittest is what it is all about. In future war, an opponent may alternately seek to withstand initial blows through dispersion of forces/maskirovka, and selectively attack high value targets with weapons of mass destruction or launch early preemptive attacks against our base/staging areas. On the other hand, it may engage in more subtle operations designed to wear us down politically as was done in Vietnam. In many respects, Maoist protracted guerrilla war strategy is most apropos for this type of future warfare by deception, using missile forces for political effects through military coercion: the enemy attacks, we retreat; the enemy encamps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy flees, we pursue. What will superior technology/air superiority do for us?
Victory in war does not guarantee future success. Airpower has matured and we can take pride in its merits, but these merits cannot blind us to its limitations vis a vis the changing complexion of war. As our defense budget decreases along with our military-industrial capabilities, is an air campaign the answer to future warfare against a nuclear missile armed adversary? We must address these issues now; tomorrow they will be upon us.
Saturday, April 21, 2012
Policy Towards North Korea
North Korea is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma: but perhaps there is a key… to view its future direction. That key is contained in Marxist dogma.
In Anti-Dühring, in discussing the Franco-German war of 1870-1871, Engels made the following observation:
[T]his war [the Franco-German War] compelled all continental powers to introduce in a stricter form the Prussian Landwehr system [militia in addition to regular army], and with it a military burden which must bring them to ruin within a few years. The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the peoples are there only to provide soldiers and feed them. But this militarism also bears within it the seed of its own destruction. Competition among the individual state forces them, on the one hand, to spend more money each year on the army, navy, artillery, etc., thus more and more hastening their financial collapse; and, on the other hand, to resort to universal compulsory military service more and more extensively, thus in the long run making the whole people familiar with the use of arms, and therefore enabling them at a given moment to make their will prevail against the warlords in command. And this moment will arrive as soon as the mass of the people—town and country workers and peasants—will have a will. At this point the armies of the princes become transformed into armies of the people; the machine refuses to work and militarism collapses by the dialectics on its own evolution. (Marx-Engels, Collected Works (International Publishers 1987), Vol. 25, p. 158).
North Korea’s Songun or “military first” policy has become the main purpose of the state, an end in itself. The Korean Workers Party no longer controls the military but is controlled by it—violating Mao’s dictum. “Political power grows from the barrel of a gun. And the party must control the gun.” Now the gun controls the party and everything else.
However, North Korea’s effort to compete militarily against South Korea, the United States and pretty much everyone else… has in fact caused its financial collapse. Moreover, the complete militarization of the population clearly make the people familiar with the use of arms, enabling them to turn against the regime—as soon as the mass of the people will have a will.
Our policies should be to do everything possible to enable the Korean people to have a will… To will a self is to become a self (Nietzche). The North Korean people are intelligent, hard-working and their lives being made unnecessarily difficult by a group of militarists whose only aim is ultimately to protect their own status—at the expense of the people.
People are people; and as Abraham Lincoln said:
You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.
This is the information age. Our policy objective and task is to inform the North Korean people through any and all means available of the reality of the world at large and how their own government is fooling them. The Korean people will free themselves.
Gonzalo I. Vergara, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.).
Friday, April 13, 2012
North Korean Missile
In 2006 , the North Koreans detonated a nuclear weapon to demonstrate that they were not going to suffer "the miserable fate of Iraq." This refers to the United States complete superiority in conventional weapons and Iraq's inability to confront the US. The North Koreans believe that if Iraq had in fact had nuclear weapons, the US would not have attacked.
This is not a new strategic assessment. In 1993 the Indian Defense Minister stated that the lesson from the Gulf War is that the only way to confront the US or its proxies is to have nuclear weapons-. The result was the reactivation of India's nuclear weapons program, culminating in the detonation of 3 devices in 1998; or 24 years after the first Indian fission test on May 18, 1974.The latest North Korean action follows the total ruin of America's nuclear non-proliferation policy -- in the sands of Libya.
Gaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons program in exchange for reconciliation with the West. Yet he was attacked by American's proxies--the British and even the… pfffff French. If Gaddafi had nuclear weapons-- he would never have been attacked. Hence the North Koreans are saying in effect: "We have nuclear weapons and the delivery systems for them. We will not suffer the same miserable fate of Saddam Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi. Moreover, we have the ability to produce nuclear-armed missiles which we can sell -- for the right price."
The North Koreans are not going to give up their weapons in exchange for some rice and kimchii and our promises of "good will" … This is the legacy of our policy in Libya. And don't think for a moment that the Iranians are not thinking along the same lines.
The disastrous failure of American foreign policy in this area is inexcusable and must be attributed directly to the Obama administration. The Obama administration needs to reformulate what our national security priorities really are in this area; and the means by which to advance same: How are we going to prevent other regimes and/or organizations (re al-qaeda) from acquiring North Korean missiles w/nuclear weapons? The North Koreans have these systems--and we can't do anything about it. What we have to do is ensure that no one else will have access to these weapons. and what means we will use to enforce our policy.
This is not a new strategic assessment. In 1993 the Indian Defense Minister stated that the lesson from the Gulf War is that the only way to confront the US or its proxies is to have nuclear weapons-. The result was the reactivation of India's nuclear weapons program, culminating in the detonation of 3 devices in 1998; or 24 years after the first Indian fission test on May 18, 1974.The latest North Korean action follows the total ruin of America's nuclear non-proliferation policy -- in the sands of Libya.
Gaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons program in exchange for reconciliation with the West. Yet he was attacked by American's proxies--the British and even the… pfffff French. If Gaddafi had nuclear weapons-- he would never have been attacked. Hence the North Koreans are saying in effect: "We have nuclear weapons and the delivery systems for them. We will not suffer the same miserable fate of Saddam Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi. Moreover, we have the ability to produce nuclear-armed missiles which we can sell -- for the right price."
The North Koreans are not going to give up their weapons in exchange for some rice and kimchii and our promises of "good will" … This is the legacy of our policy in Libya. And don't think for a moment that the Iranians are not thinking along the same lines.
The disastrous failure of American foreign policy in this area is inexcusable and must be attributed directly to the Obama administration. The Obama administration needs to reformulate what our national security priorities really are in this area; and the means by which to advance same: How are we going to prevent other regimes and/or organizations (re al-qaeda) from acquiring North Korean missiles w/nuclear weapons? The North Koreans have these systems--and we can't do anything about it. What we have to do is ensure that no one else will have access to these weapons. and what means we will use to enforce our policy.
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